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1. Introduction
Natural language looms large in the cognitive lives of ordi-
nary folk. Although proportions vary, many people seem to
spend a good deal of their waking activity engaged in “in-
ner speech,” with imaged natural language sentences occu-
pying a significant proportion of the stream of their con-
scious mentality.
This bit of folk wisdom has been corroborated by Hurl-
burt (1990; 1993), who devised a method for sampling peo-
ple’s inner experience. Subjects wore headphones during
the course of the day, through which they heard, at various
intervals, a randomly generated series of bleeps. When they
heard a bleep, they were instructed to immediately “freeze”
what was passing through their consciousness at that exact
moment and then make a note of it, before elaborating on
it later in a follow-up interview. Although frequency varied
widely, all normal (as opposed to schizophrenic) subjects
reported experiencing inner speech on some occasions –
with the minimum being 7 percent of occasions sampled,
and the maximum being 80 percent. Most subjects re-
ported inner speech on more than half of the occasions
sampled. (The majority of subjects also reported the occur-
rence of visual images and emotional feelings – on between
0 percent and 50 percent of occasions sampled in each
case). Think about it: more than half of the total set of mo-
ments which go to make up someone’s conscious waking life
occupied with inner speech – that’s well-nigh continuous!
Admittedly, the sample-sizes in Hurlburt’s studies were
small; and other interpretations of the data are possible.
(Perhaps the reports of linguistically-clothed thoughts oc-
curring at the time of the bleep were a product of confab-
ulation, for example, reflecting people’s naïve theory that
thought must be in natural language. If so, this should be
testable.) But let us suppose that inner verbalization is as
ubiquitous as common-sense belief and Hurlburt’s data
would suggest. Just what would all this inner verbalization
be doing? What would be its function, or cognitive role?
The naïve common-sense answer is that inner verbalization
is constitutive of our thinking – it is that we think by talk-
ing to ourselves in inner speech (as well as by manipulating
visual images, etc.). Anyone who holds such a view endorses
a version of what I shall call “the cognitive conception of
language,” which maintains that, besides its obvious com-
municative functions, language also has a direct role to play
in normal human cognition (in thinking and reasoning).
Quite a different answer would be returned by most
members of the cognitive science community, however.
They endorse what I shall call “the (purely) communicative
conception of language,” according to which language is 
but an input-output system for central cognition. Believing
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that language is only a channel, or conduit, for transferring
thoughts into and out of the mind, they are then obliged to
claim that the stream of inner verbalization is more-or-less
epiphenomenal in character. (Some possible minor cogni-
tive roles for inner speech, which should nevertheless be
acceptable to those adopting this perspective, will be can-
vassed later.) The real thinking will be going on elsewhere,
in some other medium of representation.
One reason for the popularity of the communicative con-
ception amongst cognitive scientists is that almost all now
believe that language is a distinct input-output module of
the mind (at least in some sense of “module,” if not quite in
Fodor’s classic – 1983 – sense). And they find it difficult to
see how the language faculty could both have this status and
be importantly implicated in central cognition. But this rea-
soning is fallacious. Compare the case of visual imagination:
Almost everyone now thinks that the visual system is a dis-
tinct input-module of the mind, containing a good deal of
innate structure. But equally, most cognitive scientists now
accept that visual imagination re-deploys the resources of
the visual module for purposes of reasoning – for example,
many of the same areas of the visual cortex are active when
imagining as when seeing. (For a review of the evidence,
see Kosslyn 1994.)
What is apparent is that central cognition can co-opt the
resources of peripheral modules, activating some of their
representations to subserve central cognitive functions of
thinking and reasoning. The same is then possible in con-
nection with language. It is quite consistent with language
being an innately structured input and output module, that
central cognition should access and deploy the resources of
that module when engaging in certain kinds of reasoning
and problem solving.
Note, too, that hardly anyone is likely to maintain that vi-
sual imagery is a mere epiphenomenon of central cognitive
reasoning processes, playing no real role in those processes
in its own right. On the contrary, it seems likely that there
are many tasks which we cannot easily solve without de-
ploying a visual (or other) image. For example, suppose you
are asked (orally) to describe the shape which is enclosed
within the capital letter “A.” It seems entirely plausible that
success in this task should require the generation of a visual
image of that letter, from which the answer (“a triangle”)
can then be read off. So it appears that central cognition op-
erates, in part, by co-opting the resources of the visual sys-
tem to generate visual representations, which can be of use
in solving a variety of spatial-reasoning tasks. And this then
opens up the very real possibility that central cognition may
also deploy the resources of the language system to gener-
ate representations of natural language sentences (in “inner
speech”), which can similarly be of use in a variety of con-
ceptual reasoning tasks.
There is at least one further reason why the cognitive
conception of language has had a bad press within the cog-
nitive science community in recent decades. (It continues
to be popular in some areas of the social sciences and hu-
manities, including philosophy.) This is that many of the
forms of the thesis which have been defended by philoso-
phers and by social scientists are implausibly strong, as we
shall see in section 3 below. The unacceptability of these
strong views has then resulted in all forms of the cognitive
conception being tarred with the same brush.
A crucial liberalizing move, therefore, is to realize that
the cognitive conception of language can come in many dif-
ferent strengths, each one of which needs to be considered
separately on its own merits. In this paper I shall distinguish
between some of the many different versions of the cogni-
tive conception. I shall begin (in sect. 2) by discussing some
weak claims concerning the cognitive functions of language
that are largely uncontroversial. This will help to clarify just
what (any interesting form of) the cognitive conception 
is, by way of contrast. I shall then (in sect. 3) consider some
claims which are so strong that cognitive scientists are
clearly right in rejecting them, before zeroing in on those
which are both interesting and plausible (in sects. 4 and 5).
I shall come to focus, in particular, on the thesis that nat-
ural language is the medium of inter-modular integration.
This is a theoretical idea which has now begun to gather in-
dependent empirical support. Finally (in sects. 6 and 7)
some additional implications, elaborations, and possible
further empirical tests of this idea are discussed.
I should explain at the outset, however, that the thesis I
shall be working towards is that it is natural language syn-
tax which is crucially necessary for inter-modular integra-
tion. The hypothesis is that non-domain-specific thinking
operates by accessing and manipulating the representations
of the language faculty. More specifically, the claim is that
non-domain-specific thoughts implicate representations in
what Chomsky (1995) calls “logical form” (LF). Where these
representations are only in LF, the thoughts in question will
be non-conscious ones. But where the LF representation is
used to generate a full-blown phonological representation
(an imaged sentence), the thought will generally be con-
scious.1
I should emphasize that I shall not be claiming that syn-
tax is logically required for inter-modular integration, of
course. Nor shall I be claiming that only natural language
syntax – with its associated recursive and hierarchical struc-
tures, compositionality, and generativity – could possibly
play such a role in any form of cognition, human or not. (In
fact it is the phrase-structure element of syntax which does
the work in my account; see sect. 6.1 below.) Rather, my
claim will be that syntax does play this role in human beings.
It is a factual claim about the way in which our cognition
happens to be structured, not an unrestricted modal claim
arrived at by some sort of task-analysis.
I should also declare at the outset how I shall be using the
word “thought” in this paper. Unless I signal otherwise, I in-
tend all references to thought and thinking to be construed
realistically. Thoughts are discrete, semantically-evaluable,
causally-effective states, possessing component structure,
and where those structures bear systematic relations to the
structures of other, related, thoughts. So distinct thoughts
have distinct physical realizations, which may be true or
false, and which cause other such thoughts and behavior.
And thoughts are built up out of component parts, where
those parts belong to types which can be shared with other
thoughts. It is not presupposed, however, that thoughts are
borne by sentence-like structures. Although I shall be argu-
ing that some thoughts are carried by sentences (namely,
non-domain-specific thoughts which are carried by sen-
tences of natural language), others might be carried by
mental models or mental images of various kinds.
It is hugely controversial that there are such things as
thoughts, thus construed, of course. And while I shall say a
little in defense of this assumption below (in sect. 3.3), for
the most part it is just that – an assumption – for present
purposes. I can only plead that one can’t do everything in
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one article, and that one has to start somewhere. Those who
don’t want to share this assumption should read what fol-
lows conditionally: if we were to accept that there are such
things as realistically-construed thoughts, then how, if at all,
should they be seen as related to natural language sen-
tences?
Also, a word about the nature of the exercise before we
proceed further. This article ranges over a great many spe-
cialist topics and literatures in a number of distinct disci-
plines. Of necessity, therefore, our discussion of any given
subject must be relatively superficial, with most of the de-
tail, together with many of the required qualifications and
caveats, being omitted. Similarly, my arguments against
some of the competitor theories have to be extremely brisk,
and some quite large assumptions will have to get taken on
board without proper examination. My goal, here, is just to
map out an hypothesis space, using quite broad strokes, and
then to motivate and discuss what I take to be the most
plausible proposal within it.
2. Weak claims
Everyone will allow that language makes some cognitive
difference. For example, everyone accepts that a human
being with language and a human being without language
would be very different, cognitively speaking. In this sec-
tion I shall outline some of the reasons why.
2.1. Language as the conduit of belief
Everyone should agree that natural language is a necessary
condition for human beings to be capable of entertaining 
at least some kinds of thought. Language is the conduit
through which we acquire many of our beliefs and con-
cepts, and in many of these cases we could hardly have ac-
quired the component concepts in any other way. Con-
cepts which have emerged out of many years of collective
labor by scientists, for example – such as electron, neu-
trino, and DNA – would de facto be inaccessible to some-
one deprived of language. This much, at any rate, should
be obvious. But all it really shows is that language is re-
quired for certain kinds of thought; not that language is ac-
tually involved in or is the representational vehicle of those
thoughts.
It is often remarked, too, that the linguistic and cogni-
tive abilities of young children will normally develop to-
gether. If children’s language is advanced, then so will be
their abilities across a range of tasks; and if children’s 
language is delayed, then so will be their cognitive capac-
ities. To cite just one item from a wealth of empirical evi-
dence: Astington (1996) and Peterson and Siegal (1998)
report finding a high correlation between language-ability
and children’s capacity to pass false-belief tasks, whose so-
lution requires them to attribute, and reason from, the
false belief of another person. Does this and similar data
show that language is actually involved in children’s think-
ing?
In the same spirit, we might be tempted to cite the im-
mense cognitive deficits that can be observed in those rare
cases where children grow up without exposure to natural
language. Consider, for example, the cases of so-called
“wolf children,” who have survived in the wild in the com-
pany of animals, or of children kept by their parents locked
away from all human contact (Malson 1972; Curtiss 1977).
Consider, also, the cognitive limitations of profoundly deaf
children born of hearing parents, who have not yet learned
to sign (Schaller, 1991; Sachs 1989). These examples might
be thought to show that human cognition is constructed in
such a way as to require the presence of natural language if
it is to function properly.
But all that such data really show is, again, that language
is a necessary condition for certain kinds of thought and
types of cognitive process; not that it is actually implicated
in those forms of thinking. And this is easily explicable 
from the standpoint of someone who endorses the standard 
cognitive science conception of language, as being but an
input-output system for central cognition, or a mere com-
municative device. For language, in human beings, is a nec-
essary condition of normal enculturation. Without lan-
guage, there are many things which children cannot learn;
and with delayed language, there are many things that chil-
dren will learn only later. It is only to be expected, then, that
cognitive and linguistic development should proceed in
parallel. It does not follow that language is itself actually
used in children’s central cognition.
Another way of putting the point is that this proposed
cognitive function of language is purely developmental – or
diachronic – rather than synchronic. Nothing is said about
the role of language in the cognition of adults, once a nor-
mal set of beliefs and concepts has been acquired. And the
evidence from aphasia suggests that at least many aspects
of cognition can continue to operate normally once lan-
guage has been removed.
Aphasias come in many forms, of course, and in many dif-
ferent degrees of severity. And it is generally hard to know
the extent of any collateral damage – that is, to know which
other cognitive systems besides the language faculty may
have been disabled as a result of the aphasia-causing brain-
damage. But many patients with severe aphasia continue to
be adept at visuo-spatial thinking, at least (Kertesz 1988),
and many continue to manage quite well for themselves in
their daily lives.
Consider, for example, the agrammatic aphasic man
studied in detail by Varley (1998; 2002). He is incapable of
either producing or comprehending sentences, and he also
has considerable difficulty with vocabulary, particularly
verbs. He has lost all mentalistic vocabulary (“belief,”
“wants,” etc.), and his language system is essentially limited
to nouns. Note that there is not a lot of explicit thinking that
you can do using just nouns! (It should also be stressed that
he has matching deficits of input and output, suggesting
that it is the underlying system of linguistic knowledge
which has been damaged.) Yet he continues to drive, and to
have responsibility for the family finances. He is adept at
communicating, using a mixture of single-word utterances
and pantomime. And he has passed a range of tests of the-
ory of mind (the standard battery of false-belief and decep-
tion tasks, explained using nouns and pantomime), as well
as various tests of causal thinking and reasoning. It appears
that, once language has done its developmental work of
loading the mind with information, a good deal of adult
cognition can thereafter survive its loss.
Since natural language is the conduit for many of our be-
liefs and for much of our enculturation, everyone should ac-
cept that language is immensely important for normal cog-
nitive development. That language has this sort of cognitive
function should be no news to anyone.2
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2.2. Language as sculpting cognition
A stronger and more controversial thesis has been proposed
and defended by some researchers over recent decades.
This is that the process of language acquisition and encul-
turation does not merely serve to load the mind with beliefs
and concepts, but actually sculpts our cognitive processes to
some degree (Bowerman & Levinson 2001; Lucy 1992a;
1992b; Nelson 1996).3
For example, acquisition of Yucatec (as opposed to En-
glish) – in which plurals are rarely marked and many more
nouns are treated grammatically as substance-terms like
“mud” and “water” – leads subjects to see similarities
amongst objects on the basis of material composition rather
than shape (Lucy 1992b; Lucy & Gaskins 2001). And chil-
dren brought up speaking Korean (as opposed to English)
– in which verbs are highly inflected and massive noun el-
lipsis is permissible in informal speech – leads children to
be much weaker at categorization tasks, but much better at
means-ends tasks such as using a rake to pull a distant ob-
ject towards them (Choi & Gopnik 1995; Gopnik 2001;
Gopnik et al. 1996).
Fascinating as these data are, they do not, in themselves,
support any version of the cognitive conception of lan-
guage. This is because the reported effects of language on
cognition are still entirely diachronic and developmental,
rather than synchronic. The fact that acquiring one lan-
guage as opposed to another causes subjects to attend to
different things and to reason somewhat differently doesn’t
show that language itself is actually involved in people’s
thinking. Indeed, on the hypothesis proposed by Gopnik
(2001), language-acquisition has these effects by providing
evidence for a pre-linguistic theorizing capacity, which op-
erates throughout development to construct children’s sys-
tems of belief and inference.
2.3. Language as a cognitive scaf fold
Other claims can be extracted from the work of Vygotsky
(1934/1986), who argues that language and speech serve to
scaffold the development of cognitive capacities in the
growing child. Researchers working in this tradition have
studied the self-directed verbalizations of young children –
for example, observing the effects of their soliloquies on
their behavior (Diaz & Berk 1992). They have found that
children tend to verbalize more when task demands are
greater, and that those who verbalize most tend to be more
successful in problem-solving.
This claim of linguistic scaffolding of cognition admits,
however, of a spectrum of readings. At its weakest, it says
no more than has already been conceded above, that lan-
guage may be a necessary condition for the acquisition of
certain cognitive skills. At its strongest, on the other hand,
the idea could be that language forms part of the function-
ing of the highest-level executive system – which would
then make it a variant of the ideas to be discussed in sec-
tions 4 and 5 below.
Clark (1998) argues for a sort of intermediate-strength
version of the Vygotskian idea, defending a conception of
language as a cognitive tool. (Chomsky, too, has argued 
for an account of this sort. See his 1976, Ch. 2.) According
to this view – which Clark labels “the supra-communicative
conception of language” – certain extended processes of
thinking and reasoning constitutively involve natural lan-
guage. The idea is that language gets used, not just for com-
munication, but also to augment human cognitive powers.
Thus by writing an idea down, for example, I can off-load
the demands on memory, presenting myself with an object
of further leisured reflection; and by performing arithmetic
calculations on a piece of paper, I may be able to handle
computational tasks which would otherwise be too much
for me (and my short-term memory). In similar fashion, it
may be that inner speech serves to enhance memory, since
it is now well-established that the powers of human mem-
ory systems can be greatly extended by association (Badde-
ley 1988). Inner speech may thus facilitate complex trains
of reasoning (Varley 1998).
Notice that according to this supra-communicative ac-
count, the involvement of language in thought only arises
when we focus on a process of thinking or reasoning ex-
tended over time. So far as any given individual (token)
thought goes, the account can (and does) buy into the stan-
dard input-output conception of language. It maintains that
there is a neural episode which carries the content of the
thought in question, where an episode of that type can ex-
ist in the absence of any natural language sentence and can
have a causal role distinctive of the thought, but which in
the case in question causes the production of a natural lan-
guage representation. This representation can then have
further benefits for the system of the sort which Clark ex-
plores (off-loading or enhancing memory).
According to stronger forms of the cognitive conception
to be explored in later sections, in contrast, a particular to-
kening of an inner sentence is (sometimes) an inseparable
part of the mental episode which carries the content of the
thought-token in question. So there is no neural or mental
event at the time which can exist distinct from that sen-
tence, which can occupy a causal role distinctive of that sort
of thought, and which carries the content in question; and
so language is actually involved in (certain types of) cogni-
tion, even when our focus is on individual (token) thinkings.
In this section I have discussed two weak claims about the
role of language (that language is necessary for the acquisi-
tion of many beliefs and concepts; and that language may
serve as a cognitive tool, enhancing the range and complex-
ity of our reasoning processes). These claims should 
be readily acceptable to most cognitive scientists. In addi-
tion, I have briefly introduced a more controversial thesis,
namely that the acquisition of one or another natural lan-
guage can sculpt our cognitive processes, to some degree.
But this thesis relates only to the developmental, or di-
achronic, role of language. It says nothing about the role of
language in adult cognition. We will in future focus on more
challenging versions of the cognitive conception of language.
3. Strong claims
As is starting to emerge, the thesis that language has a cog-
nitive function admits of a spectrum of readings. In this sec-
tion I shall jump to the other end of that spectrum, consid-
ering forms of the cognitive conception of language which
are too strong to be acceptable.
3.1. Language as necessarily required for thought
When the question of the place of natural language in cog-
nition has been debated by philosophers the discussion
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has, almost always, been conducted a priori in universalist
terms. Various arguments have been proposed for the
claim that it is a conceptually necessary truth that all
thought requires language, for example (Davidson 1975;
1982; Dummett 1981; 1989; McDowell 1994; Wittgen-
stein 1921; 1953). But these arguments all depend, in one
way or another, upon an anti-realist conception of the mind
– claiming, for instance, that since we cannot interpret
anyone as entertaining any given fine-grained thought in
the absence of linguistic behavior, such thoughts cannot
even exist in the absence of such behavior (Davidson
1975). Since the view adopted in this paper – and shared
by most cognitive psychologists – is quite strongly realist
about thought, I do not propose to devote any time to such
arguments.
Notice, too, that Davidson et al. are committed to deny-
ing that any non-human animals can entertain genuine
thoughts, given that it is very doubtful whether any such 
animals are capable of understanding and using a natural
language (in the relevant sense of “language,” that is; see
Pinker 1994; Premack 1986). This conclusion conflicts, not
just with common sense belief, but also with what can be
discovered about animal cognition, both experimentally and
by observation of their behavior in the wild (Allen & Bekoff
1997; Byrne 1995; de Waal 1982; 1996; Dickinson & Shanks
1995; Gallistel 1990; Hauser 2000; Povinelli 2000; Savage-
Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994; Walker 1983). So not only are the
arguments of Davidson et al. unsound, but we have inde-
pendent reasons to think that their conclusion is false.
Dummett (1994) makes some attempt to accommodate
this sort of point by distinguishing between concept-in-
volving thoughts (which are held to be necessarily depen-
dent upon language) and what he calls “proto-thoughts,”
which are what animals are allowed to possess. Proto-
thoughts are said to consist of “visual images superimposed
on the visually perceived scene,” and are said to be possible
only when tied to current circumstances and behavior. But
such an account vastly underestimates the cognitive capac-
ities of non-human animals, I believe. If an animal can de-
cide whom to form an alliance with, or can calculate rates
of return from different sources of food, or can notice and
exploit the ignorance of another, then these things cannot
be accounted for in Dummett’s terms. And given that con-
ceptual thinking of this sort is possible for animals, then he
will be left without any principled distinction between ani-
mal thought and human thought.
I do not expect that these brief considerations will con-
vince any of my philosophical opponents, of course; and
they aren’t meant to. Given the intended readership of this
target article, their position is not really one that I need to
take seriously. It is mentioned here just to set it aside, and
(most important) in order that other, more plausible, ver-
sions of the cognitive conception of language shouldn’t be
confused with it.
I propose, therefore, to take it for granted that thought is
conceptually independent of natural language, and that
thoughts of many types can actually occur in the absence of
such language. But this leaves open the possibility that
some types of thought might de facto involve language,
given the way in which human cognition is structured. It is
on this – weaker but nevertheless still controversial – set of
claims that I shall focus. Claims of this type seem to me to
have been unjustly under-explored by researchers in the
cognitive sciences; partly, no doubt, because they have been
run together with the a priori and universalist claims of
some philosophers, which have been rightly rejected.
3.2. The Joycean machine
Another overly strong form of cognitive conception of lan-
guage – which has been endorsed by some philosophers
and by many social scientists – is that language is, as a mat-
ter of fact, the medium of all human conceptual thinking.
Most often it has been associated with a radical empiricism
about the mind, according to which virtually all human con-
cepts and ways of thinking, and indeed much of the very
structure of the human mind itself, are acquired by young
children from adults when they learn their native language
– these concepts and structures differing widely depending
upon the conceptual resources and structures of the natural
language in question. This mind-structuring and social-rel-
ativist view of language is still dominant in the social sci-
ences, following the writings early in this century of the 
amateur linguist Whorf (many of whose papers have been
collected together in his 1956) – indeed, Pinker (1994)
refers to it disparagingly as “the Standard Social Science
Model” of the mind.
Perhaps Dennett (1991) is one of the clearest exponents
of this view. He argues that human cognitive powers were ut-
terly transformed following the appearance of natural lan-
guage, as the mind became colonized by memes (ideas or
concepts, which are transmitted, retained, and selected in a
manner supposedly analogous to genes; see Dawkins 1976).
Prior to the evolution of language, in this picture, the mind
was a bundle of distributed connectionist processors – which
conferred on early hominids some degree of flexibility and
intelligence, but which were quite limited in their computa-
tional powers. The arrival of language then meant that a
whole new – serial and compositionally structured – cogni-
tive architecture could be programmed into the system.
This is what Dennett calls the Joycean machine (named
after James Joyce’s “stream of consciousness” writing). The
idea is that there is a highest-level processor which runs 
on a stream of natural-language representations, utilizing
learned connections between ideas and patterns of reason-
ing acquired in and through the acquisition of linguistic
memes. According to this account, then, the concept-wield-
ing mind is a kind of social construction, brought into exis-
tence through the absorption of memes from the sur-
rounding culture. And in this view, the conceptual mind is
both dependent upon, and constitutively involves, natural
language.
Admittedly, what Dennett will actually say is that animals
and pre-linguistic hominids are capable of thought, and en-
gage in much intelligent thinking. But this is because he is
not (in my sense) a realist about thoughts. On the contrary,
he (like Davidson) is what is sometimes called an “inter-
pretationalist” – he thinks that there is nothing more to
thinking than engaging in behavior which is interpretable
as thinking. Yet he does seem committed to saying that it is
only with the advent of natural language that you get a kind
of thinking which involves discrete, structured, semanti-
cally-evaluable, causally-effective states – that is, thoughts
realistically construed.
Bickerton’s proposals (1990; 1995) are somewhat similar,
but more biological in flavor. He thinks that, before the evo-
lution of language, hominid cognition was extremely lim-
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ited in its powers. According to his view, these early forms
of hominid cognition consisted largely of a set of relatively
simple computational systems, underpinning an array of
flexible but essentially behavioristic conditioned responses
to stimuli. But then the evolution of language some 100,000
years ago involved a dramatic re-wiring of the hominid
brain, giving rise to distinctively human intelligence and
conceptual powers.4
Bickerton, like Dennett, allows that subsequent to the
evolution of language the human mind would have under-
gone further transformations, as the stock of socially trans-
mitted ideas and concepts changed and increased. But the
basic alteration was coincident with, and constituted by, a bi-
ological alteration – namely, the appearance of an innately-
structured language-faculty. For Bickerton is a nativist about
language. (Indeed, his earlier work on the creolization of
pidgin languages – 1981 – is often cited as part of an argu-
ment for the biological basis of language; see Pinker 1994.)
And it is language which, he supposes, conferred on us the
capacity for “off-line thinking” – that is, the capacity to think
and reason about topics and problems in the abstract, inde-
pendent of any particular sensory stimulus.
These strong views seem very unlikely to be correct. This
is so for two reasons. First, they undervalue the cognitive
powers of pre-linguistic children, animals, and earlier forms
of hominid. Thus Homo erectus and archaic forms of Homo
sapiens, for example, were able to survive in extremely
harsh tundra environments, presumably without language
(see below). It is hard to see how this could have been pos-
sible without a capacity for quite sophisticated planning and
a good deal of complex social interaction (Mithen 1996).
Second, the views of Dennett and Bickerton are inconsis-
tent with the sort of central-process modularism which has
been gaining increasing support in recent decades. Ac-
cording to this account, the mind contains a variety of 
conceptual modules – for mind-reading, for doing naïve
physics, for reasoning about social contracts, and so on –
which are probably of considerable ancestry, pre-dating the
appearance of a modular language-faculty.5 So hominids
were already capable of conceptual thought and of reason-
ing in a complex, and presumably “off-line,” fashion before
the arrival of language.
In sections 3.3 and 3.4 which follow, I shall elaborate
briefly on these points. But first, I want to consider a po-
tential reply which might be made by someone sympathetic
to Bickerton’s position. For Bickerton actually thinks that
earlier hominids probably used a form of “proto-language”
prior to the evolution of syntax, similar to the language used
by young children and to pidgin languages. (This is, in fact,
a very plausible intermediate stage in the evolution of nat-
ural language.) It might be claimed, then, that insofar as
hominids are capable of intelligent thought, this is only be-
cause those thoughts are framed in proto-language. So the
view that thought is dependent upon language can be pre-
served.
Such a reply would, indeed, give Bickerton a little extra
wiggle-room; but only a little. For as we shall see in section
3.3 below, a good deal of the evidence for hominid thinking
is provided by the capacities of our nearest relatives, the
great apes, who are known to lack even a proto-language
(without a good deal of human enculturation and explicit
training, at any rate; Savage-Rumbaugh & Lewin 1994).
And some of the other evidence – for example, provided by
hominid stone knapping – is not plausibly seen as under-
pinned by proto-language. Moreover, the various thought-
generating central modules, to be discussed in section 3.4
below, are almost surely independent both of language and
proto-language. So it remains the case that much hominid
thought is independent even of proto-language.
3.3. Hominid intelligence
Since social intelligence is something that we share with the
other great apes (especially chimpanzees), it is reasonable to
conclude that the common ancestor of all apes – and so, by
implication, all earlier forms of hominid – will also have ex-
celled in the social domain. While it is still disputed whether
chimpanzees have full-blown mind-reading, or “theory of
mind,” abilities, of the sort attained by a normal four-year-
old child, it is not in dispute that the social behavior of great
apes can be extremely subtle and sophisticated (Byrne 1995;
Byrne & Whiten 1988; 1998; Povinelli 2000).
Two points are worth stressing in this context. One is that
it is well-nigh impossible to see how apes can be capable of
representing multiple, complex, and constantly changing
social relationships (who is friends with whom, who has re-
cently groomed whom, who has recently fallen out with
whom, and so on) unless they are capable of structured
propositional thought.6 This is a development of what Hor-
gan and Tienson (1996) call “the tracking argument for
Mentalese” (i.e., an argument in support of the claim that
thoughts are structured out of recombinable components).
Unless the social thoughts of apes were composed out of el-
ements variously representing individuals and their prop-
erties and relationships, then it is very hard indeed to see
how they could do the sort of one-off learning of which they
are manifestly capable. This surely requires separate rep-
resentations for individuals and their properties and rela-
tions, so that the latter can be varied while the former are
held constant. So (contra Dennett and Bickerton) we have
reason to think that all earlier forms of hominid would have
been capable of sophisticated conceptual thought (realisti-
cally construed), at least in the social domain.7
The second point to note is that the social thinking of
apes seems sometimes to be genuinely strategic in nature,
apparently involving plans that are executed over the course
of days or months. Consider, for example, the way in which
a band of male chimpanzees will set out quietly and in an
organized and purposive manner toward the territory of a
neighboring group, apparently with the intention, either of
killing some of the males of that group, or of capturing some
of its females, or both (Byrne 1995). Or consider the way in
which a lower-ranking male will, over the course of a num-
ber of months, build up a relationship with the beta male,
until the alliance is strong enough for them to cooperate in
ousting the alpha male from his position (de Waal 1982).
Presumably the thinking that would generate such long-
term plans and strategies would have to be “off-line,” in the
sense of not being tied to or driven by current perceptions
of the environment.
We can conclude, then, that all of our hominid ancestors
would have had a sophisticated social intelligence. In addi-
tion, the stone-tool-making abilities of later species of
Homo erectus indicate a sophisticated grasp of fracture dy-
namics and the properties of stone materials. Making stone
tools isn’t easy. It requires judgment, as well as considerable
hand-eye coordination and upper-body strength. And since
it uses a reductive technology (starting from a larger stone
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and reducing it to the required shape) it cannot be rou-
tinized in the way that (presumably) nest-building by
weaver birds and dam-building by beavers can be. Stone
knappers have to hold in mind the desired shape and plan
two or more strikes ahead in order to work toward it using
variable and unpredictable materials (Mithen 1996; Pelegrin
1993). Moreover, some of the very fine three-dimensional
symmetries produced from about half-a-million years ago
would almost certainly have required significant capacities
for visual imagination – in particular, an ability to mentally
rotate an image of the stone product which will result if a
particular flake is struck off (Wynn 2000). And this is surely
“off-line” thinking if anything is!
We can also conclude that early humans were capable of
learning and reasoning about their natural environments
with a considerable degree of sophistication. They were
able to colonize much of the globe, ranging from Southern
Africa to Northwestern Europe to Southeast Asia. And they
were able to thrive in a wide variety of habitats (including
extremely harsh marginal tundra environments), adapting
their life-style to local – and sometimes rapidly changing –
circumstances (Mithen 1990; 1996). This again serves as a
premise for a version of the “tracking argument,” suggest-
ing that early humans were capable of compositionally-
structured thoughts about the biological as well as the so-
cial worlds.
3.4. The modular mind
The above claims about the cognitive powers of our early
ancestors both support, and are in turn supported by, the
evidence of modular organization in the minds of contem-
porary humans. According to this account, besides a variety
of input and output modules (including, e.g., early vision,
face-recognition, and language), the mind also contains a
number of innately channeled conceptual modules, de-
signed to process conceptual information concerning par-
ticular domains. Although these would not be modules in
Fodor’s classic (1983) sense, in that they wouldn’t have pro-
prietary transducers, might not have dedicated neural hard-
ware, and might not be fully encapsulated, they would still
be innately channeled dedicated computational systems,
generating information in accordance with algorithms
which are not shared with, nor accessible to, other systems.
Plausible candidates for such conceptual modules might
include a naïve physics system (Baillargeon 1995; Leslie
1994; Spelke 1994; Spelke et al. 1995), a naïve psychology
or “mind-reading” system (Baron-Cohen 1995; Carey 1985;
Leslie 1994), a folk-biology system (Atran 1990; 1998; 2002),
an intuitive number system (Dehaene 1997; 1995; Gallistel
& Gelman 1992; Wynn 1990), a geometrical system for re-
orienting and navigating in unusual environments (Cheng
1986; Hermer & Spelke 1994; 1996) and a system for pro-
cessing and keeping track of social contracts (Cosmides &
Tooby 1992; Fiddick et al. 2000).
Evidence supporting the existence of at least the first two
of these systems (folk-physics and folk-psychology) is now
pretty robust. Very young infants already have a set of ex-
pectations concerning the behaviors and movements of
physical objects, and their understanding of this form of cau-
sality develops very rapidly over the first year or two of life.
And folk-psychological concepts and expectations also de-
velop very early and follow a characteristic developmental
profile. Indeed, recent evidence from the study of twins
suggests that three-quarters of the variance in mind-read-
ing abilities amongst three year olds is both genetic in ori-
gin and largely independent of the genes responsible for
verbal intelligence, with only one quarter of the variance
being contributed by the environment (Hughes & Plomin
2000).8
Now, of course the thesis of conceptual modularity is still
highly controversial and disputed by many cognitive scien-
tists. And I cannot pretend to have said enough to have es-
tablished it here; nor is there the space to attempt to do so.
This is going to be one of the large assumptions that I need
to ask my readers to take on board as background to what
follows. However, there is one sort of objection to concep-
tual modularity which I should like to respond to briefly
here. This is that there simply hasn’t been time for all of
these modular systems to have evolved (or at any rate, not
those of them that are distinctively human – geometry and
folk-physics might be the exceptions).
Tomasello (1999) argues that the mere six million years or
so since the hominid line diverged from the common an-
cestor of ourselves and chimpanzees is just too short a time
for the processes of evolution to have sculpted a whole suite
of conceptual modules. He thinks that explanations of dis-
tinctively-human cognition need to postulate just one – at
most two – biological adaptations, in terms of which all the
other cognitive differences between us and chimpanzees
should be explained. His preferred option is theory of mind
ability, which underpins processes of cultural learning and
cultural accumulation and transmission. Others might argue
in similar fashion that the only major biological difference is
the language faculty (Perner, personal communication).
The premise of this argument is false, however; six mil-
lion years is a lot of time, particularly if the selection pres-
sures are powerful ones. (Only 10,000 years separate polar
bears and grizzlies, for example.) And this is especially so
when, as in the present case, many of the systems in ques-
tion don’t have to be built ab initio, but can result from a
deepening and strengthening of pre-existing faculties. Thus
theory of mind would surely have developed from some
pre-existing social-cognition module; folk-biology from a
pre-existing foraging system; and so on. In order to rein-
force the point, one just has to reflect on the major, and
multiple, physical differences between ourselves and chim-
panzees – including upright gait, arm length, physical
stature, brain size, nasal shape, hairlessness, whites of eyes,
and so on. These, too, have all evolved – many of them in-
dependently, plainly – over the last six million years.
3.5. Taking stock
What has happened in the cognitive sciences in recent
decades, then, is this. Many researchers have become in-
creasingly convinced, by neuropsychological and other ev-
idence, that the mind is more or less modular in structure,
built up out of isolable, and largely isolated, components
(Barkow et al. 1992; Fodor 1983; Gallistel 1990; Hirschfeld
& Gelman 1994; Pinker 1997; Sachs 1985; Shallice 1988;
Sperber et al. 1995). They have also become convinced that
the structure and contents of the mind are substantially in-
nate (Carey 1985; Fodor 1981; 1983; Spelke 1994), and that
language is one such isolable and largely innate module
(Chomsky 1988; Fodor 1983; Pinker 1994). There has then
been, amongst cognitive scientists, a near-universal reac-
tion against the cognitive conception of language, by run-
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ning it together with the Whorfian hypothesis. Most re-
searchers have assumed, without argument, that if they
were to accept any form of cognitive conception of lan-
guage, then that would commit them to Whorfian linguis-
tic relativism and radical empiricism, and would hence be
inconsistent with their well-founded beliefs in modularity
and nativism (Pinker 1994).
It is important to see, however, that someone endorsing
the cognitive conception of language does not have to re-
gard language and the mind as cultural constructs, either
socially determined or culturally relative. In fact, some
form of cognitive conception of language can equally well
be deployed along with a modularist and nativist view of
language and mind. There is a range of positions interme-
diate between the input-output conception of language on
the one hand and Whorfian relativism (the Standard Social
Science Model) on the other, which deserve the attention
of philosophers and cognitive scientists alike. These views
are nativist as opposed to empiricist about language and
much of the structure of the mind, but nevertheless hold
that language is constitutively employed in many of our
thoughts.
4. Language and conscious thinking
What is at stake, then, is the question whether language
might be constitutively involved in some forms of human
thinking. But which forms? In previous work I suggested
that language might be the medium in which we conduct
our conscious propositional thinking – claiming, that is, that
inner speech might be the vehicle of conscious-conceptual
(as opposed to conscious visuo-spatial) thinking (Car-
ruthers 1996). This view takes seriously and literally the bit
of folk-wisdom with which this paper began – namely, that
much of our conscious thinking (namely, our propositional
thinking) is conducted in inner speech.
Now, if the thesis here is that the cognitive role of lan-
guage is confined to conscious thinking, then it will have to
be allowed that much propositional thinking also takes
place independently of natural language – for it would
hardly be very plausible to maintain that there is no think-
ing but conscious thinking. And there are then two signifi-
cant options regarding the relations between non-conscious
language-independent thought, on the one hand, and con-
scious language-involving thinking, on the other. For either
we would have to say that anything which we can think con-
sciously, in language, can also be thought non-consciously,
independently of language; or we would have to say that
there are some thought-types which can only be enter-
tained at all, by us, when tokened consciously in the form
of an imaged natural language sentence.
Suppose that it is the first – weaker and more plausible
– of these options that is taken. Then we had better be able
to identify some element of the distinctive causal role of an
imaged sentence that is sufficiently thought-like or infer-
ence-like for us to be able to say that the sentence in ques-
tion is partly constitutive of the (conscious) tokening of the
thought-type in question, rather than being merely expres-
sive of it. For otherwise – if everything which we can think
consciously, in language, we can also think non-consciously,
without language – what is to block the conclusion that in-
ner speech is merely the means by which we have access to
our occurrent thoughts, without inner speech being in any
sense constitutive of our thinking? (On this, at length, see
Carruthers 1998b.)
There would seem to be just two distinct (albeit mutually
consistent) possibilities here. One (implicit in Carruthers
1996) would be to propose a suitably weakened version of
Dennett’s Joycean machine hypothesis. While allowing (con-
tra Dennett) that much conceptual thinking (realistically
construed) and all conceptual thought-types are indepen-
dent of language (in the sense of not being constituted by it),
we could claim that there are certain learned habits and pat-
terns of thinking and reasoning that are acquired linguisti-
cally, and then restricted to linguistic (and conscious) token-
ings of the thoughts that they govern. It is surely plausible,
for example, that exact long-division or multiplication can
only be conducted consciously, in imaged manipulations of
numerical symbols. Similarly, it may be that the result of 
taking a course in logic is that one becomes disposed to 
make transitions between sentences, consciously in language,
where one would otherwise not have been disposed to make
the corresponding transitions between the thoughts ex-
pressed. If these sorts of possibilities are realized, then we
would have good reason to say of a token application of a par-
ticular inference-form, that the imaged natural language sen-
tences involved are constitutive of the inference in question,
since it could not have taken place without them.
A second possibility is proposed and defended by Frank-
ish (1998a; 1998b; forthcoming; see also Cohen 1993). This
is that the distinctive causal role of inner speech is partly a
function of our decisions to accept, reject, or act on the
propositions which our imaged sentences express. I can
frame a hitherto unconsidered proposition in inner speech
and decide that it is worthy of acceptance, thereby com-
mitting myself to thinking and acting thereafter as if that
sentence were true. Then provided that I remember my
commitments and execute them, it will be just as if I be-
lieved the proposition in question. (In his published work,
Frankish describes this level of mentality as the “virtual
mind” and the beliefs in question as “virtual beliefs.”) But,
by hypothesis, I would never have come to believe what I
do, nor to reason as I do reason, except via the tokening of
sentences in inner speech. Frankish argues, in effect, that
there is a whole level of mentality (which he now dubs “su-
permind”) which is constituted by our higher-order deci-
sions and commitments to accept or reject propositions;
and that language is constitutive of the thoughts and beliefs
which we entertain at this level.
Such views have considerable plausibility; and it may well
be that one, or other, or both of these accounts of the causal
role of inner speech is correct. Indeed, the dual process the-
ory of human reasoning developed over the years by Evans
and colleagues (Evans & Over 1996; Wason & Evans 1975),
and more recently by Stanovich (1999), combines elements
of each of them. According to this account, in addition to a
suite of computationally powerful, fast, and implicit rea-
soning systems (from our perspective, a set of conceptual
modules), the mind also contains a slow, serial, and explicit
reasoning capacity, whose operations are conscious and un-
der personal control, and which is said (by some theorists at
least; e.g., Evans & Over 1996) to involve natural language.
The emphasis here on learned rules in the operations of the
explicit system is reminiscent of Dennett’s “Joycean ma-
chine,” whereas the stress on our having personal control
over the operations of that system seems very similar to
Frankish’s conception of “supermind.”
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Not only is some form of dual-process theory plausible,
but it should also be stressed that these accounts are inde-
pendent of central-process modularism. Those who deny
the existence of any conceptual modules can still accept
that there is a level of thinking and reasoning which is both
language-involving and conscious. It is surely plain, how-
ever, that none of the above accounts can amount to the
most fundamental cognitive function of language once con-
ceptual modularity is assumed.
Given conceptual modularity, then unless the above
views are held together with the thesis to be developed in
section 5 below – namely, that language provides the me-
dium for inter-modular communication and non-domain-
specific thinking – then we can set their proponents a
dilemma. Either they must claim that a domain-general ar-
chitecture was in place prior to the evolution of language;
or they must allow that there was no significant domain-
general cognition amongst hominids prior to the appear-
ance of language and language-involving conscious think-
ing; and they must claim that such cognition still evolved as
a distinct development, either at the same time or later.
Since contemporary humans are manifestly capable of con-
joining information across different domains in both their
theoretical thought and their planning, then either pre-lin-
guistic humans must already have had domain-general the-
oretical and practical reasoning faculties; or they must have
evolved them separately at the same time or after the evo-
lution of the language faculty (that is, if it isn’t language it-
self which enables us to combine information across mod-
ules).
The problem with the first alternative, however – namely,
that domain-general reasoning capacities pre-dated lan-
guage – is that the evidence from cognitive archaeology
suggests that this was not the case. For although the vari-
ous sub-species of Homo erectus and archaic forms of Homo
sapiens were smart, they were not that smart. Let me briefly
elaborate.
As Mithen (1996) demonstrates at length and in detail,
the evidence from archaeology is that the minds of early 
humans were in important respects quite unlike our 
own. While they successfully colonized diverse and rapidly
changing environments, the evidence suggests that they
were incapable of bringing together information across dif-
ferent cognitive domains. It seems that they could not (or
did not) mix information from the biological world (utilized
in hunting and gathering) with information about the phys-
ical world (used in tool making); and that neither of these
sorts of information interacted with their social intelli-
gence. Although they made sophisticated stone tools, they
did not use those tools for specialized purposes (with dif-
ferent kinds of arrow-head being used for different kinds of
game, for example); and they did not make tools out of an-
imal products such as antler and bone. There is no sign of
the use of artifacts as social signals, in the form of body or-
naments and such, which is ubiquitous in modern human
cultures. And there is no indication of totemization or other
sorts of linkages between social and animal domains, such
as lion-man figurines, cave-paintings, or the burying of the
dead with (presumably symbolic) animal parts – which all
emerge onto the scene for the first time with modern hu-
mans. As Mithen summarizes the evidence, it would appear
that early humans had sophisticated special intelligences,
but that these faculties remained largely isolated from one
another.
The problem with the second horn of the dilemma
sketched above is just that it is hard to believe, either that
a domain-general reasoning faculty might have evolved 
after the appearance of language some 100,000 years ago
(in just the 20,000 years or so before the beginning of the
dispersal of modern humans around the globe), or that
language and domain-general capacities might have co-
evolved as distinct faculties. For as we shall see in section
5, the evolution of language would in any case have involved
the language faculty taking inputs from, and sending out-
puts to, the various modular systems, if there wasn’t already
a domain-general system for it to be linked to. And it is hard
to discern what the separate selection pressures might have
been, which would have led to the development of two dis-
tinct faculties at about the same time (language and do-
main-general thought), when just one would serve.
5. Language as the medium of non-domain-
specific thinking
The hypothesis that I particularly want to explore, then, is
that natural language is the medium of non-domain-spe-
cific thought and inference. Versions of this hypothesis have
been previously proposed by Carruthers (1996; 1998a), by
Mithen (1996), and by Spelke and colleagues (Hermer-
Vazquez et al., 1999; Spelke & Tsivkin 2001; Spelke, in
press). I shall sketch the thesis itself, outline the existing ex-
perimental evidence in its support, and then (in the section
following) consider some of its ramifications and possible
elaborations. Finally (in sect. 7), I shall discuss what further
evidence needs to be sought as a test of our thesis.
5.1. The thesis
The hypothesis in question assumes a form of central-
process modularism. That is, it assumes that in addition to
the various input and output modules (vision, face-recogni-
tion, hearing, language, systems for motor-control, etc.),
the mind also contains a range of conceptual modules,
which take conceptual inputs and deliver conceptual out-
puts. Evidence of various sorts has been accumulating in
support of central-process modularism in recent decades
(some of which has already been noted above). One line of
support is provided by evolutionary psychologists, who have
argued on both theoretical and empirical grounds that the
mind contains a suite of domain-specific cognitive adapta-
tions (Barkow et al., 1992; Pinker 1997; Sperber 1996;). But
many who would not describe themselves as “evolutionary
psychologists” have argued for a modular organization of
central cognition, on developmental, psychological, and/or
neuro-pathological grounds (Baron-Cohen 1995; Carey
1985; Carey & Spelke 1994; Gallistel 1990; Hauser & Carey
1998; Leslie 1994; Smith & Tsimpli 1995; Shallice 1988;
Spelke 1994).
What cognitive resources were antecedently available,
then, prior to the evolution of the language faculty? Taking
the ubiquitous laboratory rat as a representative example, 
I shall assume that all mammals, at least, are capable of
thought – in the sense that they engage in computations
which deliver structured (propositional) belief-like states
and desire-like states (Dickinson 1994; Dickinson & Bal-
leine 2000). I shall also assume that these computations are
largely carried out within modular systems of one sort or 
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another (Gallistel 1990) – after all, if the project here is to
show how cross-modular thinking in humans can emerge
out of modular components, then we had better assume
that the initial starting-state was a modular one. Further-
more, I shall assume that mammals possess some sort of
simple non-domain-specific practical reasoning system,
which can take beliefs and desires as input, and figure out
what to do.
I shall assume that the practical reasoning system in ani-
mals (and perhaps also in us) is a relatively simple and lim-
ited-channel one. Perhaps it receives as input the currently-
strongest desire and searches amongst the outputs of the
various belief-generating modules for something which can
be done in relation to the perceived environment which will
satisfy that desire. So its inputs have the form desire [y] and
belief [if x then y], where x should be something for
which an existing motor-program exists. I assume that the
practical reasoning system is not capable of engaging in
other forms of inference (generating new beliefs from old),
nor of combining together beliefs from different modules;
though perhaps it is capable of chaining together condition-
als to generate a simple plan – for example, belief [if w
then x], belief [if x then y], r belief [if w then y].
The central modules will take inputs from perception, of
course. And my guess is that many of the beliefs and desires
generated by the central modules will have partially index-
ical contents – thus a desire produced as output by the sex
module might have the form, “I want to mate with that fe-
male,” and a belief produced by the causal-reasoning mod-
ule might have the form, “That caused that.” So if the prac-
tical reasoning system is to be able to do anything with such
contents, then it, too, would need to have access to the out-
puts of perception, to provide anchoring for the various in-
dexicals. The outputs of the practical reasoning system are
often likely to be indexical too, such as an intention of the
form, “I’ll go that way.”
The inputs to central-process modules can presumably
include not only conceptualized perceptions but also prop-
ositional descriptions (in the latter case deriving from lin-
guistic input – for we surely use our mind-reading system,
for example, when processing a description of someone’s
state of mind as well as when observing their behavior). And
in some cases, too, the inputs to a module will include the
outputs of other central-process modules; for we might ex-
pect that there will be cases in which modules are organized
into some sort of hierarchy. But what of the outputs from
central-process modules? Besides being directed to other
modules (in some instances), and also to the practical rea-
soning system, where is the information which is generated
by central-process modules normally sent? And in particu-
lar, is there some non-domain-specific central arena where
all such information is collated and processed?
The hypothesis being proposed here is that there is such
an arena, but one which crucially implicates natural lan-
guage, and which cannot operate in the absence of such lan-
guage. Moreover, the hypothesis is not just that our conscious
propositional thinking involves language (as sketched in
sect. 4 above), but that all non-domain-specific reasoning
of a non-practical sort (whether conscious or non-con-
scious) is conducted in language. And as for the question of
what a non-conscious tokening of a natural language sen-
tence would be like, we can propose that it would be a rep-
resentation stripped of all imagistic-phonological features,
but still consisting of natural language lexical items and syn-
tactic structures. (The role of syntax in the present account
will be further explored in sect. 6.1 below.)
Chomsky (1995) has maintained, for example, that there
is a level of linguistic representation which he calls “logical
form” (LF), which is where the language faculty interfaces
with central cognitive systems. We can then claim that all
cross-modular thinking consists in the formation and ma-
nipulation of these LF representations. The hypothesis can
be that all such thinking operates by accessing and manip-
ulating the representations of the language faculty. Where
these representations are only in LF, the thoughts in ques-
tion will be non-conscious ones. But where the LF repre-
sentation is used to generate a full-blown phonological rep-
resentation (an imaged sentence), the thought will nomally
be conscious. And crucially for my purposes, the hypothe-
sis is that the language faculty has access to the outputs of
the various central-process modules, in such a way that it
can build LF representations which combine information
across domains.
Let me say a just little more about the conscious/non-
conscious distinction as it operates here. As I shall mention
again in a moment (and as I shall return to at some length
in sect. 6.2) language is both an input and an output mod-
ule. Its production sub-system must be capable of receiv-
ing outputs from the conceptual modules in order to trans-
form their creations into speech. And its comprehension
sub-system must be capable of transforming heard speech
into a format suitable for processing by those same con-
ceptual modules. Now when LF representations built by
the production sub-system are used to generate a phono-
logical representation, in “inner speech,” that representa-
tion will be consumed by the comprehension sub-system,
and made available to central systems. One of these systems
is a theory of mind module. And on the sort of higher-order
theory of consciousness which I favor (Carruthers 2000),
perceptual and imagistic states get to be phenomenally con-
scious by virtue of their availability to the higher-order
thoughts generated by the theory of mind system (i.e.,
thoughts about those perceptual and imagistic states). So
this is why inner speech of this sort is conscious: It is be-
cause it is available to higher-order thought.
The hypothesis, then, is that non-domain-specific, cross-
modular, propositional thought depends upon natural lan-
guage – and not just in the sense that language is a neces-
sary condition for us to entertain such thoughts, but in the
stronger sense that natural language representations are
the bearers of those propositional thought-contents. So lan-
guage is constitutively involved in (some kinds of) human
thinking. Specifically, language is the vehicle of non-modu-
lar, non-domain-specific, conceptual thinking which inte-
grates the results of modular thinking.
Before moving on to discuss the evidence in support of
our thesis, consider one further question. Why does it have
to be language, and not, for example, visual imagery that
serves the integrative function? For visual images, too, can
carry contents which cross modular domains. But such vi-
sual thinking will access and deploy the resources of a pe-
ripheral input module. It cannot, therefore, play a role in
integrating information across conceptual modules, be-
cause the latter exist down-stream of the input-systems. Vi-
sion provides input to conceptual modules, and doesn’t re-
ceive output from them. The language faculty, in contrast,
while also “peripheral,” has both input and output func-
tions. (I shall return to this point again in sect. 6.2 below.) I
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would hypothesize, therefore, that in cases where visual im-
ages have cross-modular contents (and aren’t memory im-
ages), they are always generated from some linguistic rep-
resentation which originally served to integrate those
contents.
5.2. The evidence
What evidence is there to support the hypothesis that nat-
ural language is the medium of inter-modular communica-
tion, or of non-domain-specific integrated thinking? Until
recently, the evidence was mostly circumstantial. For ex-
ample, one indirect line of argument in support of our the-
sis derives from cognitive archaeology, when combined
with the evidence of contemporary central-process modu-
larism (Mithen 1996). For as we noted above, it seems that
we have significant evidence of cross-modular thought only
following the emergence of contemporary humans some
100,000 years ago; whereas independent evidence suggests
that language, too, was a late evolutionary adaptation, only
finally emerging at about the same time (perhaps from an
earlier stage of “proto-language” – Bickerton 1990; 1995).
So the simplest hypothesis is that it is language which actu-
ally enables cross-modular thinking.
Another strand of indirect evidence can be provided if we
take seriously the idea that the stream of inner verbalization
is constitutive of (some forms of) thinking (Carruthers
1996). For as we saw in section 4, such views can only plau-
sibly be held (given the truth of central-process modular-
ism) together with the present hypothesis that language is
the main medium of inter-modular communication.
Much more important, however, direct tests of (limited
forms of) our hypothesis have now begun to be conducted.
The most important of these is Hermer-Vazquez et al. (1999),
which provides strong evidence that the integration of geo-
metric properties with other sorts of information (color,
smell, patterning, etc.) is dependent upon natural language.
The background to their studies with human adults is the
apparent discovery of a geometric module in rats by Cheng
(1986), as well as the discovery of a similar system in pre-
linguistic human children (Hermer & Spelke 1994; 1996).
Cheng (1986) placed rats in a rectagonal chamber, and
allowed them to discover the location of a food source. They
were then removed from the chamber and disoriented, be-
fore being placed back into the box with the food now hid-
den. In each case there were multiple cues available – both
geometric and non-geometric – to guide the rats in their
search. For example, the different walls might be distinc-
tively colored or patterned, one corner might be heavily
scented, and so on. In fact in these circumstances the rats
relied exclusively on geometric information, searching with
equal frequency, for example, in the two geometrically-
equivalent corners having a long wall on the left and a short
wall on the right. Yet rats are perfectly well capable of notic-
ing and remembering non-geometric properties of the en-
vironment and using them to solve other tasks. So it appears
that, not only are they incapable of integrating geometric
with non-geometric information in these circumstances,
but that geometric information takes priority.
(This makes perfectly good ecological-evolutionary
sense. For in the rat’s natural environment, overall geo-
metrical symmetries in the landscape are extremely rare,
and geometrical properties generally change only slowly
with time; whereas object-properties of color, scent-mark-
ings, and so on will change with the weather and seasons.
So a strong preference to orient by geometrical properties
is just what one might predict.)
Hermer and Spelke (1994; 1996) found exactly the same
phenomenon in pre-linguistic human children. Young chil-
dren, too, rely exclusively on geometric information when
disoriented in a rectangular room, and appear incapable of
integrating geometrical with non-geometrical properties
when searching for a previously seen but now-hidden ob-
ject. Older children and adults are able to solve these prob-
lems without difficulty – for example, they go straight to the
corner formed with a long wall to the left and a short blue
wall to the right. It turns out that success in these tasks isn’t
directly correlated with age, nonverbal IQ, verbal working-
memory capacity, vocabulary size, or comprehension of
spatial vocabulary. In contrast, the only significant predic-
tor of success in these tasks which could be discovered, was
spontaneous use of spatial vocabulary conjoined with object-
properties (e.g., “It’s left of the red one”). Even by them-
selves, these data strongly suggest that it is language which
enables older children and adults to integrate geometric
with non-geometric information into a single thought or
memory.
Hermer-Vazquez et al. (1999) set out to test this idea with
a series of dual-task experiments with adults. In one condi-
tion, subjects were required to solve one of these orien-
tation problems while shadowing (i.e., repeating back)
speech played to them through a set of headphones. In an-
other condition, they were set the same problems while
shadowing (with their hands) a rhythm played to them in
their headphones. The hypothesis was that speech-shad-
owing would tie up the resources of the language faculty,
whereas the rhythm-shadowing tasks would not; and great
care was taken to ensure that the latter tasks were equally if
not more demanding of the resources of working memory.
The results of these experiments were striking. Shadow-
ing of speech severely disrupted subjects’ capacity to solve
tasks requiring integration of geometric with non-geomet-
ric properties. In contrast, shadowing of rhythm disrupted
subjects’ performance relatively little. Moreover, a follow-
up experiment demonstrated that shadowing of speech
didn’t disrupt subjects’ capacities to utilize non-geometric
information per se – they were easily able to solve tasks re-
quiring only memory for object-properties. So it would ap-
pear that it is language itself which enables subjects to con-
join geometric with non-geometric properties, just as the
hypothesis that language is the medium of cross-modular
thinking predicts.
Of course, this is just one set of experiments – albeit el-
egant and powerful – concerning the role of language in en-
abling information to be combined across just two domains
(geometrical and object-properties). In which case, little di-
rect support is provided for the more-demanding thesis that
language serves as the vehicle of inter-modular integration
in general. But the evidence does at least suggest that the
more general thesis may be well worth pursing.
5.3. Challenging the data
The position taken by Hermer-Vazquez et al. (1999) has
come under pressure from two different directions. First,
there are claims that other species (chickens, monkeys) can
integrate geometric and landmark information when dis-
oriented (Gouteux et al. 2002; Vallortigara et al. 1990). And
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second, there is the finding that success in these tasks
amongst young children is somewhat sensitive to the size of
the room – in a larger room, significantly more young (four-
year-old) children make the correct choice, utilizing both
geometric and landmark information; and even more five-
and six-year-old children are also able to make the correct
choice (Learmonth et al. 2001; in press).
To begin unpicking the significance of these new results,
we need to return to some of the original claims. It is too
strong to say that the original data with rats (Cheng, 1986)
showed the existence of a geometric module in that species.
For rats can use landmark information when navigating in
other circumstances. The fact is just that they don’t use such
information when disoriented. Nor is it established that rats
cannot integrate geometric with landmark information.
The fact is just that they do not utilize both forms of infor-
mation when disoriented. So the data are consistent with
the following model: there are no modules; rather, geomet-
ric and landmark information are both processed according
to general-purpose algorithms and made available to some
sort of practical reasoning system. But when disoriented,
rats only pay attention to, and only make use of, the geo-
metric information.
Even if one thinks (as I do) that other forms of evidence
and other arguments make some sort of modularist archi-
tecture quite likely, the following proposal is still consistent
with the data: both the geometric and landmark modules
normally make their information available to some sort of
practical reasoning system; but when disoriented, rats show
a strong preference to make use only of the geometric in-
formation.
Equally, however, the fact that other species are able to
solve these problems doesn’t show that members of those
species can integrate geometric with landmark information
into a single belief or thought. For it is possible to solve
these tasks by making use of the information sequentially.
The problems can be solved by first re-orienting to the
landmark, and then using geometric information to isolate
the correct corner. So the data are consistent with the fol-
lowing modularist model: Both the geometric and land-
mark modules make their outputs available to a limited-
channel practical reasoning system, where the latter doesn’t
have the inferential resources to integrate information from
different modules; rather, it can only utilize that informa-
tion sequentially, using a variety of heuristics (both innate
and learned) in selecting the information to be used, and in
what order. According to this view, the difference between
monkeys and rats is just that the former utilize landmark in-
formation first, before using geometry; whereas the latter
use geometry exclusively in these circumstances. Neither
species may in fact be capable of integrating geometrical
with landmark information.
(It is tempting to seek an adaptionist explanation of these
species differences. Open-country dwellers such as rats and
pre-linguistic humans may have an innate pre-disposition to
rely only on geometric information when disoriented be-
cause such information alone will almost always provide a
unique solution – given that rectagonal rooms don’t nor-
mally occur in nature! Forest dwellers such as chickens and
monkeys, in contrast, have an innate pre-disposition to seek
for landmark information first, only using geometric infor-
mation to navigate in relation to a known landmark. This is
because geometric information is of limited usefulness in a
forest – the geometry is just too complex to be useful in in-
dividuating a place in the absence of a landmark such as a
well-known fruit-tree.)
What of the new data concerning the effects of room
size? Well, the first thing to say is that this data leaves intact
the finding by Hermer-Vazquez et al. (1999) that the best
predictor of success in children (in small room experi-
ments) is productive use of left-right vocabulary. This sug-
gests, both that language has something to do with their
success, and that it is specifically syntax (the capacity to 
integrate different content-bearing items into a single
thought) that is required. For if the role of language were
simply to help fix the salience and importance of landmark
information, one would expect that it should have been pro-
ductive use of color vocabulary, rather than spatial vocabu-
lary, which was the best predictor of success. For by hy-
pothesis, after all, children are already disposed to use
geometric information in reorienting; their problem is to
make use of color information as well.
Equally untouched are the experiments with adults in-
volving speech shadowing and rhythm shadowing, which
found that the former greatly disrupts the capacity to use
geometric and landmark information together, whereas the
latter does not. These results, too, suggest that it is language
which enables adults to integrate the two forms of infor-
mation.
Why should room size have any effect upon children’s
performance, however? Here is one testable possibility,
which is consistent with the theoretical framework of Her-
mer-Vazquez et al. (1999) and the present author. In a small
room (4 feet by 6 feet) it requires but very little time and
energy to select a corner and turn over a card. In a larger
room (8 feet by 12 feet), in contrast, children have to take
a few steps in order to reach a selected corner, giving them
both a motive, and the time, to reflect. It may then be that
the children who were able to succeed in the large-room
condition were on the cusp of having the linguistic compe-
tence necessary to integrate geometric and landmark infor-
mation. Perhaps they could do this, but only haltingly and
with some effort. Then it is only to be expected that such
children should succeed when given both the time and the
motive to do so.
5.4. More data: Language and arithmetic
We have examined one set of data which provides strong
support for a limited version of our thesis. Data is now avail-
able in one other domain – that of number. This comes
from a recent bilingual training study conducted by Spelke
and Tsivkin (2001). The background to this study is the dis-
covery of numerical capacities in animals and human in-
fants, of two different sorts. One is the capacity possessed
by many different kinds of animal (including birds and fish)
to represent the approximate numerosity of largish sets of
items (Dehaene 1997; Gallistel 1990). This capacity is uti-
lized especially in foraging, enabling animals to estimate
rates of return from different food sources. The other nu-
merical capacity is possessed by monkeys and human in-
fants, at least. It is a capacity to represent the exact number
of small sets of items (up to about four), keeping track of
their number using simple forms of addition and subtrac-
tion (Gallistel & Gelman 1992; Hauser & Carey 1998).
The developmental hypothesis which forms the back-
drop to Spelke and Tsivkin’s study is that language-learning
in human children – specifically, learning to pair number
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words with items in a set through the process of counting –
builds upon these two pre-linguistic numerical capacities to
enable humans to represent exact numbers of unlimited
magnitude. But the developmental hypothesis could be in-
terpreted in two ways. On one interpretation, the role of
language is to load the child’s mind with a set of language-
independent exact numerical concepts – so that, once ac-
quired, the capacity to represent exact large magnitudes is
independent of language. The other interpretation is that it
is the numerical vocabulary of a specific natural language
which forms the medium of exact-magnitude representa-
tion, in such a way that natural language is the vehicle of
arithmetic thought. It is this latter interpretation which
Spelke and Tsivkin (2001) set out to test.
They conducted three different bilingual arithmetic train-
ing experiments. In one experiment, bilingual Russian-En-
glish college students were taught new numerical operations;
in another, they were taught new arithmetic equations; and
in the third, they were taught new geographical and histori-
cal facts involving both numerical and non-numerical infor-
mation. After learning a set of items in each of their two lan-
guages, subjects were tested for knowledge of those and of
new items in both languages. In all three studies subjects re-
trieved information about exact numbers more effectively in
the language in which they were trained on that information,
and they solved trained problems more effectively than new
ones. In contrast, subjects retrieved information about ap-
proximate numbers and about non-numerical (geographical
or historical) facts with equal ease in their two languages, and
their training on approximate number facts generalized to
new facts of the same type.9 These results suggest that one
or another natural language is the vehicle of thought about
exact numbers, but not for representing approximate nu-
merosity (a capacity shared with other animals).
What we have, then, is the beginnings of evidence in sup-
port of our general thesis that natural language is the
medium of inter-modular non-domain-specific thinking. In
sect. 7, I shall briefly consider where and how one might
search for yet more evidence. But first I shall look at some
of the questions raised by our thesis.
6. Ramifications and implications
In this section I shall consider – very briefly – some of the
implications of the hypothesis just proposed, as well as dis-
cussing a number of outstanding questions.
6.1. Speech production
It is plain that the present hypothesis commits us to a non-
classical account of speech production. Classically, speech
begins with thought – with a mental representation of the
message to be communicated; and then linguistic resources
(lexical and phonological items, syntactic structures and so
on) are recruited in such a way as to express that thought in
speech. (See, e.g., Levelt 1989.) But of course this is a pic-
ture which we cannot endorse. We cannot accept that the
production of the sentence, “The toy is to the left of the blue
wall” begins with a tokening of the thought, the toy is to
the left of the blue wall (in Mentalese), since our hy-
pothesis is that such a thought cannot be entertained inde-
pendently of being framed in natural language.10 How, then,
does the sentence get assembled? I have to confess that I
don’t have a complete answer to this question in my pocket
at the moment! But then this need be no particular embar-
rassment, since classical theorists don’t have an account of
how their initial Mentalese thoughts are assembled, either.
In fact our hypothesis enables us to split the problem of
speech production/domain-general thought-generation into
two, each of which may prove individually more tractable.
For we are supposing that central modules are capable of
generating thoughts with respect to items in their domain.
Thus the geometrical module might build a thought of the
form, the toy is in the corner with a long wall on
the left and a short wall on the right, whereas the
object-property system might build a thought of the form,
the toy is by the blue wall. Each of these thoughts
can be taken as input by the language faculty, we may sup-
pose, for direct translation into natural language expression.
It is, then, not so very difficult to suppose that the language
faculty might have the resources to combine these two
thoughts into one, forming a representation with the con-
tent, The toy is in the corner with a long wall on the left and
a short blue wall on the right.11 Nor is this such a very large
departure from classical accounts. (Certainly it is much less
radical than Dennett’s endorsement of pandemonium mod-
els of speech production; see his 1991.)
The two tasks facing us, then, in explaining speech pro-
duction are, first, to explain how the thoughts generated by
central modules are used to produce a natural language
sentence with the same content; and second, to explain how
the language faculty can take two distinct sentences, gen-
erated from the outputs of distinct conceptual modules,
and combine them into a single natural language sentence.
There is some reason to hope that, thus divided, the prob-
lem may ultimately prove tractable. In responding to the
first part of the problem we can utilize classical accounts of
speech production. Here just let me say a brief word about
the second of the above problems, by way of further ex-
plaining the role of syntax in my model.
Two points are suggestive of how distinct domain-spe-
cific sentences might be combined into a single domain-
general one. One is that natural language syntax allows for
multiple embedding of adjectives and phrases. Thus one
can have, “The food is in the corner with the long wall on
the left,” “The food is in the corner with the long straight
wall on the left,” and so on. So there are already “slots” into
which additional adjectives – such as “blue” – can be in-
serted. The second point is that the reference of terms like
“the wall,” “the food,” and so on will need to be secured by
some sort of indexing to the contents of current perception
or recent memory. In which case it looks like it would not
be too complex a matter for the language production sys-
tem to take two sentences sharing a number of references
like this, and combine them into one sentence by inserting
adjectives from one into open adjective-slots in the other.
The language faculty just has to take the two sentences,
“The food is in the corner with the long wall on the left” and,
“The food is by the blue wall” and use them to generate the
sentence, “The food is in the corner with the long blue wall
on the left,” or the sentence, “The food is in the corner with
the long wall on the left by the blue wall.”
6.2. Cycles of LF activity
The present proposals may enable us to rescue one other
aspect of Dennett’s (1991) “Joycean machine” hypothesis
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(in addition to the “learned linguistic habits” idea, discussed
in sect. 4 above), again without commitment to his claim
that language is the medium of all (realistically-construed
and structured) conceptual thought. This is the suggestion
that by asking ourselves questions we can initiate searches
in a number of different modular systems, perhaps gener-
ating new information which in turn generates new ques-
tions, and so on. In general this cycle of questions and an-
swers will go on consciously, in inner speech (as Dennett
supposes), but it might also be conducted non-consciously
(either below the threshold of attention or perhaps in LF –
I shall not pursue this suggestion here), through over-learn-
ing. Let me elaborate.
The crucial point for these purposes is that natural lan-
guage is both an input and an output system. It is the out-
put sub-system of the language faculty which will initially
play the role of conjoining information from different con-
ceptual modules, since it is this sub-system which will have
been designed to receive inputs from those modules. This is
because the evolution of a language system would already
have required some sort of interface between the Mentalese
outputs of the conceptual modules and the speech-produc-
tion sub-system of the language faculty, so that those
thoughts could receive expression in speech. And we are
supposing that this interface became modified during the
evolution of language so that thoughts deriving from distinct
conceptual modules could be combined into a single natural
language sentence. But when the resulting LF representa-
tion is used to generate a phonological representation of that
sentence, in inner speech, this might normally co-opt the re-
sources of the input sub-system of the language faculty, in
such a way as to generate a “heard” sentence in auditory
imagination. By virtue of being “heard,” then, the sentence
would also be taken as input to the conceptual modules
which are down-stream of the comprehension sub-system
of the language faculty, receiving the latter’s output. So the
cycle goes: thoughts generated by central modules are used
to frame a natural language representation, which is used to
generate a sentence in auditory imagination, which is then
taken as input by the central modules once again.
A comparison with visual imagination may be of some
help here. According to Kosslyn (1994), visual imagination
exploits the top-down neural pathways (which are deployed
in normal vision to direct visual search and to enhance ob-
ject recognition) in order to generate visual stimuli in the
occipital cortex, which are then processed by the visual sys-
tem in the normal way, just as if they were visual percepts.
A conceptual or other non-visual representation (of the let-
ter “A,” as it might be) is projected back through the visual
system in such a way as to generate activity in the occipital
cortex, just as if a letter “A” were being perceived. This ac-
tivity is then processed by the visual system to yield a quasi-
visual percept.
Something very similar to this presumably takes place in
auditory (and other forms of) imagination. Back-projecting
neural pathways which are normally exploited in the pro-
cessing of heard speech will be recruited to generate a
quasi-auditory input, yielding the phenomenon of “inner
speech.” In this way the outputs of the various conceptual
modules, united into a sentence of LF by the production
sub-system of the language faculty, can become inputs to
those same modules by recruiting the resources of the com-
prehension sub-system of the language faculty, in inner
speech.
But now, how would a sentence which combines infor-
mation across a number of distinct central-modular do-
mains have its content “split up” so as to be taken as input
again by those modules, with their proprietary and domain-
specific concepts? One plausible suggestion is that this is
one of the primary functions of so-called “mental models”
– non-sentential, quasi-imagistic representations of the
salient features of a situation being thought about (John-
son-Laird 1983). For it is now well-established that mental
models play an indispensable role in discourse comprehen-
sion (see Harris 2000, for reviews). When listening to
speech, what people do is construct a mental model of the
situation being described, which they can then use to un-
derpin further inferences. The reason why this may work is
that mental models, being perception-like, are already of
the right form to be taken as input by the suite of concep-
tual modules. For of course those modules would originally
have been built to handle perceptual inputs, prior to the
evolution of language.
So the suggestion is that language, by virtue of its role in
unifying the outputs of conceptual modules, and by virtue
of our capacity for auditory imagination, can be used to gen-
erate cycles of central-modular activity, hence recruiting
the resources of a range of specialized central-modular sys-
tems in seeking solutions to problems. This may be one of
the main sources of the cognitive flexibility and adaptabil-
ity which is so distinctive of our species. But how, exactly,
are the LF questions which are used in such cycles of en-
quiry to be generated? How does the language system for-
mulate interrogative sentences which are both relevant and
fruitful? I do not have an answer to this question. But I am
not embarrassed by this lack, since I suspect that no one
has, as yet, a worked-out story about how interrogative
thoughts are formed.
6.3. LF consumers
What are the consumer systems for the LF sentences gen-
erated from the outputs of the central modules? What can
be done with an LF sentence, once it has been formulated?
One thing which it can be used for, obviously, is to gen-
erate an imaged natural language sentence with the same
content, thereby rendering the thought in question con-
scious, and triggering the kinds of mental activity and 
further consequences distinctive of conscious thinking.
Specifically, it may make possible sequences of thought in
accordance with learned habits or rules (see sect. 4 above);
it will make that sentence and its content accessible to a va-
riety of central-process systems for consideration, and for
acceptance or rejection (see sect. 4 above); and it may make
possible cycles of LF activity involving central modules,
generating new thought-contents which were not previ-
ously available (see sect. 6.2 above).
In addition, I can think of two plausible special-purpose
systems which may have been designed to consume LF rep-
resentations. First, it may be that there is a domain-general
factual memory system. (It is already known that there is a
factual-semantic memory system which is distinct from the
experiential-personal memory system, and that the latter is
experience-driven whereas the former is not. See Baddeley
1988.) This system would either store domain-general in-
formation in the form of LF sentences, or (more plausibly)
in some other format (mental models?) generated by the
LF sentences which it takes as input. (Recall the data from
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Spelke & Tsivkin 2001, that geographical and historical in-
formation is recalled equally readily whether or not the lan-
guage of learning is the same as the language of testing.)
Second, it may be that there is, in addition, some sort 
of innately-channeled abductive reasoning faculty, which
places constraints upon sentence acceptance (Carruthers
1992; 2002). This would be a domain-general reasoning sys-
tem, taking LF sentences as input and generating LF sen-
tences as output. The reasons for believing in a faculty of
“inference to the best explanation” are two-fold. First, there
are certain very general constraints on theory-choice em-
ployed in science which are equally valid in other areas of
enquiry, and which appear to be universal amongst humans.
While no one any longer thinks that it is possible to codify
these principles of abductive inference, it is generally
agreed that the good-making features of a theory include
such features as: (1) accuracy (predicting all or most of the
data to be explained, and explaining away the rest); (2) sim-
plicity (being expressible as economically as possible, with
the fewest commitments to distinct kinds of fact and
process); (3) consistency (internal to the theory or model);
(4) coherence (with surrounding beliefs and theories, mesh-
ing together with those surroundings, or at least being con-
sistent with them); (5) fruitfulness (making new predictions
and suggesting new lines of enquiry); and (6) explanatory
scope (unifying together a diverse range of data).
Essentially the same principles are employed in many
contexts of everyday reasoning. Most strikingly for our pur-
poses, however, such principles are employed by human
hunter-gatherers, especially when tracking prey. Successful
hunters will often need to develop speculative hypotheses
concerning the likely causes of the few signs available to
them, and concerning the likely future behavior of the ani-
mal; and these hypotheses are subjected to extensive de-
bate and further empirical testing by the hunters con-
cerned. When examined in detail these activities look a
great deal like science, as Liebenberg (1990) demonstrates.
First, there is the invention of one or more hypotheses
concerning the unobserved (and now unobservable) causes
of the observed signs, and the circumstances in which they
may have been made. These hypotheses are then examined
and discussed for their accuracy, coherence with background
knowledge, and explanatory and predictive power.12 One of
them may emerge out of this debate as the most plausible,
and this can then be acted upon by the hunters, while at the
same time searching for further signs which might confirm
or count against it. In the course of a single hunt one can
then see the birth, development, and death of a number of
different “research programs” in a manner which is at least
partly reminiscent of theory-change in science (Lakatos
1970).
The second point supporting the existence of an abduc-
tive “consumer system” is this. Not only are abductive prin-
ciples universal amongst humans, but it is hard to see how
they could be other than substantially innate (Carruthers
1992). Because these principles are amongst the basic prin-
ciples of learning, they cannot themselves be learned. And
neither are they explicitly taught, at least in hunter-gatherer
societies. While nascent trackers may acquire much of their
background knowledge of animals and animal behavior by
hearsay from adults and peers, very little overt teaching of
tracking itself takes place. Rather, young boys will practice
their observational and reasoning skills for themselves, first
by following and interpreting the tracks of insects, lizards,
small rodents, and birds around the vicinity of the campsite,
and then in tracking and catching small animals for the pot
(Liebenberg 1990). Nor are abductive principles taught to
younger school-age children in our own society, in fact. Yet
experimental tests suggest that children’s reasoning and
problem-solving is almost fully in accord with those princi-
ples, at least once the tests are conducted within an appro-
priate scientific-realist framework (Koslowski 1996). This is
in striking contrast with many other areas of cognition,
where naïve performance is at variance with our best nor-
mative principles. (For reviews see Evans & Over 1996;
Stein 1996.)
In addition to a domain-general factual memory system,
then, I have suggested that there may well be a domain-
general faculty of abductive inference. So there are, it
seems, at least two likely domain-general consumer-sys-
tems for LF representations, which either co-evolved with
language, or which were specially designed by evolution at
some point after language had taken on its role as the
medium of inter-modular integration.
6.4. LF and mind reading
There are a number of reasons for thinking that the lan-
guage faculty and our mind reading (or “theory of mind”)
faculty will be intimately connected with one another. First,
there is no question but that mind reading is vitally impli-
cated in the processing and interpretation of speech, espe-
cially in its pragmatic aspects, including such phenomena
as metaphor and irony (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995). Sec-
ond, there is good reason to think that the evolution of the
two faculties will have been intertwined in a kind of evolu-
tionary “arms race” (Gómez 1998), and that language is one
of the crucial inputs for normal mind reading development
in young children (Harris 1996; Peterson & Siegal 1998).
Finally, our mind reading faculty – specifically our capacity
for higher-order or meta-representational thought – will be
crucial to the operations of the sort of serial, conscious, lan-
guage-using level of mentality discussed in sections 4 and
6.2 above (Perner 1998; Sperber 1996).
Almost everyone now accepts that our mind-reading ca-
pacity comes in degrees, developing in stages between nine
months (or earlier) and around four years of age; and a
number of related proposals have been made concerning
the stages which young children pass through (Gopnik &
Melzoff 1997; Perner 1991; Wellman 1990). Those who
want to claim that language is implicated in mind-reading
capacities would, I think, restrict their claims to the sort of
meta-representational mind reading of which children be-
come capable at about four (Segal 1998; de Villiers 2000).
That is, what they find attractive is the suggestion that two-
and three-year-old psychology (of the sort which we may
well share with chimpanzees, perhaps) is independent of
language, whereas full-blown theory of mind (four-year-old
psychology or ToM) partly depends upon it. But we should
distinguish between two different claims here, one of which
is very likely true, yet the other of which is probably false.
The first (weaker) suggestion is just that full-blown ToM
needs to access the resources of the language faculty in or-
der to describe the contents of (some of) the thoughts be-
ing attributed to self or other. (I say this is weaker because
the concept of thought in general, as a representational
state of the agent which can represent correctly or incor-
rectly, can still be held to be independent of language – see
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below.) And if you think about it, something like this must
be true if any version of the present proposal about the role
of language in linking together different modules is correct.
For if geometry and color (say) can’t be combined in a sin-
gle thought without language, then one could hardly expect
the mind-reading faculty to be able to attribute a thought
to another (or to oneself) which conjoins geometry with
color without deploying language! This would be to give
that faculty almost-magical super-properties possessed by
no other module. No, if entertaining the thought that the
object is to the left of the blue wall requires tokening the
LF representation, “The object is to the left of the blue
wall,” then ascribing to someone the belief that the object is
to the left of the blue wall would similarly require the use
of that LF sentence.
There may be a more general point here, which gives the
element of truth in so-called “simulationist” theories of our
mind-reading abilities (Goldman 1989; 1993; Gordon 1986;
1995; Heal 1986; 1995). For in order for you to know what
someone is likely to infer from a given thought, you will have
to deploy your general – non-ToM – inferential resources,
including any that are modular in nature. Otherwise we will
have to think of the mind-reading system as somehow en-
compassing all others, or as containing a meta-theory which
describes the operations of all others. This is in fact the 
reason why many – including Nichols and Stich, 1998, and
forthcoming; Botterill and Carruthers 1999; and others –
are now defending a sort of mixed theory/simulation view
of our mind-reading abilities.
The second, stronger, hypothesis would be that the very
concept of thought is dependent upon language, and re-
quires an LF vehicle. According to this view, you can only
have the concept of belief, say, as a representational and po-
tentially-false state of an agent, if you are a language-user –
specifically, if you have mastered some version of the that-
clause construction made available in all natural languages
(Segal 1998). It is this hypothesis which I would be inclined
to deny. For there is evidence from aphasic adults, at least,
that people who have lost their capacity for mentalistic vo-
cabulary can nevertheless pass false-belief tasks of various
sorts (Varley 1998). So I think that the full, four-year-old,
ToM system is a language-independent theory which comes
on line at a certain stage in normal development (albeit with
that development being especially accelerated by the de-
mands of interpreting linguistic input – Harris 1996; Pe-
terson & Siegal 1998), which nevertheless has to access the
resources of other systems (including the language faculty)
in order to go about its work of deducing what to expect of
someone who has a given belief, and so on. But of course
the question is an empirical one, and the stronger hypoth-
esis may well turn out to be right.
One way of pointing up the difference, here, is that on
the weaker hypothesis you can do false-belief without lan-
guage (at least in intra-modular contexts), although there
will be many thoughts which you will be incapable of at-
tributing (namely, those which are dependent upon lan-
guage); whereas on the stronger hypothesis the capacity to
solve false-belief tasks will be language-dependent across
all contexts. Another empirical difference between the two
accounts would appear to be that on the weaker hypothesis
false-belief tasks which deal with contents drawn from a
single module should be easier than those dealing with
cross-modular contents – for the latter but not the former
will need to operate on an LF representation. But on the
stronger hypothesis there should be less or no difference,
since all higher-order thoughts will deploy LF representa-
tions. These predictions cry out for experimental investiga-
tion.
7. Future evidence
What further sorts of evidence would either confirm, or 
disconfirm, the hypothesis that natural language is the
medium of cross-modular thinking?
One obvious way forward would be to undertake many
more dual-task studies of the sort conducted by Hermer-
Vazquez et al. (1999). Subjects might be asked to solve prob-
lems which require information to be conjoined from two or
more central-modular domains – for example: geometrical
and folk-biological, or geometrical and folk-physical, or folk-
biological and folk-physical. They might be asked to solve
these tasks in two conditions – in one of which they are
asked to shadow speech (hence tying up the resources of
their language faculty), and in the other of which they are
asked to shadow a rhythm (tying up their working memory
to an equal or greater degree). If they fail on the task when
shadowing speech but not when shadowing rhythm then
this would be further evidence in support of the thesis that
it is language which is the medium for integrating knowl-
edge from different conceptual modules.
If it were to turn out that subjects perform equally well
in the two conditions (either succeeding in both or failing
in both), then would this be evidence against our thesis?
Perhaps. But some caution would need to be shown before
drawing any such conclusion. For one difficulty standing in
the way of developing such studies is that of ensuring that
the tasks genuinely do involve the conjoining of information
across domains, and that they cannot be solved by access-
ing that information sequentially. So if subjects succeed un-
der each of the conditions (whether shadowing speech or
shadowing rhythm) in a task requiring them to tap into both
folk-physical and folk-biological information, say, this might
be because they first use information from one domain to
make progress in the task and then use information from
the other to complete it. (One of the distinctive features of
the problems chosen for study by Hermer-Vazquez et al., is
that it was known independently that in conditions of spa-
tial disorientation, geometric information is relied upon
exclusively in the absence of language.) Some care will
therefore need to be taken in designing the relevant ex-
periments.
In addition, of course, it is still to some degree contro-
versial whether (and if so which) central modules exist. So
a negative result in a dual-task experiment might be be-
cause one or more of the supposed conceptual modules
chosen for the study doesn’t really exist, not because lan-
guage isn’t the medium of inter-modular communication.
But as often has to happen in science, we can regard such
dual-task studies as jointly testing both the thesis of con-
ceptual modularity and the claim that language is the
medium of inter-modular integration. A positive result will
count in favor of both claims; a negative result will count
against one or other of them (but not both).
In principle, dual-task studies might fruitfully be devised
wherever researchers have independent reason to believe
in the existence of a conceptual module. For example, those
who believe that there is a special system for recognizing
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and figuring out the degree of relatedness of kin, or those
who believe that there is a special system for processing so-
cial contracts and detecting cheaters and free-riders, might
construct a dual-task study to test whether the conjoining
of information from these domains with others requires lan-
guage. But I want to stress that such studies should not be
conducted in the domain of mind-reading (despite the fact
that many believe in its central-modular status), because of
the points made in section 6.4 above. Since there is reason
to think that mind reading routinely co-opts the resources
of the language faculty in any case, failure in a speech-shad-
owing task but not in a rhythm-shadowing task would not
necessarily count in favor of the thesis that language is the
medium of cross-modular thinking.13
The other obvious place to look for evidence for or
against our thesis, is in connection with either global or
agrammatic aphasia. If subjects who are known to lack any
capacity for formulating natural language sentences fail at
tasks requiring them to conjoin information from different
conceptual-modular domains, but can pass equivalently de-
manding tasks within a given domain, then this would be
strong evidence in support of our claim. (This is a big “if,”
of course, given the difficulties of discriminating between
patients who have lost all grammatical competence and
those who have problems only with linguistic input and out-
put.) And here, as before, if such subjects should turn out
to pass both types of task, then this will count either against
the thesis that language is the medium of inter-modular in-
tegration; or the existence of one or other of the supposed
modules in question (but not both).
8. Conclusion
This paper has reviewed a wide range of claims concerning
the cognitive functions of language. At one extreme is the
purely communicative (or input-output) conception of lan-
guage, and at the other extreme is the claim that language
is required for all propositional thought as a matter of con-
ceptual necessity, with a variety of positions in between
these two poles. Section 2 discussed some versions of the
cognitive conception of language which are too weak to be
of any deep interest; and section 3 considered some claims
which are too strong to be acceptable. Section 4 expressed
sympathy for a variety of “dual process” models of cogni-
tion, especially the claim that language is the vehicle of con-
scious-conceptual thinking. But it pointed out that to be
plausible (given the truth of central-process modularism)
such views must depend on the prior and more fundamen-
tal claim that language is the medium of cross-modular
thought. This then became the focus of our enquiries in sec-
tions 5 through 7, where evidence was adduced in its sup-
port, its implications discussed, and a call for further ex-
perimental testing was posted.
In closing, however, let me provide a reminder of the
character of the exercise we have undertaken. Almost every
paragraph in this paper has contained claims which are still
controversial to some degree, and yet there hasn’t been the
space to pursue those controversies or to defend my as-
sumptions. This has been inevitable, given the array of the-
ories we have considered, and the range of considerations
and types of evidence which are relevant to their truth,
drawn from a variety of academic disciplines. But then the
task has only been to survey those theories, and to show that
some of them are well enough motivated to warrant further
investigation – not to nail down and conclusively establish
a precisely formulated thesis. And in that task, I hope, the
target article has succeeded.
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NOTES
1. Philosophers and logicians should note that Chomsky’s LF
is very different from what they are apt to mean by “logical form.”
In particular, sentences of LF don’t consist just in logical constants
and quantifiers, variables, and dummy names. Rather, they are
constructed from lexical items drawn from the natural language in
question. They are also syntactically structured, but regimented in
such a way that all scope-ambiguities and the like are resolved, and
with pronouns cross-indexed to their referents and so on. More-
over, the lexical items will be semantically interpreted, linked to
whatever structures in the knowledge-base secure their meanings.
Note, too, that an appeal to LF isn’t strictly necessary for the
purposes of the main thesis of this article. I use it more by way of
illustration, and for the sake of concreteness. All that is truly es-
sential is that there should exist a separate mental faculty for pro-
cessing natural language, with both input and output functions,
and that this faculty should deal in structured representations.
2. Admittedly, developmental psychologists have – until very
recently – tended to down-play the significance of testimony (and
hence of language) in child development. Following Piaget, they
have mostly viewed children as individualistic learners – acquir-
ing information for themselves, and developing and testing theo-
ries in the light of the information acquired (e.g. Gopnik & Mel-
zoff 1997). See Harris (2002) who makes a powerful plea for the
role of testimony to be taken much more seriously in accounts of
child development.
3. This is, in fact, a weak version of the Whorfian hypothesis,
to be discussed in its strongest form in section 3.2.
4. This date for the first appearance of fully-syntactic natural
language seems to be quite widely adopted amongst cognitive ar-
chaeologists – see Mithen 1996 – so I, too, propose to accept it
(albeit tentatively) in what follows. But it is, of course, still highly
controversial. And it should be noted that at least some of the ev-
idence for it turns on assumptions about the cognitive role of lan-
guage.
5. Here and throughout the remainder of this article I shall use
the term “module” loosely (following Smith & Tsimpli 1995, and
others) especially when talking about central-process, or concep-
tual, modules. (Another option would have been to use the stylis-
tically-barbaric term “quasi-module” throughout.) While these
systems might not be modular in Fodor’s classic (1983) sense –
they will not have proprietary inputs, for example, and might not
be fully encapsulated – they should be understood to conform to
at least some of the main elements of Fodorian modularity. As I
shall henceforward understand it, modules should be innately
channeled (to some significant degree) and subject to character-
istic patterns of breakdown; their operations might be mandatory
and relatively fast; and they should process information relating to
their distinctive domains according to their own specific algo-
rithms.
6. Note that the computer programme ChimpWorld which
successfully simulated chimpanzee behaviors and social structures
without deploying higher-order thoughts nevertheless did employ
structured propositional representations (Hughes 1993, reported
in Povinelli 2000).
7. What is the status of arguments that take the form, “It is very
hard to see how otherwise?” Do they merely reflect a lack of imag-
ination on our part? Perhaps. But a more sympathetic gloss is that
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these are just standard arguments to the best available explana-
tion. All theorizing, of course, in whatever discipline, has to work
with those theories which can be imagined, or thought of, to ex-
plain the data. And it is often the case that there is only one the-
ory which can be thought of to explain a given set of data.
8. How does this square with the data mentioned earlier, that
there is nevertheless a substantial correlation between language
ability and theory of mind in young children? Well, first, the
Hughes and Plomin finding is that the genes for theory of mind
and for verbal intelligence are not wholly independent of one an-
other. And second, a quarter of the variance in theory of mind abil-
ity comes from the environment: and this may well be linguisti-
cally mediated in one way or another.
9. Note that geographical information isn’t the same as geo-
metric information; neither do the kinds of fact in question re-
quire integration with geometry. (Knowing that Paris is the capi-
tal of France doesn’t need geometry.) So the finding that recall of
geographical information is independent of language isn’t incon-
sistent with the thesis that language is necessary to integrate geo-
metric information with information of other kinds.
10. I follow the usual convention of using small capitals for
Mentalese expressions, quotation-marks for natural language ex-
pressions, and italic to designate contents (as well as for empha-
sis).
11. In order to do this, the language faculty would need the re-
sources to know that the short wall on the right is the blue wall.
This might be possible if the outputs of the central modules are
always partly indexical, as suggested in section 5.1 above, with re-
ferring elements tied to the contents of current perception. For
we can surely suppose that the contents of perception are inte-
grated – one’s current perceptual state will contain a representa-
tion of the spatial layout of the room together with the colors of
the walls. See Carruthers (2000, Ch. 11) for an argument that the
demands of practical reasoning in relation to the perceived envi-
ronment require an integrated perceptual field.
12. I haven’t been able to find from my reading any direct ev-
idence that trackers will also place weight upon the relative sim-
plicity and internal consistency of the competing hypotheses. But
I would be prepared to bet a very great deal that they do. For these
are, arguably, epistemic values which govern much of cognition in
addition to hypothesis selection and testing (Chater 1999).
13. Other sorts of dual-task study can be imagined which
would test the thesis that language is implicated in the normal op-
erations of the mind-reading faculty. For example, subjects might
be asked to solve a pictoral version of one of the standard false-be-
lief tasks while shadowing speech (in one condition) and while
shadowing rhythm (in the other). But note that, given the differ-
ent versions of the proposal discussed in section 6.4 above, care
would need to be taken in choosing a mind-reading task. To test
the stronger of those proposals (that language is required for the
very idea of false belief), any sort of false-belief task would do; but
to test the weaker proposal (that language is involved in drawing
inferences from attributed beliefs) a more complex series of pic-
tures might be required.
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Abstract: Those who assume domain specificity or conceptual modular-
ity face Fodor’s Paradox (the problem of “combinatorial explosion”). One
strategy involves postulating a metamodule that evolved to take as input
the output of all other specialized conceptual modules, then integrates
these outputs into cross-domain thoughts. It’s difficult to see whether this
proposed metamodular capacity stems from language or theory of mind.
The argument for language as a metamodule that integrates in-
formation across cognitive domains assumes that peculiarly hu-
man conceptual capacities of categorization, reference, and rea-
soning are domain-specific, or modular. These modular faculties
automatically (innately and through maturation) parse the flux of
human experience into manageable proportions. Otherwise, the
world would seem too noisy for humans to acquire such rich and
complex systems of knowledge in fairly unique and uniform ways
(hence not susceptible to modeling by associationist processes,
connectionist or otherwise), despite wide individual variation in
exposure to diverse and fragmentary experiences (the “poverty-of-
stimulus” argument).
Parsing occurs through privileged (but not exclusive or propri-
etary) access to certain domains of stimuli, or input (e.g., me-
chanical movements of rigid bodies, organic relationships among
species and species parts, goal-directed interactions among self-
activating agents). These mental faculties (the old Descartes-
Leibniz term), or cognitive modules (the newer Chomsky-Fodor
notion), then process input from their respective natural domains
in highly distinctive ways to produce humankind’s ordinary con-
ceptions of the world (sometimes called “intuitive ontology”).
Candidates for the limited varieties of our evolved intuitive ontol-
ogy include so-called folk (or naïve) physics, biology, and psychol-
ogy, as well as spatial geometry and temporally sequenced num-
bering.
Those who accept domain specificity or conceptual modularity
face Fodor’s Paradox – the problem of combinatorial explosion.
Thus, the fact that none of us finds it difficult to generate and com-
prehend a sentence or thought in which, say, germs, gods, and
grease (or the kitchen sink) coexist cannot be explained by the sort
of modular processing that supposedly characterizes our intuitive
ontology. One strategy to solve the problem is to introduce the
possibility of a metamodule, whose evolved task (whether as a nat-
urally selected adaptation or concomitant by-product) is to take as
input the output of all other specialized conceptual modules, then
integrate these outputs into cross-domain thoughts.
Perhaps the first to propose such a metamodule was Dan Sper-
ber. His metamodule is part of folk psychology, that is, theory of
mind (ToM). The functional domain of what he calls the metarep-
resentational module is “the set of all representations of which the
organism is capable of inferring or otherwise apprehending the ex-
istence and content” (Sperber 1994, p. 60). The general idea is
that once you have mental states in your intuitive ontology, in-
cluding mental states of others, it’s a short evolutionary step (per-
haps no step at all) to forming intentions and desires to manipu-
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late the mental states of others. Indeed, this is what human com-
munication seems to be mostly about. Although such communi-
cation is clearly mediated by a public language (the product of a
language module), “the very development of public language is
not the cause, but an effect of the development of communication
made possible by the metarepresentational mode.”
Carruthers offers a similar solution to Fodor’s Paradox; only, he
attributes evolved metamodular functions to the language faculty,
not ToM. Carruthers’s insights about the role of language in
thought are enlightening (at least to me); his suggestions for fur-
ther experiments to test claims about how language integrates
thoughts across domains are important and should be seriously
pursued. But I see nothing here to allow a decision on whether
language or ToM is ultimately responsible for cross-modular inte-
gration.
Like Sperber, Carruthers maintains that “mind reading (or ‘the-
ory of mind’) . . . is vitally implicated in the processing and inter-
pretation of speech, especially in its pragmatic aspects.” More-
over, “there is good reason to think that the evolution of the two
faculties will have been intertwined in a kind of evolutionary ‘arms
race.’” In sum, “meta-representational thought – will be crucial to
the sorts of serial, conscious, language-using mentality” responsible
for “non-domain-specific, cross-modular, propositional thought.”
Carruthers harnesses new and compelling experimental evidence
from Hermer, Spelke, and colleagues to support the claim that
language is crucially involved in cross-modular thinking; however,
he acknowledges such studies cannot distinguish between lan-
guage and ToM as the ultimate source of domain integration be-
cause of their being so intertwined developmentally and, presum-
ably, evolutionarily.
It’s difficult to decide for one source or the other. This is be-
cause the crucial structural aspect of the metarepresentational
system, embedding of mental states (in ToM), may have coevolved
with syntactic recursion (in language) (Atran 2002). Short-term
memory limits iterated embedding of mental states (e.g., “Peter
thinks that [Dan knows that] . . .”) to five or six levels (R. Dunbar);
but as with center-embedding of linguistic clauses (also memory-
limited to under seven levels, N. Chomsky), computational ma-
chinery allows for indefinitely many embeddings (to any apparent
limit, add: “You really believe that . . .”). By giving a person more
time and external memory, more embedding is interpretable in a
unique and uniform way (not predicted by associationist models,
connectionist or otherwise). Without this embedding process
(whatever its source), whose surface product is logical form, there
seems to be no way to build cross-modular representations in sen-
tences or thoughts.
In the end, preference for one source over the other may de-
pend on whose evolutionary stories one finds congenial. But these
stories (so far) are just speculative tales consistent with natural se-
lection, lacking evidentiary standards for eliminating indefinitely
many alternative and even contrary explanations. Although Car-
ruthers renders some of these stories as parenthetical remarks, his
reasoning suggests more than there is. When he says “this makes
perfectly good-ecological-evolutionary sense” and leads to “just
what one might predict,” there remain indefinitely many other
sensible stories compatible with the data. At best, these accounts
retrodict findings. In no case do they predict surprising or signif-
icant discoveries unavailable before the “evolutionary” account
was proposed (this is a frequent problem with evolutionary psy-
chology explanation, however interesting).
Finally, Carruthers may be too kind to neo-Whorfians, who ar-
gue that particular languages sculpt culture-specific cognitive
processes. Thus, evidence on Yukatek (as opposed to English) sug-
gesting that subjects see similarities among objects based on ma-
terial composition rather than shape or function carries no deep
cognitive consequences (in reasoning, reference, pragmatic use,
or categorization). Stimuli were routinely simple objects (cork,
pieces of paper); when more complex objects were involved, dif-
ferences between Yukatek and English disappeared. For example,
our field team found Itza’ Maya (closely related to Yukatek) more
likely to group, say, a cedar canoe (chem) with an aluminum mo-
torboat (laanchaj) than with a cedar tree (k’uche’). Frequently
cited differences in spatial reasoning (e.g., more cardinal than rel-
ative positioning because of lack of prepositions in the language)
may not be much greater between languages and cultures than be-
tween, say, New Yorkers (lousy at cardinal positioning) and rural
Midwesterners (who talk about “the north side of the barn”). Even
a near-prepositionless Australian aboriginal wouldn’t likely refer
to the mole on the right side of the nose only in cardinal terms
(which would imply change of reference with every head move-
ment).
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Abstract: Thought uses meaning but not necessarily language. Meaning,
in the form of a set of possible concepts and ideas, is a nonphysical reality
that lay waiting for brains to become smart enough to represent these
ideas. Thus, the brain evolved, whereas meaning was discovered, and lan-
guage was invented – collectively – as a tool to help the brain use mean-
ing.
Carruthers’s excellent, thought-provoking article clarifies the re-
lationship between language and thought. It highlights important
distinctions among language, meaning, cognition, and conscious-
ness, none of which is entirely reducible to the other.
Baumeister (in press) proposes that natural selection shaped
the human psyche specifically for participation in culture. Cul-
ture uses language and meaning to organize social life and accu-
mulate knowledge, thereby improving success at the basic bio-
logical tasks of survival and reproduction. In this view, all living
things must deal with the physical environment to satisfy basic
needs. Many species use social life and social interaction as
strategies for improving how they deal with the physical envi-
ronment. A few species (ours, most extensively) use culture to
improve how they deal with social life and with the physical en-
vironment.
Carruthers speaks of the “evolution of language,” but if one
wishes to maintain the strict conceptual distinctions he promotes,
it is misleading to speak of language as having evolved. The brain
evolved; meaning was discovered; language was invented. Lan-
guage is a tool to help process meaning. Carruthers is persuasive
that some thought can occur without language, but of course the
ability to process complex meanings, including combining multi-
ple concepts into novel ideas, must remain quite limited without
language.
In saying that meaning is discovered, we imply that a large set
of concepts and their interrelationships lies “out there” indepen-
dently of people or brains. This is in some ways a radical view that
is at the opposite pole of the Sapir-Whorf (Whorf 1956) doctrine
that language determines thought. Sapir and Whorf promoted the
thesis that different languages produced fundamentally different
ways of thinking and experiencing. But in fact, most languages ex-
press the same concepts and have similar grammars. (The order
of words may vary, but the basic, underlying grammatical rela-
tionships are much the same. All languages denote things in the
world and their activities, properties, and relationships.) Some
writers, such as Pinker (2002), use this basic sameness to argue
that grammatical structure derives from brain structure. We pro-
pose the opposite: Grammar is inherent in the basic, universal
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structures of meaning, and the brain evolved to enable people to
represent and make profitable use of it.
The argument can be appreciated most clearly with mathemat-
ics, which is a relatively pure form of meaning. Mathematical
truths, such as 3 x 8 5 24, are true everywhere. Some cultures may
not have mastered multiplication, but in all cultures that have
mastered it, 3 x 8 5 24. Yet we do not see this as stemming from
any accident of how the structure of the brain evolved. Indeed, if
it becomes possible to travel across the galaxy and meet up with
intelligent life in distant solar systems – intelligence that is based
on brains that evolved quite independently of events on earth –
we predict that 3 times 8 will still equal 24. We also predict that
their languages, assuming they have developed them, will have
grammars similar to those on earth, so as to express things in the
world and their activities, properties, and relationships. Again,
these are inherent to the nature of meaning, not a by-product of
the how brain structure accidentally happened to evolve. Logical
reasoning is yet another example: Modus ponens will still be true
on the other side of the galaxy.
Thus, there is one very large set of concepts and ideas, and all
languages use it. This universe of possible ideas is an important
form of environment that needs to be appreciated. It is not a phys-
ical reality, although many concepts refer to things in the physical
world. Thinking inevitably uses these ideas, but as Carruthers has
persuasively shown, it does not necessarily use language to do so.
Still, language is by far the best tool for processing meaning, which
is presumably why all known human groups have developed lan-
guage. Baumeister’s (in press) argument is that the human brain
evolved in part to enable people to make use of this universe of
possible ideas, first in terms of social communication and then
more profoundly by developing culture.
As Carruthers has persuasively argued, language is optional in
the sense that many cognitive functions can be executed without
it. But surely he would agree that language vastly facilitates these
functions. Moreover, language is most valuable (and Carruthers
suggests even indispensable) for the most complex and integrative
mental operations. Precise mathematical calculation, logical rea-
soning, grammar and syntax, narrative story construction – these
are among the uses of meaning that enable human culture to flour-
ish, and they rely most heavily on language.
We have spoken as if language is a tool that individuals can in-
vent and use, but this ascribes too much power to the individual.
Language is invariably found to reside in groups. It is under-
standable that Carruthers neglected this aspect, because his focus
was on the cognitive rather than the social functions of language,
but in our view the social aspect is profoundly and perhaps inex-
tricably intertwined with the cognitive.
On that basis, we object gently to Carruthers’s phrase describ-
ing what happens when language “has done its developmental
work of loading the mind with information.” Putting it that way
implies that language serves a one-time function. On the contrary,
language’s most profound use is how it continues to connect the
individual to the culture. Many special features of human psy-
chology, such as lifelong plasticity, seem particularly suited for en-
abling people to live in a cultural society. Language’s “develop-
mental work of loading the mind with information” is never fully
done.
Language allows human culture to surpass what other species
can accomplish, because it stores information in the collective.
The bubonic plague may kill a third of the population, but the cul-
ture’s knowledge survives, because it is held in common. Hence
language should be understood as a tool used by the collective,
not just of individuals. Language allows cognition to accomplish
things that no individual mind could achieve, such as multigen-
erational accumulation and transmission of knowledge. That was
probably one of the decisive advantages that led natural selection
to favor it.
Domain-generality and the relative pronoun
José Luis Bermudez
University of Stirling, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK. jb10@stir .ac.uk
Abstract: The hypothesis in the target paper is that the cognitive function
of language lies in making possible the integration of different types of do-
main-specific information. The case for this hypothesis must consist, at
least in part, of a constructive proposal as to what feature or features of
natural language allows this integration to take place. This commentary
suggests that the vital linguistic element is the relative pronoun and the
possibility it affords of forming relative clauses.
Carruthers marshals an impressive array of evidence in support of
the hypothesis that natural language has the highly important cog-
nitive function of permitting the domain-general integration of
different, domain-specific types of information. The hypothesis is
put forward partly as a way of making sense of certain puzzling
features of the archeological record, and partly as a way of inter-
preting some highly suggestive experiments carried out on the
emergence of domain-specific thinking in early childhood (Her-
mer-Vazquez et al. 1999). As Carruthers himself admits, the power
and plausibility of the hypothesis is a function, not just of the de-
gree of correlation that can be established between language-use
and domain-general thinking, but more importantly of how ex-
actly it explains the way that language makes possible domain-gen-
eral thinking. We need to know not just what language does, but
how it does it. In particular, we need to know what aspects of lan-
guage might plausibly be thought to make possible the transition
from domain-specific to domain-general thinking.
The basic tenet of the hypothesis of domain specificity is that
certain fundamental types of cognitive activity are carried out by
modular systems that have evolved to deal with particular types of
problems and particular types of situations. Popular candidates for
domain-specific modules include the interpersonal competences
involved in social interactions, the basic principles about objects
and their interactions that are usually collectively labeled naïve
physics, and an intuitive grasp of folk biology and natural history.
These modules operate on a highly selective and domain-specific
set of inputs with a fixed and limited amount of background in-
formation. There is integration of information within each mod-
ule, but not across modules. An example of this failure of inter-
modular (as opposed to intramodular) integration can be found in
the archeological record. In the Middle Paleolithic, for example,
we find what seem to be highly developed tool-making skills ex-
isting side by side with a subtle and advanced knowledge of the
natural environment, but it is not until the Upper Paleolithic and
the emergence of language that we see these two bodies of knowl-
edge being integrated in the form of tools specially designed for
dealing with different plants and animal, together with hunting
strategies that are tailored to the habits of specific animals (Mithen
1996).
Let us suppose, with Mithen and Carruthers, that language is
required for the integration of domain-specific modules. In line
with our opening question, we need to ask what feature of lan-
guage could make this integration possible? I will suggest that the
crucial linguistic phenomenon is provided by the linguistic mech-
anisms of quantification and the relative pronoun (the natural lan-
guage equivalent of the bound variable of quantification).
The crucial feature of the relative pronoun is that it permits the
formation of relative clauses. One way of thinking about relative
clauses is as a way of distinguishing within a sentence between the
object that is the logical subject of the sentence (what the sentence
is about) from what the sentence says about that object (Quine
1974, p. 24). In English, for example, from a sentence such as “the
red deer comes to the water just before nightfall” we can extract
the relative clause “that comes to the water just before nightfall.”
This relative clause can be used to characterize other animals, or
be embedded in further sentences, and so forth. Once the relative
clause has thus been constructed and detached from the original
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sentence, the information it provides is available in a form that can
be employed in a variety of different contexts.
Consider a simplified model of domain-specific cognition in
which a thinker can think about two separate domains, each of
which contains two objects and four properties. The properties
from one domain can only be applied in thought to the objects in
that domain but no object or predicate features in more than one
domain. Suppose that a is an object in the first domain, and G a
predicate in the second domain. How might such a creature come
to be capable of the thought that Ga? Only by forming a concep-
tion of what it is for something to be a G that is no longer tied to
the objects in the second domain. That is to say, only by forming
a conception of what it is for an arbitrary object to be a G. And it
is this that the introduction of the relative pronoun makes possi-
ble (Bermudez 2003). The relative clause allows complex predi-
cates to be extracted from complete thought in a form that will al-
low them to be applied to objects falling under other cognitive
domains, and the defining feature of domain-general cognition is
that objects from one domain can be thought about in terms for-
merly associated only with objects from another domain, as in
totemic art when an artifact is attributed the properties of an ani-
mal, or as in advanced tool construction when the design of a tool
is specifically tailored to properties of the intended prey.
How does this apply to the Hermer-Vazquez experiments? As
Carruthers points out, the representations required to carry out
this task involve multiple embedding of predicates and phrases.
We can view this as a multiple embedding of relative clauses. Con-
sider Carruthers’s sentence/thought: “The toy is in the corner with
a long wall on its left and a short blue wall on its right” (sect. 5.2).
Perhaps this should be parsed: “The toy is in the corner that is
bounded on its left by a wall that is long and that is bounded on its
right by a wall that is short and that is blue.” The five relative pro-
nouns in this sentence introduce relative clauses that qualify (a)
the corner, (b) the left wall, (c) the corner, (d) the right wall, (e)
the right wall. The integration of domain-specific information oc-
curs because these relative pronouns serve to bind together into a
single sentence/thought a range of relative clauses conveying in-
formation from different domains.
Language in the modular mind? 
It’s a no-brainer!
Derek Bickerton
Department of Linguistics, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI 96822.
bickertond@prodigy .net
Abstract: Although Carruthers’s proposals avoid some of the more obvi-
ous pitfalls that face analysts of the language-cognition relationship, they
are needlessly complex and vitiated by his uncritical acceptance of a highly
modular variety of evolutionary psychology. He pays insufficient attention
both to the neural substrate of the processes he hypothesizes and to the
evolutionary developments that gave rise to both language and human cog-
nition.
I found much of Carruthers’s article quite helpful. On some issues
he’s surely right, and he’s shown me where my own thinking has
been insufficiently explicit (after all, isn’t that what philosophers
are for?). He’s right in thinking that language is not just an input-
output system for communicating ready-made thoughts, and in
rejecting the “no thought without language” position. The cogni-
tive functions of language lie somewhere between these extremes.
But precisely where?
He rejects my take on their location (Bickerton 1990; 1995) –
that “off-line thinking,” requiring manipulation of a secondary
representational system created by language, is therefore unavail-
able to other species – for inadequate reasons. First, he cannot see
how Homo erectus and archaic Homo sapiens could have survived
“in extremely harsh tundra environments” without language.
Leaving aside whether any pre-Neanderthals actually did this,
how does he think bears or caribou survive? Second, he finds my
position inconsistent with “central-process modularism” (by which
he seems to mean the brand of evolutionary psychology advocated
by, e.g., Barkow et al. [1992]). That is true but irrelevant; I simply
don’t buy this view of the mind.
The crunch comes when he claims that “an ability to mentally
rotate an image of the stone product that will result if a particular
flake is struck off” (required, he believes, for the making of
Achuleian hand-axes) is “surely ‘off-line’ thinking if anything is!”
Clearly I haven’t been explicit enough. What I meant by “off-line
thinking” was not the capacity to manipulate mental images of pre-
existing objects when the raw material for those objects was phys-
ically present. Rather, it was the capacity, unique to our species,
to conceive and subsequently create new objects – for example,
barbed missiles (arrows, harpoons, etc.). At Olduvai, Homo erec-
tus produced the same tool for a million years (Jellinek 1977).
Imagine Homo sapiens doing that! What most sharply distinguishes
us from other species is complex language and a capacity to pro-
duce an unlimited variety of both behavioral and artifactual nov-
elties. These two things surely did not evolve in isolation from one
another; how they are related should be the central issue of cog-
nitive studies.
Off-line thinking isn’t just imagining different versions of what’s
present – it’s assembling and reassembling internalized represen-
tations to produce wholly new concepts, behaviors, and artifacts.
Barbed missiles could not have been produced until someone con-
ceived of “a missile that, when it struck its target, could not easily
be dislodged.” To generate such concepts you need, most cru-
cially, syntax (the importance of which Carruthers grants but never
really explains); note that the expression of the barbed-missile
concept is biclausal, as any complex thought surely must be: if x
then y, x because y, y whenever x, and so on. If, perhaps for rea-
sons given in Bickerton (2002), protolanguage (and any extra
thinking it enabled) was limited to equivalents of single clauses,
the simultaneous emergence of syntax and our species provides a
possible explanation for the colossal cognitive differences be-
tween ourselves and other animals.
Carruthers downplays these differences. He rejects Tomasello’s
(1999) compelling argument that there was insufficient time for
more than one or two novel cognitive capacities to evolve in the
few million years of our independent evolution. He rejects it be-
cause “only 10,000 years separate polar bears and grizzlies”! But
we’re not talking about minor differences such as distinguish bear
species – we’re talking about what Maynard Smith and Szathmary
(1995) characterized as one of the major transitions of evolution,
which led at least one paleoanthropologist (Tattersall 2002) to de-
clare his belief in saltational events. This isn’t normal speciation,
and it involves more than time shortage – each of Carruthers’s
suite of cognitive capacities would then demand its own selec-
tional history. But evolutionary psychology, despite its title and its
protestations, has produced little beyond a handful of just-so sto-
ries lacking precise evolutionary whens, wheres, and whys.
The modular mind model has other shortcomings. Carruthers’s
article barely mentions the brain that, presumably, generates all
the phenomena under discussion. Except for two paragraphs in
section 6.2, little in the article would be incompatible with full-on
Cartesian dualism. None of the many brain-imaging studies of the
last couple of decades is referenced. This is unsurprising; little of
that literature supports modularity. Indeed, it suggests that, out-
side the familiar sensory and motor systems, little if any cortex is
uniquely dedicated to a single function. Rather, numbers of neu-
rons may be recruited for whatever cognitive task attention mech-
anisms currently focus on.
This picture yields at least two alternatives to Carruthers’s in-
terpretation of experiments that show differences between solv-
ing orientation problems while shadowing speech and shadowing
rhythms. Rather than the first task being hampered because lan-
guage mediates between cognitive modules, the first task may re-
cruit more neurons than the second, or the first task may involve
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circuits shared by both the functions concerned, whereas the sec-
ond does not.
Indeed, Carruthers’s concept of language as “the medium of
non-domain-specific thinking” remains problematic even if one
accepts the modular mind. While all parts of the brain aren’t
equally well connected, none involved in cognition come even
close to being self-contained, either in our species or (as far as we
can determine) others. So why did we need specifically language
to integrate modular outputs? And exactly how did language per-
form the integration?
Carruthers’s explanation assumes that an overwhelmingly mod-
ular brain required some “non-domain-specific central arena” to
receive inputs from various modules, merge them, and organize
their output. Language forms just such an arena. But why didn’t
some form of “mentalese” or “language of thought” perform this
task? Why did the arena require a physical output through a spe-
cific modality?
The closest he comes to an explanation is to suppose that we
somehow must “hear” inner speech before we can understand it
and therefore must first give it some kind of phonological repre-
sentation (this is the only way I can interpret the second paragraph
in sect. 6.2). But who “hears” inner speech? I don’t – I’d think I
was having auditory hallucinations if I did – and I know of no ev-
idence that others do. Carruthers certainly provides none. The un-
fortunate term inner speech merely renames the Joycean stream
of consciousness – the largely spontaneous, unfocused cerebral
activity that occupies much of our waking life. We need to re-
member that there is no speech in the brain, no images, no sen-
tences, no thoughts – only chains of electrochemical impulses that,
depending on their locations and/or routing, may appear to us in
one of these guises.
The concept of a language module busily inputting, outputting,
splitting, and cohering material from many quasi-autonomous
cognitive modules creates a needlessly complex (as well as neuro-
logically ill-supported) model of how language affects cognition.
It’s more parsimonious and more congruous with what we know
of the neurophysiology of language (see, e.g., a good recent review
such as Pulvermuller [2002]) to suppose that its semantic compo-
nent, present in protolanguage, provides a layer of representations
additional to those found in the brains of other species, whereas
its syntactic component, unique to true language, builds from
those secondary representations the complex cognitive constructs
underlying our equally unique behavioral plasticity. There’s at
least provisional grounding for such a proposal in the actual de-
tails of human evolution (Bickerton 2002; Calvin & Bickerton
2000). Carruthers fails to ground his model in those details. But
such grounding is essential for any adequate theory of language
and cognition.
You don’t say: Figurative language 
and thought
Gregory A. Bryant and Raymond W. Gibbs
Department of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz, Social
Sciences II, Santa Cruz, CA, 95064. gbryant@ucsc.edu
gibbs@ucsc.edu
Abstract: Carruthers has proposed a novel and quite interesting hypoth-
esis for the role of language in conceptual integration, but his treatment
does not acknowledge work in cognitive science on metaphor and analogy
that reveals how diverse knowledge structures are integrated. We claim
that this body of research provides clear evidence that cross-domain con-
ceptual connections cannot be driven by syntactic processes alone.
The relation between language and thought has been central to
research examining the role of metaphor and analogy in commu-
nication and reasoning. Carruthers’s hypothesis that language may
function to integrate the output of conceptual modules has a cer-
tain appeal. For example, it is consistent with the fact that lan-
guage does not seem inextricably tied to one modality. Traditional
approaches to the evolution and function of language generally fo-
cus on speech communication, and this is clearly not the entire
picture. Carruthers also makes specific claims about which aspects
of language are conscious and which are not. By distinguishing the
parts of the system that function to integrate the output of con-
ceptual modules from the communicative mechanisms (i.e., lan-
guage production and comprehension, and inner speech) we can
begin to make proposals about the phylogenetic history of this
multifaceted capacity, and design experiments that tease these el-
ements apart.
However, Carruthers’s treatment ignores cognitive science re-
search that has explicitly explored the relations between language
and thought. This work strongly suggests that many aspects of
language, ranging from word meanings to conventional and novel
expressions, reflect enduring conceptual mappings from diverse
domains of knowledge and experience. A large body of work in
cognitive linguistics and experimental psycholinguistics on meta-
phor and analogy reveals how structural mapping processes ex-
ploit common relations across domains (Gentner et al. 2001), and
help structure abstract, often vaguer, aspects of knowledge in
terms of concrete, often embodied, source domains (Fauconnier
& Turner 2002; Gibbs 1994; Lakoff & Johnson 1999). For exam-
ple, enduring conceptual metaphors like LIFE IS A JOURNEY
and KNOWING IS SEEING map diverse knowledge domains to
provide a rich set of entailments that are evident in everyday lan-
guage (e.g., “We came to a turning point in our research project”
and “I can’t see what you mean in this article”). A significant body
of empirical research suggests that people tacitly employ concep-
tual metaphors in many aspects of reasoning, memory, and lan-
guage use (Gibbs 1994; Katz et al. 1997).
More recent linguistic and psychological studies demonstrate
that certain enduring conceptual mappings arise from perva-
sive correlations in embodied experience such as KNOWING 
IS SEEING, MORE IS UP, DIFFICULTIES ARE PHYSICAL
BURDENS, and SIGNIFICANT IS LARGE. These “primary
metaphors” are not temporary mappings, perhaps created just for
communicative purposes, but reflect people’s embodied under-
standings of the positive correlations in their experiences of both
the source and target domains (Gibbs et al., in press; Grady 1999).
Related work on structure mapping theory suggests that structural
consistency constraints and a systematicity principle guide the
mapping of relations between domains dictating which sets of
structures can be most readily coupled (Gentner & Bowles 2001).
We claim that this body of research on metaphor and analogy pro-
vides clear evidence that cross-domain conceptual connections
cannot be driven by syntactic processes alone, as argued by Car-
ruthers. An important element of this work is that conceptual
knowledge is not represented solely by propositional structures
but also includes various nonpropositional information (e.g.,
neural nets, image schematic structures). These alternative rep-
resentational formats reduce the need for resolving propositional
representations by syntactic processes.
Carruthers’s proposal does not specify any constraints on which
domains can be easily integrated, nor does it say how this can ac-
tually be accomplished. How are different domains hooked into
the system? How does evolution create a system that integrates
what would be safe to assume are domain specific representational
formats? The answers to these questions appear somewhat circu-
lar in that if syntax is the defining feature of language, and the LF
representations act as the underlying basis of sentence production
and module integration, then the module output must have syn-
tactic structure to be exploited. We believe that a clearer, less cir-
cular explanation is needed for the grounding of conceptual rela-
tions in human thought and language.
One possibility is that structure mapping and syntactically
based conceptual integration may coexist in some manner. Car-
ruthers’s model may best account for the combining of informa-
tion from disparate domains that perhaps are not structurally
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aligned. In this way, Carruthers’s hypothesis may complement 
research findings on metaphor and analogy. We applaud Car-
ruthers’s attempt to identify a particular functional role for lan-
guage in theories of conceptual integration. But let’s not forget
that language often reflects enduring aspects of conceptual struc-
ture, showing how concepts from different domains are unre-
flectively, metaphorically contrasted and combined to allow peo-
ple to make sense of their experience and the world around them.
Language isn’t quite that special
Joanna J. Bryson
Department of Computer Science, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, United
Kingdom. jjb@cs.bath.ac.uk http: //www.cs.bath.ac.uk /~jjb
Abstract: Language isn’t the only way to cross modules, nor is it the only
module with access to both input and output. Minds don’t generally work
across modules because this leads to combinatorial explosion in search and
planning. Language is special in being a good vector for mimetics, so it be-
comes associated with useful cross-module concepts we acquire culturally.
Further, language is indexical, so it facilitates computationally expensive
operations.
Carruthers has provided an excellent review of the various ways in
which language can affect cognitive function, and a description of
some of the most exciting new data currently available on the sub-
ject. In this commentary I will take a position largely sympathetic
with Carruthers’s viewpoint on the general architecture of mind,
and also with his ambition of creating a “‘suitably weakened’” ver-
sion of Dennett’s (1991) Joycean machine hypothesis. However,
my position on the role of language is weaker still than Car-
ruthers’s. I do not believe language is the only way to “‘cross’” cog-
nitive modules. I also do not believe current evidence can distin-
guish my view from Carruthers’s. To do so, I propose at the end of
my commentary some experiments extending those of Hermer-
Vazquez et al. (1999), described in Carruthers’s section 5.2, which
might help distinguish these theories.
Carruthers takes the view that modules of mind are necessarily
fully disjoint, except where they are combined by language. In
fact, modules may frequently interact, provided the individual
modules are able to exploit each other’s processing. To argue this
point requires a clear definition of “module.” I believe that the
most critical feature of modularity is that individual modules sup-
port and are supported by specialised representations. During
both evolution (for the species) and development (for the indi-
vidual), preferred synaptic organisations are learned for recog-
}nising regularities that are useful for controlling actions and
achieving goals. These regularities may arise from the external en-
vironment, as communicated by the senses, or from neighbouring
neural systems – from the neuron’s perspective there is no differ-
ence. This view of the development of modularity in the individ-
ual is similar to that of Bates (1999) and to some extent to that of
Karmiloff-Smith (1992), whose work emphasises the develop-
mental aspects of skill specialisation. On the species level, it echos
Livesey’s (1986) account of the evolution of brain organisation.
These specialized representations provide the neural platform for
the better-known characteristics of modularity, the specialized
learning and processing, for example, of faces or language.
What are modules for? From a computation perspective, the
answer is clear: Modularity combats combinatorics by focusing
computational resources on a fertile but strictly limited substrate
of potentially useful ideas (Bryson 2001; Minsky 1985). This ex-
plains why cross-modular processing is unusual – it is generally a
bad idea. Evolution and /or learning have shown the agent that the
fertile solutions for this problem (that addressed by one module)
lie here (within the module). Searching other modules takes time
and working memory, and is unlikely to be productive. Neverthe-
less, animal behaviour requires modules to interact. They interact
not simply at “‘centralised’” switching locations such as the basal
ganglia (though that probably happens; see, e.g., Gurney et al.
[1998]), but also directly. A common example is the visual system,
where bidirectional channels of visual processing seem to flow
through much of the cortex, with various regions specialised to
particular parts of sensory processing and expectation setting (Rao
& Ballard 1997). These regions qualify as modules by my criteria,
because they have discrete representational maps dedicated to
different levels of visual abstraction.
So modules communicate without language. I would also argue
that, as elegant as the argument of the LF cycle is, it seems un-
likely that language is the only module capable of perceiving its
own output. First, it seems unlikely that language is composed of
only one module, any more than vision is. But second, we know
from Rizzolatti et al.’s (2000) “mirror neuron” work that at least
one module exists in nonhuman primates that is used for both
sensing and action.
What makes language special, then? It may be just two things.
First, (returning to the Joycean Machine (Dennett 1991), lan-
guage is tightly associated with cultural knowledge. Doing diffi-
cult computational work quickly is one of the big advantages to
having a massive number of processors operating simultaneously,
provided these processors can communicate their results. This is
just what humans do. Thus if some individuals do manage to find
cross-modular strategies that are useful, those strategies are likely
to be collected in our culture and passed on linguistically. Things
that look cross-modular might even be newly developed skills. It
would be hard to know to what extent new skills leverage native
abilities, and that extent may well vary between individuals.
Spelke and Tsivkin’s (2001) beautiful study appears to demon-
strate that for large-magnitude approximate number values, most
people utilise their innate magnitude estimation module. How-
ever, it does nothing to prove whether we ever truly learn to ex-
ploit the small exact-number module or, as we learn to count, we
develop a new module that remains heavily dependent on our lex-
icon.
The second special thing about language is that it is indexical.
That is, it is a compact way to refer to a concept. By compact, I
mean that it doesn’t take as much working memory, or carry as
much qualia or its associated emotional and motivational baggage,
as a full concept. This property of symbols has been demonstrated
by Boysen et al. (1996) with chimpanzees. Two chimpanzees are
presented with two bowls containing different numbers of pieces
of fruit, and then one subject is asked to select the bowl the other
chimp will receive. Chimps are selfish, so the goal of all subjects
is to point at the smaller bowl, but the subjects find themselves in-
capable of this indirection in the face of the fruit itself – they al-
ways point at the larger bowl, which they want. However, they can
do the task when the bowls contain numerals, which they are al-
ready trained to understand. Hauser (1999) speaks further on this
task and its relationship to self-inhibition.
The conciseness of symbol-like words may explain the experi-
ments by Hermer-Vazquez et al. (1999). Language allows the con-
cepts of “left” or “right” to be retained in working memory (or
even the phonological loop), while the other processing that needs
to be done to combine navigational information is performed. We
already know that learning new navigational strategies even in rats
requires a resource that’s also implicated in episodic memory re-
call: the hippocampus (Bannerman et al. 1995; McClelland et al.
1995).
There is no reason, with the possible exception of parsimony, to
believe the account presented here rather than Carruthers’s, or his
instead of mine. However, this question might possibly be re-
solved using chimpanzees or bonobos. Kuhlmeier and Boysen
(2002) have already been conducting experiments on chimpan-
zees’ abilities to combine cues in navigation through using their
innate ability to map from a small-scale model of their enclosure
to the actual enclosure. Unfortunately, their chimps do not have
any symmetric spaces suitable for the Hermer-Vazquez et al.
(1999) experiment, but perhaps such a space could be constructed.
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If LEFT and RIGHT happen to be concepts adult chimps ac-
quire, they may be able to solve the task. Perhaps, if apes can learn
symbols for “left” and “right”, this experiment might be best con-
ducted by one of the ape-language labs. If my indexical argument
holds, then it may be that only apes who have learned symbols for
these concepts can succesfully complete the task. If it is in fact the
phonological loop that is critical, then it may be that only the
chimps who able to carry or gesture the symbol will be able to nav-
igate successfully.
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Is LF really a linguistic level?
Nick Chater
Department of Psychology, Institute for Applied Cognitive Science, University
of Warwick, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK. nick.chater@warwick.ac.uk
Abstract: Carruthers’s argument depends on viewing logical form as a lin-
guistic level. But logical form is typically viewed as underpinning general
purpose inference, and hence as having no particular connection to lan-
guage processing. If logical form is tied directly to language, two problems
arise: a logical problem concerning language acquisition and the empiri-
cal problem that aphasics appear capable of cross-modular reasoning.
Let us assume, with Carruthers, that there is an internal language
in terms of which domain-general reasoning is conducted (fol-
lowing Fodor [1975], call it the language of thought – LOT). Nat-
ural language must clearly interface with such an internal lan-
guage: That is, language understanding must involve translating
from natural language to LOT, and language production must in-
volve the reverse.
What might LOT be like? The standard assumption is that LOT
must be a logical language, that is, a language over which logical
(or more precisely proof-theoretic) operations can be defined (see
Fodor 1975; Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988). Accordingly, for each nat-
ural language sentence, there will a corresponding a “logical form”
– in the traditional formal semantic sense. (Typically, there will be
several such logical forms, because of ambiguities in natural lan-
guage; and the picture is further complicated by anaphora, deixis,
etc., but in ways irrelevant to the present argument.) The project
of formal semantics (Dowty et al. 1981) seeks to explicate the re-
lationship between natural sentences and their putative logical
forms; and logical form has, of course, been a central notion in an-
alytic philosophy and linguistics. The advocate of LOT typically
takes a “psychologistic” view of logical form – logical forms corre-
spond to representations of sentences in LOT. (One might query
whether inference can be captured by logical reasoning alone –
but this is another issue; see Oaksford & Chater [1991; 1998].)
Carruthers points out that Chomsky (1995) argues that there is
a level of linguistic representation (called logical form, or LF). He
then claims that all domain-general propositional thought is
framed in terms of these LF representations. It is in this sense, he
argues, that language has a cognitive function: a linguistic level of
representation, LF, that plays an essential role in domain-general
thought.
The interest of this claim seems to hinge on terminology: It
seems to be crucial that logical form is viewed as a linguistic level
of representation. Then, one may say that thought has, in a sense,
a linguistic basis, and therefore that language has a cognitive func-
tion. If, however, we described LF as, say, a logical level of repre-
sentation, then there would be no tendency to claim that thoughts
(framed in LF) have a linguistic basis; or that language thereby has
a cognitive function.
Carruthers’s assumptions concerning LF are, as far as I can see,
precisely the standard ones described above – natural language is
translated in and out of LF; and LF is the representation over
which domain-general inferences are defined. Thus, LF seems
not to serve as a linguistic level of representation – but as a level
of representation for general cognition; although one that must 
interface with natural language, as it must with perceptual input
systems and motor output systems. In particular, from what 
Carruthers says about LF, it seems quite conceivable that, for 
example, LF developmentally and evolutionarily precedes the de-
velopment of external natural language. As it happens, Chomsky
(1995) has a specific theory of LF, which differs in a number of
ways from standard views of logical form, but features specific to
Chomsky’s notion are not discussed in, and are therefore presum-
ably not critical to, Carruthers’s argument.
In a nutshell, advocates of LOT typically think of LOT as ex-
pressing the logical form of natural language sentences and
thereby serving as a basis for inference. Carruthers does not ap-
pear to add substantive assumptions that establish any further
sense in which logical form is fundamentally a linguistic style of
representation. But without such assumptions, it seems inappro-
priate to draw conclusions about the putative cognitive function
of language, which might more neutrally be viewed as concerning
the putative cognitive functions of LOT.
One could imagine strengthening Carruthers’s claim in the fol-
lowing way: Suppose that logical form representations can only
be entertained if (at least in principle) the cognitive system can
derive syntactic and phonological representations corresponding
to the logical form representation (which, in principle, might
mean something like “given appropriate cognitive resources”).
Then the linguistic abilities of language users (their phonological
and syntactic capacities) will strikingly constrain their powers 
of domain general reasoning. According to this view, logical form
representations will necessarily be constrained, in evolution and
development, by the development of language abilities; people
with impaired linguistic abilities will necessarily have impaired
general reasoning abilities; and so on. By making this strong 
connection with other levels of linguistic representation, the lin-
guistic character of logical form representation is given real sub-
stance.
But this viewpoint, though substantive, seems difficult to de-
fend. One problem is logical. As Fodor (1980; 1981) points out, if
thought is bounded by language, then language learning is im-
possible. This is because language learning requires framing hy-
potheses about the meaning of linguistic forms that have not yet
been mastered – and this requires being able to entertain mean-
ings for which a current linguistic representation is not available.
But this is precisely what is precluded on the view just described:
that logical form representations are only available where the cor-
responding phonological and syntactic representations can be
constructed. A second empirical problem is presented by patients
with severe aphasia, who can carry out numerous complex tasks.
For example, as Carruthers notes, an aphasic studied by Varley
(1998; 2002) can, among many other things, pass the false belief
task. From a modularist’s perspective, this requires at least the in-
tegration of visual modules (viewing and understanding the ex-
perimental setting) and social reasoning modules (concerning be-
liefs and related notions) and hence is a paradigm example of
cross-modal reasoning.
One might, though, defend the claim that conscious proposi-
tional thought necessarily implicates language. Indeed, it seems to
me that this claim is almost certainly right. Conscious awareness
seems to be limited to perceptual inputs (broadly construed to in-
clude awareness of bodily state, motor activity, pain, etc.) and their
imagistic analogues (visual, auditory images). The only way of
turning propositional thought into a form that allows it to be per-
ceived (or imaged) appears to be to turn it into a linguistic form.
Natural language is arguably the only means we have of externally
representing propositional thought; if we can only be conscious of
that which can (potentially) be externally represented (i.e., per-
ceived and imaged), then natural language must inevitably un-
derpin conscious thought.
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Anchors not inner codes, coordination not
translation (and hold the modules please)
Andy Clark
Cognitive Science Program, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405.
andy@indiana.edu
Abstract: Peter Carruthers correctly argues for a cognitive conception of
the role of language. But such a story need not include the excess baggage
of compositional inner codes, mental modules, mentalese, or translation
into logical form (LF).
In this well-researched and very valuable contribution, Peter Car-
ruthers defends a specific version of what he calls the “cognitive
conception of language,” in which language plays some direct and
important role in at least some aspects of human thinking and rea-
soning. I think the cognitive conception is correct and immensely
important. But the starting points of the story are open to both
conceptual and empirical challenges. A different kind of starting
point may lead to an even more interesting view of language and
its role in human thought.
Carruthers’s central claim is that natural language (and more
specifically, the structured logical form internal representations of
natural language sentences) is the medium for intermodular and
non-domain-specific thinking. The structured LF representations
of the language faculty provide the common format for integrat-
ing information from multiple conceptual modules, each of which
might use its own form of mentalese. According to this view,
thoughts are translated from mentalese into natural language rep-
resentations, so that input from multiple modules can be repre-
sented in a single, integrated linguaform representation.
But suppose you are not a friend of large-scale mental modular-
ity, and you do not believe in mentalese. Perhaps you do not even
believe that the internal representations of sentences themselves
have logical form or constitute a compositional inner code. Could
you still accommodate the impressive results of Hermer-Vazquez
et al. and preserve a strong cognitive conception of language?
I think the answer is yes. One possibility is to think of percep-
tually encountered or recalled words and sentences as acting less
like inner data structures, replete with slots and apt for combina-
toric action, and more like cheap ways of adding task-simplifying
structure to the perceptual scene. Words and sentences, in this
view, act as stable anchor points around which complex neural dy-
namics swirl and coalesce. Instead of thinking of linguistic encod-
ings as enabling informational integration by acting as a common
format for the outputs of multiple modules, we can think of the
whole process as one not of translation into a single unifying rep-
resentation but of attention-based coordination. Words and sen-
tences here serve as kinds of simple, cheap, quasi-perceptual
marker posts, enabling the agent to attend to specific dimensions
of a scene, including specific combinations of aspects of the scene
that would otherwise remain unnoticed.
We can also delete the modules. By all means, allow that human
learning is sculpted by some innate biases, but do not suppose that
the thinkings thus supported are architecturally isolated from
each other. Into this nexus, learning words (such as “blue”) and
phrases (such as “to the left of”) may be seen as the developmen-
tal source of new forms of selective attention. Learning the words
(which now act much like cheap behavioral targets for reward and
reinforcement routines) shapes the child’s attentional biases in
language-specific ways that then promote new forms of problem-
solving, such as the use of conjoint geometric and color cues. And
certainly, there is ample evidence that children show attentional
biases that appear sensitive to the language they are learning (or
have learned) – for example, Bowerman and Choi (2001); Lucy
and Gaskins (2001). Smith (2001) explicitly suggests that learned
linguistic contexts come to “serve as cues that automatically con-
trol attention” (p. 113).
Carruthers might (again) reply that this is just to fall back on a
weak conception of the role of language in which word learning
merely sculpts what is basically a nonlinguistic form of representa-
tion. Such a weak role is, he might add, undermined by the shad-
owing results reported by Hermer-Vazquez et al. (1999), in which
linguistic activity in a distractor task impairs performance on (only)
those tasks requiring integration of information across domains. But
if the very process of selective attention to a complex conjoined cue
required (in humans) the retrieval of at least some of the relevant
lexical items, the shadowing result would also be predicted. Perhaps
we need to first retrieve simple quasi-perceptual placeholders (such
as words) when (and only when) a task requires us to target atten-
tional resources on complex “unnatural,” or otherwise elusive, ele-
ments of an encountered scene. Such a picture is radically different
from one in which the logical form of the natural language sentence
provides the skeleton for a whole new compositional internal rep-
resentation unifying the outputs of multiple modules.
Carruthers also innocently misclassifies my own view (Clark
1998) as a kind of weak, purely diachronic account in which lan-
guage-independent, content-bearing structures do all the real
work, and in which linguistic tokens merely serve to freeze spe-
cific contents for subsequent reencounter and further reflection.
Although I do think this is an important role, it is not an exhaus-
tive one. The presence of linguistic vehicles, I argue (in the same
paper cited by Carruthers), is what makes possible the important
phenomenon of “thinking about thinking” (or what I there call
“second-order cognitive dynamics”). Only creatures who are able
to make their thoughts into stable, attendable, scrutinizable ob-
jects, by explicitly vehicling them in some way, can then turn the
apparatus of thinking onto the act of thinking itself.
Throughout, Carruthers draws a firm line between a “weak” role
for language as a necessary condition for certain kinds of thought
and a “strong” role for language as literally constitutive of the
thoughts in question. But there is space for intermediate options. In
particular, there is space for the idea that thoughts about thoughts
are possible only because linguistic vehicling makes thoughts
available as targets of reflection. Carruthers may say that this is
again the weak diachronic story. But is it? If I think to myself, “I am
not thinking straight today,” or if I think, “My opinions about lan-
guage are probably all wrong,” neither of these picks out a process
any more extended in time than, say, having the thought that grass
is green. These are all individual token thoughts. Token thoughts
that target other thoughts may be possible (in humans) only in
virtue of the presence, at that very moment, of inner speech and
rehearsal.
In sum, I think we should also consider an alternative, per-
ception-and-attention-based picture of the role of language in
thought. Such a picture is every bit as speculative as Carruthers’s
own. I offer it simply as a rough-and-ready sketch of one way to
pursue a strong cognitive conception without embracing the full
apparatus of modules, mentalese, and compositional inner codes.
A linguistic module for integrating the
senses, or a house of cards?
Rick Dale and Michael Spivey
Department of Psychology, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853.
rad28@cornell.edu http: //www.people.cornell.edu /pages /rad28
spivey@cornell.edu
http: //www.psych.cornell.edu /faculty /people /Spivey_Michael.htm
Abstract: Carruthers invokes a number of controversial assumptions to
support his thesis. Most are questionable and unnecessary to investigate
the wider relevance of language in cognition. A number of research pro-
grams (e.g., interactionist psycholinguistics and cognitive linguistics) have
for years pursued a similar thesis and provide a more empirically grounded
framework for investigating language’s cognitive functions.
The wider role of language in cognition is an important and inter-
esting question, and can be studied from many directions. In some
Commentary/Carruthers: The cognitive functions of language
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2002) 25:6 681
ways, the claim that language should be implicated in wider cog-
nition seems almost self-evident. One is reluctant to approach
Carruthers’s general thesis with skepticism, because it seems in-
tuitive that language is a kind of cognitive intersection for social,
perceptual, and motor information. Indeed, to many researchers
in the cognitive sciences, this is an important theoretical primary.
Contrary to Carruthers’s assertions, however, many of these re-
searchers do not endorse the purely communicative conception of
language. The reason for this is simple: Many researchers do not
hold that language is a distinct input-output module. In general,
there is a prominent trend to reject the assumption that cognition
is largely modular. Because Carruthers assumes modularity as a
core premise, he alienates many who would be interested in the
target article’s argument and whose research efforts are very rel-
evant to a cognitive conception of language. Carruthers appears to
suspect this, and he asks the reader to hold in abeyance any sen-
timents against the assumption. However, there are two additional
assumptive burdens that are borne by those who are willing to
grant his premises: reification of thought and Chomsky’s use of
logical form (LF). In what follows, we discuss research that brings
into question these three assumptions. Most important, this re-
search offers a more empirically grounded approach to investi-
gating the cognitive functions of language.
First, as a minor assumption, Carruthers invokes LF represen-
tations as a vehicle for propositional thought. He provides little
justification for recruiting this framework beyond the fact that
Chomsky has proposed it. In fact, to our knowledge, there has
been little or no empirical work substantiating the psychological
relevance of LF. Because Carruthers’s thesis is supposed to be a
psychological one, one would expect that a firmly established psy-
chological framework for thought would be employed in his argu-
ment. However, there is no such framework, and even those who
lean toward a more classical Chomskyan perspective on language
seem to be acknowledging that such purely discrete structural
representations are not psychologically plausible (e.g., Ferreira et
al. 2002; Sanford & Sturt 2002).
A second assumption, closely related to the previous one, is Car-
ruthers’s claim that thoughts are discrete, semantically evaluable,
and have component structure. Whether or not we deny him LF
for want of experimental validation, Carruthers’s general position
that mental states have these overall properties should be ques-
tioned. Research using headband-mounted eye-tracking suggests
that mental states are dynamic and continuous rather than dis-
crete, and are only occasionally semantically evaluable with com-
ponent structure. Eye-tracking has provided psycholinguists with
behavioral data about how rapidly multimodal information is in-
tegrated in cognitive processes. For example, Tanenhaus et al.
(1995) used eye-tracking to demonstrate that during spoken lan-
guage comprehension syntactic ambiguity resolution, as well as
word recognition, can be immediately influenced by visual con-
text. Conversely, Spivey et al. (2001) demonstrated that linguistic
information actively influences the temporal dynamics of con-
junctive visual search. Both of these processes unfold very rapidly
and probabilistically, and they appear to share their continuously
updated partial (or underspecified) representations with one an-
other.
This brings us to modularity, Carruthers’s most controversial as-
sumption. Within the cognitive sciences, the notion of modularity
has been refined in various ways, and has gradually become,
though not by any means to consensus, a neurophysiological pos-
tulate that has lost much of its strict Fodorian content. Carruthers
knows this but still ends up with a “conceptual” modularity that fi-
nesses ongoing debate in the cognitive and brain sciences (e.g.,
Kingsbury & Finlay 2001). In short, it seems to us inappropriate
to assume a mosaic of innate domain-specific modules when the
verdict is still out. This firm commitment to conceptual modular-
ity also leads Carruthers to some questionable speculation that
should engender skepticism even from those who accept it. For
example, he hypothesizes the existence of an abductive reasoning
module, neglecting a recent argument (from the father of modern
modularity himself) that such a module is exactly what modular-
ity cannot offer (Fodor 2000).
So how should the cognitive functions of language be studied?
Carruthers fails to mention that there are active areas of research
in the cognitive sciences dedicated to the cognitive, rather than
purely communicative, properties of language. For example, the
fast-growing approach to language, dubbed cognitive linguistics,
takes as a central tenet that language is inherently scaffolded by
the rest of perception and cognition (Tomasello 1998). Also, for
almost three decades, the interactionist and connectionist ap-
proaches in psycholinguistics have aimed to establish broad inte-
gration of information in language processing (e.g., Marslen-
Wilson 1975; Rumelhart 1977). Researchers in this area seek an
answer to more general questions: How fluid is the interaction be-
tween language and other systems? Do they mutually influence
each other in cognitive processing? In fact, the empirical data sup-
port a view that language is very much like the “cross-modular”
entity that Carruthers proposes. The problem is that visual per-
ception, audition, motor cortex, and so forth, also seem to inte-
grate information across modalities. If these various modalities
(including language) are already in the business of interacting con-
tinuously on essentially the same level, then there is no need for
an exclusive linguistic switchboard function using logical form or
any other format of representation.
To summarize, there are good reasons to doubt the assumptions
in which Carruthers couches his version of the cognitive concep-
tion of language. The target article’s ornate network of assump-
tions and speculation is slightly frustrating given Carruthers’s hope
to establish a “factual claim” and not some “modal claim arrived
at by some sort of task-analysis.” He seems instead to have estab-
lished a quasi-factual claim arrived at by an analysis of many as-
sumptions and scant evidence. His proposal for a more cognitive
conception of language, however, is important and should be pur-
sued. We have discussed a few lines of research engaged in this
question and would welcome Carruthers to consider them as well.
Why not LF for false belief reasoning?
Jill G. de Villiers and Peter A. de Villiers
Psychology Department, Smith College, Clark Science Center, Northampton,
MA 01063. jdevil@smith.edu pdevilli@smith.edu
Abstract: We argue that natural language has the right degree of repre-
sentational richness for false belief reasoning, especially the complements
under verbs of communication and belief. Language may indeed be nec-
essary synchronically for cross-modular reasoning, but certain achieve-
ments in language seem necessary at least diachronically for explicit rea-
soning about false beliefs.
We could not agree more with Carruthers’s central claim that lan-
guage, especially syntax, allows new forms of representation and
reasoning. That has been our position with regard to the develop-
ment of false belief reasoning, supported empirically with both
hearing four-year-olds (de Villiers & Pyers 2002) and language-de-
layed deaf children (de Villiers & de Villiers 2000; 2002). We ar-
gue that there is a critical property of complements in natural lan-
guage; namely, they permit the representation of false beliefs held
by another mind, and falsity is a notoriously difficult property to
represent in the absence of a syntactically structured symbol sys-
tem (Fodor 1975; Jackendoff 1996; Olson 1994).
With this overlap one would expect Carruthers to embrace our
position with enthusiasm, but he rejects it. We are used to rejec-
tion: Linguists accuse us of being Whorfian, anthropologists ac-
cuse us of ethnocentrism, theory of mind theorists think we seized
command of their module.
There are two options for false belief reasoning: Either it is
propositional or it is not. We agree with Carruthers that it is. But
then we can see three clear alternatives. One is that all (or most)
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thought is underlyingly propositional, or mentalese (Fodor 1975).
The second is that there is both mentalese and LF, but only LF
does the work of cross-modular thinking. That would seem to be
Carruthers’s position. The third is that mentalese of sufficient
complexity to handle propositional attitudes would have to be vir-
tually identical to LF (de Villiers & Pyers 1997; Segal 1998). If so,
why duplicate the functions and structures? Why not assume that
natural language is the medium for such thinking, especially as LF
rather than inner speech? We raised that among a list of other log-
ical possibilities for the relationship between natural language and
the language of thought in this domain (de Villiers & de Villiers
2000).
Does Varley’s aphasic contradict this possibility? Not necessar-
ily, because LF could (logically) be preserved but inaccessible to
the phonological input and output systems for language. Car-
ruthers uses Varley’s case study to deny that language is needed
synchronically for false-belief reasoning, but that is because of his
commitment to two other connected notions: (1) ToM is a mod-
ule and (2) LF is only needed for cross-modular thinking. He is
also tempted to say that animals have mental state representations,
arguing that their “long chains” of social reasoning imply proposi-
tional mentalese. This is where our behaviorist beginnings show.
We haven’t seen evidence from primates or younger children that
would convince us to posit both propositional mentalese and LF,
once you allow LF to be the medium for false belief reasoning.
But Carruthers needs both if he only allows LF to be the medium
of cross-modular thought. It’s curious, because the arguments in
favor of the subtlety of syntax and semantics needed to capture
propositional attitudes seem to us so much more convincing than
those needed to capture “left of the blue wall”!
Carruthers has to avoid the conclusion that false belief reason-
ing is dependent on language if he is to keep to the claim that it is
a module. So he argues that the full theory of mind system, a mod-
ule independent of language, comes on line at age four. But it is
accelerated by interpreting linguistic input, which leaves us won-
dering what might happen in the absence of complex linguistic in-
put. This language-independent module would then come on line
at what? 5 years? 8 years? 25 years? In addition, Carruthers states
that the language-independent ToM module “has to access the re-
sources of other systems (including the language faculty) to go
about its work.” Why? In particular, “mind-reading ability rou-
tinely co-opts the resources of the language faculty.” Is this be-
cause it is routinely cross-modal? Maddeningly, Carruthers does
not specify sufficiently which false belief tasks count as which
type: The only example provided is one in which the subject be-
lieves a proposition that is itself cross-modular, “that the object is
to the left of the blue wall.” So, it’s all very well to “cry out for ex-
perimental investigation,” but only if it’s clear enough to test.
Perhaps what Carruthers has in mind is that a person without
sufficient language, say, a three-year-old, can imagine the false be-
lief of another, and can token it in some system of thought but not
explicitly deduce consequences or predict behaviors from it. So,
logically, the theory of mind system could be language-indepen-
dent. That is the kind of picture that Clements and Perner (1994)
posit for their toddlers who look expectantly at the place a char-
acter will emerge premised on his false belief but then fail when
asked the simple question, “Where will he look?” However, they
argue that the children’s expectancy might not be propositional 
at this point but behavioral (Dienes & Perner 1999). To answer 
explicitly, a propositional format must be developed. Carruthers
believes that the standard false belief tasks require only intra-
modular thinking, hence not natural language, though maybe
propositional mentalese. But in the development of such reason-
ing, he also admits that language plays a crucial role in input and
output systems.
So the difference comes down to this. Our own data are just
what one would expect if the acquisition of complementation un-
der verbs of communication and belief in language made possible
the representation of the relationships between people’s minds
and false states of affairs, representations that were inaccessible to
explicit reasoning or incomplete before. It sounds like a good idea
to us to propose that something like the LF of natural language is
the format for such thinking, because LF has the necessary rep-
resentational richness. But we would still need to explain why LF
of sufficient complexity takes time to develop. For all we know, se-
vere aphasics might have access still to LF, but primates would
not. That is not to say there are many other subtle things that can
be done (even in mind reading) without LF, and it is an exciting
question to ask if such things really need propositional reasoning.
Much experimental and philosophical ingenuity will be required
(Dennett 1983)!
Cross-domain thinking: Common
representation format or generalized
mapping process?
Peter F. Dominey
Sequential Cognition and Language Group, Institut des Sciences Cognitives,
Bron, France. dominey@isc.cnrs.fr
http: //www.isc.cnrs.fr /dom /dommenu.htm
Abstract: In Carruthers’s formulation, cross-domain thinking requires
translation of domain specific data into a common format, and linguistic
LF thus plays the role of the common medium of exchange. Alternatively,
I propose a process-oriented characterization, in which there is no com-
mon representation and cross-domain thinking is rather the process of es-
tablishing mappings across domains, as in the process of analogical rea-
soning.
Carruthers proposes that cross-modular thinking consists of the
integration of central-process modules’ outputs by the language
faculty to build logical form (LF) representations, which thus
combine information across domains, and that “all cross-modular
thinking consists in the formation and manipulation of these LF
representations (sect. 5.1, para. 7).” I will argue that cross-domain
thinking can occur without intervention of the language faculty.
Rather, such thinking relies on a generalized cross-domain map-
ping capability. Interestingly, this type of mapping capability can
operate across diverse domains, including the mapping required
for performing the transformation from sentences to meanings in
language processing.
In Carruthers’s formulation, cross-domain thinking requires
translation of domain specific data into a common format, and 
linguistic LF thus plays the role of the common cross-domain
medium of exchange. Alternatively, we can consider a process-ori-
ented characterization, in which there is no common representa-
tion, and cross-domain thinking is rather the process of establish-
ing mappings or transformations across domains, as in the process
of analogical reasoning.
We can gain insight into this issue of cross-domain processing
from its long tradition in the sensorimotor neurosciences. Con-
sider the problem of cross-domain coordination required for vi-
sually guided reaching to an object. The retinal image is combined
with information about position of the eye in the orbit, and the ori-
entation of the head with respect to the body to determine the po-
sition of the object in space with respect to the body. This sensory
domain representation is then used to command the arm reach
that should be specified in the native motor system coordinates of
the individual muscles. Interestingly, Kuperstein (1988) demon-
strated that this cross-domain problem could be solved without
invoking common representation format but rather by construct-
ing a direct mapping from sensory to motor system coordinates.
Can an analogous mapping strategy be used for cross-domain
thinking? In response to this question, I will illustrate a form of
transformation processing for the mapping of grammatical struc-
ture in language to conceptual structure and then will demon-
strate how this mapping capability extends to generalized cross-
domain mapping, making this point with the analogical reasoning.
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A central function of language is communicating “who did what
to whom,” or thematic role assignment. In this context, consider
the two sentences in which the open class words are labeled.
a. John(1) hit(2) the ball(3).
b. It was the ball(3) that John(1) hit(2).
Both of these sentences correspond to the meaning encoded by
the predicate hit (agent, object), instantiated as labeled hit(2)
(John(1), ball(3)). For each sentence, the structural mapping from
open class words onto event and thematic role structure in the
meaning is straightforward (123–213, and 312–213 for sentences
(a) and (b), respectively). The difficulty is that the particular map-
ping is different for different sentence types. This difficulty is re-
solved by the property that different sentence types have differ-
ent patterns of grammatical function words (or morphemes) that
can thus identify and indicate the appropriate ksentence, mean-
ingl mapping for each sentence type. Based on this mapping/
transformation characterization, we suggested that nonlinguistic
cognitive sequencing tasks that require application of systematic
transformations guided by “function” markers would engage lan-
guage-related mapping processes. Indeed, in these tasks we ob-
served (1) language-related ERP profiles in response to the func-
tion markers (Hoen & Dominey 2000), (2) correlations between
linguistic and nonlinguistic transformation processing in aphasics
(Dominey et al. 2003), and (3) transfer of training across these do-
mains (Hoen et al. 2002). These data argue for the existence of a
generalized transformation processing capability that can extend
across domains and is thus a candidate for a cross-domain think-
ing mechanism.
Within this structural mapping context, Holyoak and colleagues
(Gick & Holyoak 1983) have studied the process of analogical
mapping in reasoning. A classic example involves the “conver-
gence” schema. Consider: A general must attack a fortress at the
center of a town. His army is too large to approach the fort by any
one of the many paths that converge on the fort. He divides his
army into small groups, each converging simultaneously on the
fort. Now consider: A doctor must eliminate a tumor in a patient’s
thorax. The doctor has a radiation beam that can destroy the tu-
mor, but at full strength, it will destroy the intervening tissue as
well. Gick and Holyoak (1983) demonstrated that subjects could
use the analogical mapping to solve the radiation problem. This
analogical reasoning process does not appear to rely on translation
into language or a propositional representation. Rather, we can
consider that it is based on mapping of the target problem onto a
nonpropositional spatial image schema of the analog problem.
Thus, we can consider that not all cross-modular thinking is
propositional. Similarly, when physics students discover that re-
sistor-capacitor circuits behave like the physical mass-spring sys-
tems they have studied, an analogical mapping process is triggered
that yields a number of new insights. These can potentially be ex-
pressed in language, but they do not originate in any language-re-
lated format. On the contrary, the structural properties required
for analogical mapping would likely be lost in the LF conversion.
A related form of nonpropositional cross-domain reasoning has
been well explored in the mental models paradigm by Johnson-
Laird (1996).
In summary, I have the impression that Carruthers has overex-
tended the original function of LF as an interface between lan-
guage and conceptual systems. It appears implicit in Carruthers’s
theory that all cross-domain thinking must be propositional (or
must be of the type that can be realized by the language faculty).
“All” is a strong word. The cross-domain analogical mapping ex-
amples above define cases where cross-domain interaction cannot
occur via a propositional LF-like data structure. Rather, these
cases require mapping processes that establish the cross-domain
correspondences, independent of a neutral common representa-
tion.
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Abstract: Carruthers’ proposals would seem to implicate language in
what is known as System 2 thinking (explicit) rather than System 1 think-
ing (implicit) in contemporary dual process theories of thinking and rea-
soning. We provide outline description of these theories and show that
while Carruthers’ characterization of non-verbal processes as domain-spe-
cific identifies one critical feature of System 1 thinking, he appears to over-
look the fact that much cognition of this type results from domain-general
learning processes. We also review cognitive psychological evidence that
shows that language and the explicit representations it supports are heav-
ily involved in supporting System 1 thinking, but falls short of supporting
his claim that it is the medium in which domain-general thinking occurs.
Carruthers proposes that language is the medium for general
thought, serving to integrate the outputs of various domain-spe-
cific conceptual systems. He briefly mentions links with dual
process theories of thinking. The most relevant in this context are
those of Reber (1993), Evans and Over (1996), and Stanovich
(1999). All of these theorists argue that humans have two separate
cognitive systems with distinct evolutionary histories. System 1
evolved early, is shared with other animals, allows rapid and par-
allel processing of information and is independent of general in-
telligence. System 2 evolved late, is uniquely human, is slow and
sequential, requires central working memory, and is highly corre-
lated with general intelligence. Both Reber and Evans and Over
label System 1 as implicit and System 2 as explicit.
The first question is how well do these two systems map onto Car-
ruthers’s distinctions? System 1 functions are generally regarded as
domain-specific, whereas System 2 allows general-purpose ab-
stract and hypothetical reasoning. However, Carruthers apparently
presupposes that domain-specific cognition is grounded in specific
innate modules, which is unwarranted. Much domain-specific 
cognition is the result of domain-general learning processes. Im-
plicitly acquired knowledge is limited to the domain in which it 
is learned (Berry & Dienes 1993), but this in itself is not evidence
for innate specificity. There is a high degree of biological pre-
paredness for some learning, for example, in the human visual and
language systems, but general associative learning processes can
account for much of our domain-specific knowledge (Almor, in
press).
We translate Carruthers’s hypothesis as the claim that language
provides the medium of System 2 thought. This does link with
some tentative suggestions made by Evans and Over (1996). We
too are struck by the fact that both language and System 2 think-
ing are uniquely human and agree with Carruthers that language
is strongly related to domain-general thought, but we will refer to
further psychological support for this view.
System 1 is responsible for much linguistic understanding and
production: It is automatic in function and broadly universal in ef-
ficacy across human beings. Like other System 1 processes, lan-
guage delivers its products into consciousness. We comprehend
the meaning of a sentence even though we have not the slightest
idea of the process by which we derived it. However, the key as-
pect of language for the present purpose is that it supports explicit
representations. Language is the medium of explication. To refer
to System 1 as implicit and System 2 as explicit is to associate lan-
guage with the distinction. With language, we can formulate rules
and principles that apply generally. For example, if we learn sta-
tistical principles by experience, we will apply them in a domain-
specific manner (Jepson et al. 1983). If we learn them through
verbal instruction, we can apply them generally (Fong et al. 1986).
We can also use System 2 to reason nonconstructively, inferring,
for example, a disjunction “from above” with the help of general
rules without knowing which disjunction is true. In the purest case
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of this, we can infer by logic alone that either a proposition or its
negation is true, and this capacity requires language.
In psychological research, language defines the distinction be-
tween implicit and explicit knowledge. The latter can be stated;
the former cannot. System 2 thinking can be made explicit in
think-aloud protocols; System 1 thinking cannot. Another key as-
pect of System 2 thinking is that it is volitional. System 2 reason-
ing performance can be directly influenced by verbal instruction.
For example, people use System 2 to override System 1 belief bias
when strongly exhorted to reason logically (Evans & Over 1996),
although the ability to do this is strongly related to general intelli-
gence (Stanovich & West 2000).
Is language linked also to this volitional aspect of System 2
thinking? Carruthers makes several references to the notion of
“inner speech” and quotes evidence that it is a prevalent aspect of
our consciousness. He refers to the position of Frankish that peo-
ple can frame a sentence in inner speech “as if that sentence were
true” to see whether they should believe it or act on it. This posi-
tion reminds us somewhat of our own theory of hypothetical
thought about possibilities and of the conditional inference that
follows from it in System 2 (Evans et al., in press; Over & Evans,
in press). Hypothetical thought about possibilities is a purely hu-
man activity, like advanced language use, and the two activities
must be deeply connected.
Language use is thus related to System 2 thinking in a number
of deep ways. The extent to which it is the medium of such think-
ing, as Carruthers claims, is debatable, however. Much explicit
thinking, in our view, depends on representing and manipulating
mental models (Johnson-Laird 1983; Evans et al., in press). How-
ever, the extent to which such models are linguistic in nature is un-
clear at present. In the version of mental model theory of John-
son-Laird and his collaborators, there is not only a negation sign
but various brackets and other symbols, recently even including
so-called mental footnotes (Johnson-Laird & Byrne 1991; 2002).
Such features cannot simply be represented by concrete images
and may be linguistic in nature. However, some theorists believe
that models should be regarded as concrete and have revised the
theory to deal with this (Barrouillet & Lecas 1998). It has also been
shown in the domain of relational reasoning (Evans et al. 1993)
that at least some linguistic information that is used to build mod-
els of spatial relationships is lost after a short delay. We also know
that communication between humans relies on pragmatic factors
well beyond the boundaries of language (Sperber & Wilson 1995).
In conclusion, research on the psychology of thinking supports
the view that language is intimately related to domain general
thinking, but falls short of providing clear support for the claim
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Abstract: Carruthers suggests that natural language, in the form of inner
speech, may be the vehicle of conscious propositional thought, but he ar-
gues that its fundamental cognitive role is as the medium of cross-modu-
lar thinking, both conscious and nonconscious. I argue that there is no
evidence for nonconscious cross-modular thinking and that the most plau-
sible view is that cross-modular thinking, like conscious propositional
thinking, occurs only in inner speech.
In section 4 of the target article, Carruthers suggests that auditory
images of natural language sentences (“inner speech”) are the ve-
hicles of conscious propositional thinking, tentatively endorsing
proposals by Dennett and myself (Dennett 1991; Frankish 1998a;
1998b; forthcoming). He goes on, however, to argue that natural
language has a more fundamental cognitive role as the medium of
cross-modular thinking. Now, of course, the former thesis already
involves a partial commitment to the latter. If conscious proposi-
tional thinking occurs in inner speech, then conscious cross-mod-
ular propositional thinking will do so, too. However, Carruthers
claims that we also entertain nonconscious cross-modular
thoughts (sect. 5.1), which take the form of logical form (LF) rep-
resentations rather than auditory images, and which are fed di-
rectly to systems that take cross-modular inputs. This claim is, I
think, a more contentious one, and I want to question whether
there is any basis for it.
Is there any evidence for the existence of nonconscious cross-
modular thinking? There is little or no behavioural evidence for
it, I think. It is true that we are capable of performing some fairly
demanding tasks nonconsciously – driving, for example, or walk-
ing down a busy street. But while these tasks may draw on outputs
from more than one central module, it is doubtful that they re-
quire integration of them into cross-modular thoughts. The activ-
ities we can perform nonconsciously are typically routine ones, re-
quiring precise behavioural control rather than creative thinking,
and are not significantly more demanding than ones that other
mammals can be trained to perform. Tasks requiring creative in-
telligence, however, quickly evoke conscious thought.
Rather more promising evidence for nonconscious cross-mod-
ular thinking is provided by what we may call eureka thoughts –
episodes in which the solution to a problem pops into one’s head
some time after one has ceased to think about it consciously (Car-
ruthers 2000, Ch. 3). Such thoughts frequently involve conjoining
ideas in new ways, and it is tempting to conclude that they must be
the product of nonconscious cross-modular reasoning. Of course,
if Carruthers is right, such thoughts cannot be initially framed as
a result of cross-modular reasoning, because by hypothesis they
are constructed by the speech production system mechanically
combining outputs from discrete central modules (sect. 6.1). But
– Carruthers may say – it is likely that they have undergone non-
conscious filtering before issuing in inner speech. Cross-modular
thoughts might be routinely passed to the abductive reasoning fac-
ulty for evaluation, with only the most promising ones eventually
emerging in inner speech. There is another possibility, however.
This is that cross-modular thoughts are fed directly into inner
speech without filtering, and that their evaluation takes place sub-
sequently, as the agent “hears” and reacts to them. On this view,
eureka thoughts are special, not because they have been prese-
lected for significance, but because we recognize them as impor-
tant and hold onto them, whereas others are forgotten. This view
is, I suggest, more consistent with the introspective data than the
alternative. After all, a great deal of inner speech is simply non-
sense – whims, fancies, and absurd ideas, which are instantly dis-
missed. Again, then, there is no compelling evidence for noncon-
scious cross-modular thinking – rather the opposite, in fact.
Could we elicit experimental data that would bear on the issue?
What would be needed is something like a version of the Hermer
and Spelke reorientation task in which subjects were distracted
from thinking consciously about what they are doing. It is hard to
see how this could be arranged, however. It might be suggested
that we could seek the assistance of blindsighted patients – pre-
senting them with geometric and colour information in their blind
field and seeing if they could integrate it. But again is hard to see
how we could test for integration of the information without stim-
ulating the subjects to conscious thought. (Remember that blind-
sighted patients do not react to blind-field stimuli unless overtly
prompted to do so.)
This is not conclusive, of course, and it may be that evidence for
nonconscious cross-modular thinking will emerge. Even if it does,
however, this would not in itself show that cross-modular thoughts
can be tokened as LF representations as well as auditory images.
For it may be that auditory images can themselves be noncon-
scious. It is plausible to think that episodes of inner speech can be
unattended, and on some theories of consciousness this will be suf-
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ficient for them to be nonconscious. Nonconscious inner speech
might nonetheless be cognitively effective – being processed by
the comprehension system and made available to conceptual
modules and domain-general systems.
I have argued that there is no evidence for the existence of
cross-modular thinking in any form other than inner speech. I now
want to outline a positive reason for thinking that it always takes
that form. It is widely accepted that there is a feedback loop within
the language faculty, which takes phonological representations
from the speech production system and passes them to the speech
comprehension system, bypassing the articulatory and auditory
systems (Dennett 1991; Levelt 1989). It is this loop that supports
inner speech. But if nonconscious cross-modular thinking occurs,
then – assuming Carruthers is right about its language depen-
dency – there must be additional feedback loops, which take LF
representations as input and feed them back to domain-general
consumer systems, such as the abductive reasoning faculty.1 But
why should such loops have developed in addition to the phono-
logical one? After all, contents entering the phonological loop
would also reach domain-general consumer systems via the
speech comprehension system – and would in addition be avail-
able to other processes operating specifically on conscious
thoughts (see sects. 4 and 6.3). Given this, what selectional pres-
sure would there have been to develop additional loops chan-
nelling bare LF representations? They might have been margin-
ally faster, but that is all. (Note that it is unlikely that such loops
could have developed before the phonological one; both would
have had to develop at much the same time, subsequent to the
emergence of language.) The more economical hypothesis is
surely that there is just one feedback loop from the language sys-
tem – the one which carries auditory images in inner speech – and
that it is the channel for both cross-modular thinking and con-
scious propositional thinking.
NOTE
1. In fact, it is doubtful that LF representations could be channelled
directly to an abductive reasoning faculty in the way Carruthers suggests.
It seems likely that such a faculty would operate on mental models rather
than propositional representations.
Inner speech and the meeting of the minds
William Frawley
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Abstract: Four extensions of Carruthers’s arguments are given. (1) Spe-
cifics of the Vygotskyan tradition can enhance his claims. (2) Linguistic rel-
ativity might be seen as variation in how logical form (LF) and phonetic
form (PF)serve working memory. (3) Language aids intermodular think-
ing because it makes representations maximally visible. (4) Language for
intermodular thinking is not hardwired but opportunistic.
Carruthers gives substance to the claim that if mind is a computa-
tional form, then it is in the form of language and mind where they
come together. I offer four extensions of his points, (1) elaborat-
ing on Vygotsky, (2) recasting linguistic relativity, (3) examining
representational explicitness, and (4) suggesting opportunism in
language-thought relations.
Vygotsky can be generally understood as claiming that language
surfaces where minds meet: certain forms of language, internal-
ized as speech for thought, drive metathinking (Frawley 1999).
Vygotsky was concerned with minds meeting in the external world
and social language internalized into personal metathinking via in-
ner and private speech. But an individual’s internal subminds
might also be coordinated by speech for thought. Language is the
vehicle of computational control as minds implement executive
tasks (Frawley 1997). This view evokes Frankish’s arguments that
language serves the supermind by aiding the acceptance or rejec-
tion of propositions – a classic mental-control function. A Vygot-
skyan take on Carruthers’s arguments, then, is that inner speech –
imagined speech as PF recycles through the architecture – is the
form of metamind for on-line, cross-domain mental computation.
Several benefits accrue from using this view of Vygotsky. One is
that language-thought relations emerge developmentally as speak-
ing and thinking intertwine. Speech, as Vygotsky said, “goes un-
derground.” When Carruthers observes developmental patterns
in the use of spatial vocabulary to solve geometric tasks, he invokes
a long tradition of experiment and analysis in Vygotskyan theory
(Vygotsky [1986] is an early statement) on the emergence of lan-
guage in on-line thinking.
A second benefit concerns the form of speech for thought. For
Vygotsky, inner speech is predication, and so to claim that lan-
guage drives intermodular thinking, insofar as it is a point about
LF, is to claim that the way a language creates predicates at the in-
terpretive level affects informational integration. When inner
speech surfaces in truncated form as overt speech for thought, it
is entirely predicative. Personal speech for problem solving is a
rich data source for how the interpretive mechanisms of language
drive informational integration (Frawley 1997).
PF’s critical role in the execution of speech for metathought
substantiates Vygotsky’s point that speech, not language, aids
thinking (Myshlenie i rech, meaning “thinking and speech,” is the
original Russian). Speech for thought is really something like
speech, which raises the importance of examining how speech is
implicated in working memory. If acoustic and articulatory codes
are activated in working memory – and if inner speech as PF is
the vehicle of intermodular processing – then there ought to be
an asymmetry in language/nonlanguage disruptions in working
memory tasks: Speech intrusion ought to interfere in nonlan-
guage tasks, but not vice versa. There is some evidence to this 
effect. Baddeley (1999, pp. 50–51) argues that recall of visually
presented digits can be disrupted by any linguistic input, even 
input that is not the native language of the subject, but not by 
nonlinguistic noise. When suppressing speech, individuals have
difficulty transferring visually presented material to short-term
phonological store, thus suggesting that speech is involved in
crossing modes. Further careful experiments on the role of
speech in working memory across modes would be quite reveal-
ing.
A second extension of Carruthers’s points raises a new view of
linguistic relativity. LF and PF have known patterns of variation.
Would such variation imply that differences across languages in
the way syntax delivers representations for interpretation, which
are then used as vehicles informational integration, are thus mea-
sures of linguistic relativity? Do different languages provide work-
ing memory alternate formats for silent predication (LF) and in-
formational ordering (PF)? Baddeley (1999, p. 53) argues that the
articulatory loop in working memory is a good checking mecha-
nism for order of information, and measures of working memory
appear to be a better gauge of individual variation and perfor-
mance than IQ and general problem-solving instruments. Does
linguistic relativity lie in the ways languages offer their users al-
ternate means for silent and self-directed linguistic explicitness in
on-line thinking?
Explicitness leads to the third extension. If speech serves men-
tal computation across modules, what does cross-domain mental
computation require of speech? Any answer must explain how
representations are made visible to one another (Frawley 2002a;
2002b; Frawley & Smith 2001). At interfaces, representations
must be maximally overt, so that one domain may check the truth
of the output of another. Speech is a good vehicle of intermodu-
lar computation because it accommodates degrees of represen-
tational explicitness. (Indeed, this demand for intermodular 
visibility is probably why visual imagery is not a good vehicle 
of cross-domain thought.) If Carruthers is right, intermodular
knowledge disorders ought to evince ancillary, self-regulatory
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speech disruptions. Indeed, this seems to be the case for alex-
ithymia, arguably a cross-domain emotional deficit whose signal
symptom is a deficit in affective talk, even though the syndrome
is not a language disorder at all (Frawley & Smith 2001).
Vygotskyan theory and intermodular mental computation come
together in the fourth extension of Carruthers’s points. Is inner
speech hardwired in the modular breach? Speech for cross-do-
main thinking may be opportunistic rather than hardwired. Some
connections across domains might become automatic and implicit
with learning – as in the way an experienced navigator might de-
velop packaged cross-domain talk to presolve the integration of
geometric and nongeometric information. But novices at such
tasks will have to deploy speech for thought. Language for think-
ing thus should be opportunistically deployable. This would ex-
plain why, in the experimental results that Carruthers quotes,
speech was disruptable in environments where subjects had a
wider spatial array than a narrower one. The former, more diffi-
cult, environment demands speech deployed for metathought. In
less informationally rich environments – smaller rooms – less de-
mand does not evoke opportunistic speech for thought. This point,
however, is also Vygotsky’s, but of some 70 years ago – that is, in-
ner speech surfaces when tasks are difficult.
Does language help thinking? The Vygotskyan answer seems to
be: only when it can.
No conceptual thought without language
Christopher Gauker
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Abstract: Carruthers labels as “too strong” the thesis that language is nec-
essary for all conceptual thought. Languageless creatures certainly do
think, but when we get clear about what is meant by “conceptual thought,”
it appears doubtful that conceptual thought is possible without language.
Carruthers holds that there is some kind of thought that language
alone makes possible, but he denies that language is necessary for
specifically conceptual thought. He thinks that nonlinguistic crea-
tures plainly do engage in conceptual thought, which shows that
language is not necessary for it. I reply that while nonlinguistic
creatures solve problems, and much of their problem-solving de-
serves to be called thought, it is doubtful whether anything they
do deserves to be called “conceptual thought.”
Here is how I would define conceptual thought. The most ba-
sic kind of conceptual thought is a thought that represents some
particular as belonging to some general kind or represents several
particulars as standing in some relation. For example, my thought
that that (I am pointing at a table) is a table, is a basic conceptual
thought, because it represents that thing as belonging to the kind
table. We can define the rest of the class of conceptual thoughts
recursively as thoughts that are either (1) basic conceptual
thoughts or (2) thoughts that are inferentially related to other
thoughts that already qualify as conceptual thoughts. For exam-
ple, if from basic conceptual thoughts to the effect that this is a vi-
cious dog and that is a vicious dog, someone infers that all dogs are
vicious, then the latter is a conceptual thought; and if from the
thought that all dogs are vicious, someone infers that people
should not keep dogs as pets, then that is a conceptual thought as
well.
We know that people who speak a language can engage in con-
ceptual thinking in this sense because they can overtly say of some
particular that it is of some kind, or can overtly say of some par-
ticulars that they stand in some relation to one another, and they
can draw inferences from sayings of these kinds. For example, one
person may say to another, “That’s a vicious dog,” and from that
someone may infer, “All dogs are vicious,” from which someone
might infer, “People should not keep dogs as pets.” What kind of
evidence could we have for thinking that a creature without a lan-
guage was thinking of a particular individual and representing it
as belonging to some general kind?
One kind of evidence sometimes cited is the fact that nonlin-
guistic creatures categorize (e.g., Herrnstein 1992; but not Car-
ruthers). That is, they systematically distinguish between the
members of contrasting categories. For example, a pigeon might
learn to peck when shown a picture of a tree (whether or not it is
one of those pictures on which it was trained) and to refrain from
pecking when shown a picture of something other than a tree. But
this is not a persuasive basis for attributing conceptual thought.
One alternative explanation of categorization might treat it as a
product of imagistic thinking. A pigeon may perceive image x as
being more like image y than like image z without having to think
of x and y as belonging to some kind, such as tree, and even with-
out having to conceive of some particular respect in which x is
more like y than like z.
What Carruthers actually says is that nonlinguistic creatures 
engage in “sophisticated” thinking, as if we could identify all “so-
phisticated” thinking with conceptual thought. I think we should
flatly deny that some of these kinds of sophisticated thinking even
do take place. Carruthers mentions “mind-reading.” No doubt,
people with language, even children in the early stages of language
learning, attribute mental states to agents, and to that extent they
engage in mind reading. But because they have language, that is
not evidence for the independence of conceptual thought from
language. As for languageless creatures, there does not seem to be
any indisputable evidence that they are aware of other agents’
mental states at all (see Heyes 1998). If people or animals use a
theory of mind to predict behavior, then it should be possible to
state, at least by way of hypothesis, the content of the theory they
might be using. But beyond vaguely asserting that beliefs and de-
sires somehow lead to action, no one has ever done that.
Some of the other sorts of sophisticated thinking that Car-
ruthers alludes to surely do take place, but it is not obvious that
they depend on conceptual thought. For example, I see no reason
to assume that thinking that is “genuinely strategic in nature, ap-
parently involving plans that are executed over the course of days
or months” requires conceptual thought. Instead, it might involve
elaborate mental movie making. The animal might imagine vari-
ous courses of events and then recognize the similarity between
what is actually happening and the initial segments of some of
these mental movies. Carruthers thinks that Horgan and Tienson’s
“tracking argument” shows that nonlinguistic creatures are capa-
ble of “compositionally-structured thoughts.” But sheer composi-
tionality is no proof that thought is conceptual; imagery may ex-
hibit a kind of compositionality as well. In Horgan and Tienson’s
example of the basketball player, there are features of the agent’s
thought that cannot be accounted for imagistically, such as the
“coach’s latest instructions” (Horgan & Tienson 1996, p. 85), but
those are the ones that depend on spoken language.
Tradition and the contemporary majority hold that language
serves communication by allowing speakers to reveal to hearers
the conceptual contents of underlying thoughts. It is not clear to
me that Carruthers thinks there is anything fundamentally wrong
with that. He just thinks that the various aspects of the thought ex-
pressed do not come together in one place, so to speak, until the
sentence of spoken language is formed. But if, as I have urged, lan-
guage is the very medium of conceptual thought, so that there is
no conceptual thought without language, then this traditional pic-
ture of interpersonal communication must be abandoned. The al-
ternative is to think of language as a tool for interpersonal coop-
eration by which people can constrain one another’s actions and
steer a common course (Gauker 2003). On this conception, lan-
guage can also play a role in intrapersonal thought, but that role is
best conceived as the internalization of the methods of interper-
sonal cooperation.
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Language’ s role in enabling abstract, 
logical thought
James A. Hampton
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Abstract: Carruthers’s thesis is undermined on the one hand by examples
of integration of output from domain-specific modules that are indepen-
dent of language, and on the other hand by examples of linguistically rep-
resented thoughts that are unable to integrate different domain-specific
knowledge into a coherent whole. I propose a more traditional role for lan-
guage in thought as providing the basis for the cultural development and
transmission of domain-general abstract knowledge and reasoning skills.
What is the role of language in thought? Carruthers claims that
thought originally developed in prelinguistic hominids and other
mammals within domain specific modules such as a folk biology,
folk physics, or folk psychology, and that the evolution of language
was necessary for integrating the outputs of these modules and so
enabling humans to be more intelligent and adaptive. I take issue
with the thesis on four grounds.
First, it is unclear why language should be considered necessary
for integrating the outputs from different domain-specific mod-
ules. The evidence cited by Carruthers is very limited for such a
general claim. There are clearly unfamiliar situations in which be-
ing able to use verbal coding and inner speech will make infor-
mation of different kinds easier to integrate, recall, and use, but
that does not provide evidence that we cannot easily integrate in-
formation from different domains without language in many fa-
miliar contexts. When attempting to tackle an opponent in rugby
or football, or when selecting a shot to play in tennis, the athlete
needs to be able to integrate psychological reasoning about the
likely action about to be taken by the other player with physical in-
formation about the speed and direction in which both players
and/or the ball are travelling. It is an empirical question whether
inner speech might play some role here, but it seems unlikely to
be necessary for integration, given that reaction times are much
too quick to allow verbally mediated conscious deliberation.
Second, it is important to note (although Carruthers does not
claim to the contrary) that language may often be insufficient to
ensure integration across domains. Although we have a well-es-
tablished vocabulary with which to talk about psychology and
physics, the two domains stubbornly resist attempts to integrate
their outputs in any known form of language, even for experts. So
a psychiatrist may feel warranted to tell her patient that there is
“nothing physically wrong with you,” and then proceed to suc-
cessfully treat the “purely psychological” symptoms with a drug
known to affect physical systems in the brain. Cartesian dualism is
probably the most widely held commonsense view of the mind-
body relation, and the philosophical problems of integrating the
output from the two forms of discourse are notorious.
The failure of language to achieve integration may also be found
between folk biology and folk physics, with commonsense beliefs
in animism holding for many centuries and still demonstrable in
children before exposure to science education. There are also
many domain effects in reasoning. Tasks of logical reasoning such
as Wason’s (in)famous four-card problem are very difficult in the
abstract, but can be made trivially easy if placed in a domain where
the structure of the domain lends meaning to the problem. If lan-
guage is successful at facilitating domain-general thinking, then an
account is needed of why the task (which is presented entirely in
linguistic terms) should become so much harder when abstracted
away from a specific domain.
Third, the thesis ignores what may be a much more crucial role
for language to play in thought, namely, abstraction (see, e.g., the
early research of Bruner et al. 1966). More recently Barsalou
(1999) has developed the thesis that (broadly speaking) concepts
are mental simulations. Tokening a thought with a particular con-
ceptual content leads to (and may even just be) activation of sen-
sory and motor schemas associated with perception and action re-
lated to that concept. If his thesis is true, then thinking will oper-
ate most successfully within a modality-specific and situated form
of mental model. I would argue that a key function of language is
that it provides an escape from this primary level of thought. It
provides the bridge between the “messy” prototype representa-
tion of a concept built around experience and action in the world
and the “clean” representation of a concept as an encapsulated
atom (see, e.g., Fodor 1998). Fodor’s arguments for conceptual
atomism involve the compositionality and systematicity of thought.
Yet these arguments themselves are simply derived from earlier
considerations of the compositionality and systematicity of lan-
guage. Language allows us to abstract out a notion of a concept
from the individual experiences on which it is based. It creates a
new mental “entity” as a reified object of thought. As Dwight
Bolinger put it, “The act of naming, with all we have seen it to im-
ply in the way of solidifying and objectifying experience, becomes
one of our most powerful suasive tools, enabling us to create en-
tities practically out of nothing” (Bolinger 1975, p. 251).
Finally, I argue that a second crucial cognitive role for language
is as a necessary precursor for the cultural development of socially
shared logical thinking and hence, for rationality, narrowly de-
fined. Natural language is, of course, a very imperfect tool for ex-
pressing truths of any kind because of the vagueness to be found
in almost all of its referring expressions and the ambiguity in much
of its syntax. However, once the reference of terms is established
(e.g., by indexicals or stipulation), and care is taken in choice of
syntactic form, the development of logic (and hence mathematics
and science) can proceed, using forms of propositional argument
based on the sentences of natural language. The formation of a
community of speakers sharing the same language has therefore
been essential for the progression of human thought through the
formulation and the resolution of conflicting views.
In a sense, of course, abstract logical thinking performs the
function of taking input from domain-specific modules and inte-
grating them, just as Carruthers argues. But it is not the availabil-
ity of language per se that lies at the basis of this integration. There
are many examples of domain-specific knowledge that signally fail
to be integrated in spite of fully developed language structures for
talking about them. It is rather the fact that with language – and
the cultural development and transmission of knowledge that it
supports – comes the hard-won capacity for abstracting the form
of an argument away from its content, developing general reason-
ing skills and finding the means for testing and challenging the
reasoning of others.
Relativistic implications of a natural-
language-based format for thought
Steve Henser
Independent Researcher, 174 Pennant Road, Llanelli SA14 8HN, United
Kingdom. steve.henser@btinternet.com
Abstract: I will argue (contra Carruthers) that accepting natural language
as the format of many of our thoughts should entail accepting a version of
Whorfian relativism and that, rather than something to be avoided, evi-
dence from bilingual cognition suggests that incorporating this idea into
future research would yield further insights into the cognitive functions of
natural language.
Peter Carruthers’s work on the cognitive functions of language is
an excellent example of the healthy symbiosis of philosophy and
psychology. Carruthers’s work in this area has matured in response
to empirical evidence from scientific psychology (cf. Carruthers
1996, where no clear theory of central cognitive modules is pre-
sented, with Carruthers 1998 and subsequent work) and, at the
same time, Carruthers has injected a philosopher’s objectivity into
the debate and has pointed out important new areas for research.
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I am particularly excited by Carruthers’s identifying high-level
representations of our specific natural/public languages (English,
Spanish, Japanese, ASL, etc.) as being constitutive of many of our
thoughts and claiming that our inner use of natural language qual-
itatively enhances our ongoing cognitive abilities. I feel that these
claims capture an important insight, one that has the potential to
motivate diverse research approaches towards a unified under-
standing of the language/thought relationship.
I will focus here on one aspect of Carruthers’s thesis that I feel
needs reworking, namely, the relativistic implications of accepting
natural language (NL) as the format of many of our thoughts. In
Carruthers’s model, the mind contains a non-domain-specific cen-
tral arena (“a very large and significant central arena” Carruthers
2003, in press), which integrates data from central cognitive mod-
ules and which, crucially, operates by manipulating the higher-
level representations of specific natural languages.1 In additional
to this integrative role, NL resources are said to be co-opted by
the theory of mind module and by a putative virtual faculty of the-
oretical reason (cf. Carruthers, in press b). Thus, a specific NL (as
opposed to a universal mentalese) is seen to be the format of or
constitutive of many of our thoughts, to be directly involved in key
higher thought processes, and to be responsible for our distinctly
human cognitive abilities. The influence of NL on thought is thus
seen to be not only developmental or diachronic but also of a con-
tinuous or synchronic nature. In view of the crucial place in cog-
nition accorded it in his model, it is strange that Carruthers feels
obliged to reject the Whorfian, relativistic view of specific natural
languages as exerting an influence over the way their speakers
think.
From the brief dismissive mention of Whorf in the target arti-
cle, it seems that Carruthers has espoused a strong deterministic
interpretation of Whorf ’s views, but this does not do justice to
their scope or complexity (cf. Lakoff 1987, pp. 328–30). Although
Whorf wrote of a “linguistically determined thought world”
(Whorf 1956, p. 154), he was not suggesting that humans are to-
tally the conceptual prisoners of their first languages of acquisi-
tion. Taking an overall perspective of Whorf ’s work, it seems more
appropriate to think of him as advocating NL as exercising both a
formative influence on speakers’ concepts and an ongoing influ-
ence in habitual thought. This position is surely consistent with
Carruthers’s thesis, at least insofar as it applies to the very exten-
sive part of the mind that is said to operate by deploying NL re-
sources; it is also consistent with a considerable body of work in
cognitive psychology and neuropsychology that supports the exis-
tence of language-specific effects in cognition (e.g., Emmorey
1998; Hunt & Agnoli 1991; Zhang & Schmitt 1998).
Carruthers’s theory, while groundbreaking, may not go far
enough in pointing up the possible synchronic qualitative cogni-
tive enhancements available to an organism by virtue of its pos-
session of NL. Not only the combinatory function of natural lan-
guage syntax may be at issue,2 but also the way in which individual
items in the mental lexicon chunk otherwise unwieldy amounts of
data into discrete, quickly accessible and manipulable packages
may also be a key factor in gaining our uniquely human cognitive
edge. This point was made by A. H. Bloom (1981, p. 76), and was
later developed by me into a theoretical construct termed the ling-
pack (linguistically packaged molar concept) in my tentative
model of the language-thought relationship (Henser 2000b), a
model that embodies Levinson’s insights into a possible way in
which the “psychic unity of mankind” can be reconciled with con-
ceptual differences across groups of natural language speakers
(Levinson 1997, pp. 27–28). Were Carruthers to incorporate these
insights into his theoretical framework, it would increase its scope
and make it an even more persuasive argument for scientifically
investigating the cognitive functions of natural language.
Work in the field of bilingual cognition has already produced in-
teresting evidence of the inner deployment of language-specific
resources and the cognitive difference that such resources make.
The Spelke and Tsivkin study cited by Carruthers (Spelke &
Tsivkin 2001) is one such example, showing that a specific NL is
involved in the internal representation of large, exact numbers in
mathematical calculations. Also, certain memories have been
shown to be encoded in the language in which the relevant expe-
rience took place, irrespective of whether or not this context was
the subjects’ first language (Schrauf & Rubin 1998; 2000). Bilin-
gual psychotic patients have been reported to lose their linguistic
competence or have hallucinations in only one of their languages
(Hemphil 1971; Laski & Teleporos 1977).
Widespread anecdotal evidence from bilinguals (cf. Grosjean
1982; Wierzbicka 1985) suggests that bilinguals feel and behave
differently when using their different languages, and that there is
a sensation of switching mental channels when switching from one
language to another, either overtly or covertly. Some small-scale
studies have been done into the causes of these reports (cf. Henser
2000a), but not since the extensive work of Ervin-Tripp back in
the 1960s (Ervin-Tripp 1961; 1964a; 1964b) has there been any
concerted attempt to explain these phenomena. Such questions
cry out, both for thorough empirical research, and for a coherent
and unifying theory to account for the role of natural language in
our mental lives. Abandoning needless aversion to relativism may
be an important step forward in making progress towards resolv-
ing these issues and gaining a fuller understanding of the nature
of the language-thought relationship.
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NOTES
1. Although these high-level representations are said to be in logical
form (LF) (cf. Chomsky 1995), Carruthers makes it clear that this is a nat-
ural language-specific LF (see Carruthers 1996, pp. 249–50; Carruthers
1998, pp. 100–101).
2. Jackendoff has recently argued powerfully against a syntactocentric
conception of language (Jackendoff 2002).
Viewing cognitive mechanisms in the context
of biology
Linda Hermer-Vazquez
Department of Physiology, SUNY Downstate Medical Center, Brooklyn, NY
11203. Linda.Hermer-V azquez@downstate.edu
Abstract: Cognitive mechanisms are based in organisms’ biology, and re-
sults from biological studies suggest that there is unlikely to be a single
mechanism for reorienting or for combining information across modules
or domains. Rather, there are likely to be multiple, partly overlapping sys-
tems for accomplishing nearly all cognitive and behavioral goals, as is the
case for biological mechanisms more generally.
I agree overall with Carruthers’s thesis that language provides a
medium in humans for combining information across modules
(with the loose definition of module that he uses) to form novel
representations much more rapidly than would occur otherwise
(for a review, see the discussion in Hermer-Vazquez et al. 2001,
and for the original proposal, see Hermer 1993). Moreover, I like
his suggestions concerning the role for inner speech in mediating
the formation of these new representations. It was the fact that
adult subjects commonly described using inner speech to conjoin
geometric and nongeometric information in our earliest reorien-
tation studies (Hermer & Spelke 1994) that led me to focus on the
possible cross-module conjunctive powers of language, although
of course these self-reports may have been describing an epiphe-
nomenon rather than the actual conjunctive mechanism. In sub-
sequent discussions, Elizabeth Spelke and I developed a hypoth-
esis for how language comes to play this role in children learning
language, relying on the possibility that the argument structure of
language may not take into account domain- or module-related
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limitations. If this hypothesis is correct, then when children have
learned terms for colors and sense (right and left) relations, the
two can be combined into prepositional phrases such as “to the left
of the blue wall” because the rules for language specify, for exam-
ple, that any adjective – blue (nongeometric), as well as long (geo-
metric) – can modify the final noun in a prepositional phrase that
is otherwise about geometric (sense) relationships. This possibil-
ity as well as the ones that Carruthers mentions await further in-
vestigation.
All but the most dualist among us believe that such cognitive
mechanisms are underpinned by biology, and as someone who has
been conducting research in the fields of neurophysiology and be-
havioral neuroscience for the past six years, I would like to focus
the rest of my comments on what biology suggests to us about the
nature of cognitive modules and learning new representations.
First, language is not likely to be the mechanism for the forma-
tion of cross-module representations, but rather, one mechanism
among many, albeit one with particular advantages such as high
speed (Hermer-Vazquez et al. 2001). Likewise, the geometric re-
orientation process and the process for locating objects with re-
spect to movable landmarks (not discussed in the target article but
a focus of Biegler & Morris 1993; 1996; and Hermer-Vazquez et
al. 2001), are again two mechanisms among many with partly over-
lapping functionality. It is becoming increasingly clear that living
organisms possess multiple, partly redundant, and partly unique
coding and control mechanisms, all the way from the genetic level
(Lobe & Nagy 1998; White 2002) to the level of large-scale neural
circuits (Canedo 1997; McDonald & White 1993). In support of
this for the cognitive level, young children conjoin geometric and
nongeometric information to reorient themselves in larger envi-
ronments (Learmonth et al. 2001; in press), and rats eventually
learn to locate an object in the correct spatial relationship to a
movable landmark (Biegler & Morris 1996). These findings are
consistent with the fact that there is a hierarchy of cues used for
navigation and object search more generally (Maaswinkel &
Whishaw 1999), and that information is used to solve a given task
appears to depend on such factors as how aversive the task is in
addition to the task’s cognitive demands (Gibson et al. 2002).
Spanning over four billion years of the evolution of life, these
partly redundant mechanisms have come to make for robust or-
ganisms that are not completely felled by the incapacitation of one
system (e.g., Pettersson et al. 2000). These partly overlapping sys-
tems are also beneficial because they appear to “compete” to pro-
vide the best representation of a solution to a given problem (Pol-
drack et al. 2001).
Another important point from biology is that cognitive psychol-
ogists ought to avoid placing their findings about human abilities
in a scala naturae framework. Recently, rhesus monkeys were
found to use nongeometric as well as geometric cues for reorien-
tation (Gouteux et al. 2001), as were a species of fish (Sovrano et
al. 2002). Even the fish conjoined these two types of information
together to solve the reorientation task given them. As Sovrano et
al. point out, these findings indicate that a given species’ abilities
are better viewed in the context of adaptations to their particular
ecological niche rather than in terms of that species’ evolutionary
distance from humans.
Finally, all these findings from biology and behavioral neuro-
science underscore the difficulty of defining what a module or a
domain is. For example, we originally defined the geometric re-
orientation process as a module because of its apparent encap-
sulation in adult rats and young children to all but information
about the macroscopic shape of the environment (Cheng 1986;
Gallistel 1990; Hermer & Spelke 1994; 1996). But when later
studies showed that children conjoin geometric and nongeomet-
ric information in larger testing rooms, should it lead us to posit
that there are two (or more) reorientation modules, taking in dif-
ferent types of information depending on room size? Even if we
were to think that was a good inference, it would be circular be-
cause there would be no independent determination of module
status. With multiple, partly overlapping processes representing
problems and their solutions in parallel, more sophisticated con-
ceptual frameworks are needed. Cognitive psychologists, with
their elegant studies of operations on mental representations; bi-
ologists, with their techniques to study the full complexity of the
systems in question; and philosophers, with their sharp argumen-
tation, should work together to develop new ways of thinking
about the robustness and messiness of living systems.
The problematic transition from specific
competences to general competence
James R. Hurforda and Jean-Louis Dessallesb
aSchool of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of
Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK; bGroupe : Information, Interaction,
Intelligence : I3 Ecole Normale Supérieure des Télécommunications, Paris,
France. jim@ling.ed.ac.uk http: //www.ling.ed.ac.uk /~jim /
jld@inf.enst.fr http: //www.enst.fr /~jld
Abstract: Postulating a variety of mutually isolated thought domains for
prelinguistic creatures is both unparsimonious and implausible, requiring
unexplained parallel evolution of each separate module. Furthermore, the
proposal that domain-general concepts are not accessible without prior ex-
posure to phonetically realized human language utterances cannot be im-
plemented by any concept-acquisition mechanism.
Carruthers draws heavily on Mithen (1996) for his argument that
the thoughts of prehumans were sealed in separate compartments
such as social understanding (for dealing with the conspecifics in
one’s group), technical understanding (for dealing with tools), and
understanding of the natural world (for foraging and hunting).
Mithen’s thought-provoking account is largely arrived at by spec-
ulation from the archaeological record, rather than by experi-
mentation on nonhumans. Not much about detailed brain organi-
zation can be gleaned from remains of bones, tools, and campsites.
We are skeptical about this proposed modularity, on the grounds
that it is unparsimonious and raises more problems than it solves.
What Carruthers calls conceptual modules (which include
geometry, colour, and theory of mind) are claimed to produce non-
conscious representations, like THE TOY IS IN THE CORNER
WITH A LONG WALL ON THE LEFT AND A SHORT WALL
ON THE RIGHT. This is, according to Carruthers, what animals
and prelinguistic children have in their minds. This kind of recur-
sive and syntactically complex form of mentalese is, according to
Carruthers, module-specific. All these complex forms of repre-
sentation are sitting there, waiting for the evolution of the lan-
guage faculty to connect them: “We are supposing that this inter-
face became modified during the evolution of language so that
thoughts deriving from distinct conceptual modules could be com-
bined into a single natural language sentence” (sect. 6.2, para. 2).
The assumption of the existence of k different and yet compat-
ible mentaleses is nonparsimonious. If all these representational
modules evolved independently, we would need to explain how
they arrived at forms compatible enough to be simply connected
by the evolution of one further domain-general module. Similar
mechanisms would need to be found for all (k – 1) other modules
(colour, movement, audition, kinaesthesia, theory of mind, etc.).
Carruthers needs k parallel stories, with no guarantee that they
will converge on compatible forms. Thanks to some further mira-
cle, these mentaleses would be compatible enough to be easily
combined in linguistic sentences.
For example, if predicate-argument structure is common to all
specific modules, then to the extent that these modules are truly
independent, separate explanations would have to be given for the
emergence of this common structure. But if similar conditions
each domain give rise to predicate argument structure (e.g., the
existence of middle-sized salient objects, to which attention can
be drawn, as suggested by Hurford 2002), then the domains are
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not completely distinct. It is surely implausible that there is no
overlap between mechanisms for thinking about social life and
hunting or foraging. Chimpanzees, for example, hunt in social
groups for colobus monkeys. One chimpanzee will block the prey’s
exit in one direction, while another approaches from the other di-
rection. This involves integration of social cooperation with hunt-
ing behaviour. At another level, the mechanisms involved in seek-
ing and grasping nits during social grooming are likely to be similar
to those involved in seeking and grasping insects for food, from
the ground; grooming seems to be a case of hunting inside so-
cial interaction. Can we suppose that a chimpanzee’s thoughtful
strategies for catching nits during grooming are isolated from its
strategies for catching insects from the forest floor?
Another separate difficulty with Carruthers’s proposals involves
his view that language can be a necessary condition for certain
kinds of thought, yet not constitutively implicated in those forms
of thought. Carruthers explains this initially perplexing view with a
diachronic/ontogenetic proposal. The picture is that, during child-
hood, a person hears a full-fledged utterance with some domain-
general content, interprets this by accessing its LF, and thereby
gains access to a kind of thought previously inaccessible to him/her.
The child’s first access to such a thought must be through (fully
fledged) language, but in later life, the person can access this
thought directly via its LF, and the phonological trappings do not
necessarily come to mind. This is Carruthers’s position.
The interpretation of any utterance is seldom, if ever, accom-
plished in purely bottom-up fashion. That is, some contextual
clues as to the general kind of meaning intended by the speaker
are always deployed by the hearer in accessing the meaning of an
utterance. Carruthers’s account implies that children interpret ut-
terances with domain-general content, which open up certain
classes of thought to them, in purely bottom-up fashion, with no
prior inkling of the LF treasure they are going to find at the end
of the interpretation process. But this seems most implausible.
Children, in particular, who know less of their language than adults,
must rely more on top-down clues to meaning than do adults.
We need to ask how a child first learns the meaning of a partic-
ular domain-general natural-language predicate word, such as En-
glish same or individual or three. According to Carruthers, the
child must hear an utterance using the word, for example, “This
nut is the same colour as my skin,” and without having prior ac-
cess to the concept SAME, interpret the utterance correctly, and
thereby gain access to the concept SAME. We are in a Fodorian
paradox here, and Carruthers doesn’t show us how to get out of it.
If “non-domain-specific, cross-modular, propositional thought 
depends on natural language,” there is an ontogenetic bootstrap-
ping problem. Nonspecific thoughts must rely on domain-general 
concepts like SAME, INDIVIDUAL, or THREE. No account is
given of how such concepts are acquired. Furthermore, Car-
ruthers does not tell us where such concepts are supposed to re-
side because they do not belong to any specific module. If they are
ascribed to a “central” system, then a (k 1 1)th mentalese has to
be postulated. Such a central system could, both ontogenetically
and phylogenetically, play the role of integrator. If so, there is no
need to grant this role to syntax and phonology. If there is no such
central conceptual system, then the existence of any domain-gen-
eral concept is problematic. Words alone, and their juxtaposition
through syntax, can’t bring them to existence in the mind.
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How perspective shift integrates thought
Brian MacWhinney
Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15213.
macw@cmu.edu http: //psyling.psy .cmu.edu /brian /
Abstract: Within the context of Carruthers’s general analysis of the rela-
tion between language and thought, I present a specific hypothesis about
how grammar uses perspective flow to unify disparate cognitions. This per-
spective hypothesis allows us to understand the neolithic burst in creativ-
ity as a cultural advance in methods for knitting together thoughts.
The task of characterizing the relation between language and
thought is a core challenge facing cognitive science. Carruthers’s
cogent analysis of this difficult problem is a welcome contribution
to the literature. It was a particular pleasure for me to find that the
specific shape of the language-thought relation Carruthers envi-
sioned was so close in many ways to that which I have also been
developing (MacWhinney 1977; 1999; 2003; in press). I have been
arguing that language uses a system of perspective-switching to
knit together thoughts from at least four cognitive levels: direct
perception, spatio-temporal navigation, causal action, and social
positioning. Like Carruthers, I believe this system builds up tem-
porary mental models that then guide further thought. I also rec-
ognize that the constituent structure of syntax facilitates integra-
tion across these systems. Like Carruthers, I recognize that the
cognitive powers of prelinguistic children, aphasics, and nonhu-
man primates show that we cannot characterize all thought as in-
ner speech.
Although our views seem to occupy the same space in Car-
ruthers’s top-level logical analysis, they make extremely different
claims about (1) the dynamics of the integration across systems,
(2) the shape of the arena where integration occurs, (3) the nature
of the evolution of the linkage between language and thought, and
(4) the modular quality of the human mind. Let me, in this brief
space, present an abstract of my alternative vision, which I call the
Perspective Hypothesis.
My interest in the perspective hypothesis began when I realized
(MacWhinney 1977) that the linguistic devices of initial position-
ing and subject marking were reflexes of “starting points” for cog-
nition. Embarrassingly, it took me 20 more years to understand the
extent to which this system of perspective flow permeated all of
the constructions of language and not just the system of subject
marking. In the meantime, additional experimental work, Gerns-
bacher (1990) and growing evidence for the incremental nature of
sentence processing, made me confident that the notion of per-
spective maintenance and switching was core to understanding
the relation between language and thought. The basic idea is that
sentence comprehension involves an attentional flow that con-
structs the actions of a protagonist engaged in activities on the four
levels of the theory: direct perception, space-time, causal action,
and social relations. For example, in the sentence, “The dog the
policeman was chasing jumped over the wall,” we begin interpre-
tation by assuming the perspective of the dog. We then shift to the
policeman to imagine the chasing and then back to the dog to en-
vision the jumping over the wall. Each of these perspectives is
stored in verbal working memory, as we build up the dynamic im-
age of enactive representations. In effect, this process reduces the
whole of perception to the operations of a central homunculus that
represents the self. This construction occurs immediately and in-
crementally as we listen to sentences. In production, our sen-
tences trace out a set of activations using constructions and con-
stituent structure in a way entirely consistent with Carruthers’s
account of the union of color adjectives with directions and place
indexicals in a phrase such as “the short blue wall.”
Unlike Carruthers, I view this high-level homunculus as more
than just a call-back to input modules. For me, central cognition
occurs not through a feedback loop to the input modules, but in
an arena constructed by the interaction of the various linked pos-
terior-anterior projections areas found in frontal cortex. The evo-
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lutionary construction of this frontal homunculus as a device for
organizing planning began in the primates and continued across
the full six million years of hominid evolution. While agreeing with
Mithen’s arguments about the separateness of cognitive systems
in our ancestors, I would choose to follow Donald (1998) when he
argues that the beginning of an integration across these systems in
Homo erectus well antedates the emergence of spoken communi-
cation. I interpret the neolithic sociocognitive breakthrough stud-
ied by Mithen as the result of cumulative changes in temperament
and cognition, which then interacted with ongoing advances in vo-
cal capabilities to achieve the solidification of new social institu-
tions, such as the priesthood. The fact that radical social changes
during the last 20,000 years have led to an integration of the hu-
man mind shows that language has achieved its effect not through
some remarkable recent mutation, but by making new use of sys-
tems that we already in place.
What does this analysis say about modularity? First, it is clear
that the kinder, gentler, emergent modules proposed by Mithen,
Carruthers, Tooby, Cosmides, Pinker, and Spelke bear little re-
semblance to the modules proposed originally by Fodor. Beyond
this, one wonders whether it might not be better to think of the
effects of perspective flow not in terms of breaking down the walls
between modules, but in terms of facilitating communication be-
tween distant areas of the brain. By emphasizing the ability of lan-
guage to knit together discrepant perspectives over cognitive time,
we avoid a questionable enumeration of specific modules and a
largely fruitless debate regarding relative permeability and bio-
logical determination. The perspective hypothesis allows us to un-
derstand the extent to which language “runs all around the brain”
grabbing information from whatever source it can find. This abil-
ity to integrate information is not contingent on the exact modu-
lar shape of the informational loci. Instead, it depends on the in-
tegrative facilities of language. There are three ways in which
language achieves this integration neuronally. First, lexical items
receive stable input projections from a variety of cognitive inputs
(Li et al., in press) Second, as Carruthers notes, constituent struc-
ture allows for “plug-ins” through modification and attachment.
Third, by establishing a central perspective to each predication
and tracking shifts in that perspective, connected discourse can es-
tablish a full social narrative. The cumulative effect of these three
integrative processes is to draw on all aspects of cognition to con-
struct a central cognitive representation grounded on a fictive, in-
tentional homunculus.
Could you think Carruthers’ s ideas without
having to speak them? Talk with yourself if
you want to have any thought on that
Carlos Molina
Instituto de Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago,
Chile. cmolinac@puc.cl
Abstract: First, the importance of language in cognition is recognized.
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily imply that the locus of thought is
natural language (words, syntax, phonology). Then, difficulties with some
of Carruthers’s hypotheses are stated: Is an account based on LFs capable
of dealing with the complexities involved in what we call thought? Finally,
mention of the issue of language production is made.
Carruthers puts forward the hypothesis that “there are some
thought-types which can only be entertained at all, by us, when to-
kened consciously in the form of an imaged natural language sen-
tence.” This observation is basically obtained via introspection of
our own thought processes. It’s quite plausible to think that the ar-
chitecture of human cognition has this property. We have the im-
pression that if someone asks, “say, what do you think about Car-
ruthers’s ideas?”, you can think about the issue only if you aid your
thinking with natural-language sentences. If the following day you
meet that person and, for some reason, you didn’t talk to yourself
about the issue in the meantime, it is probable that you wouldn’t
have anything to say. Because you didn’t talk about the issue, you
didn’t think about it.
It is important to add that this does not mean that the concep-
tual system is unable to think (make inferences, etc.) if the linguis-
tic representation levels (roughly words, syntax, and phonology)
are not activated. In fact, surely there is a lot that non-linguistic-
aided thinking (NLAT) can do. We would like to point out that
some thought processes (roughly, complicated reasoning) require
the aid of the language faculty resources. But this doesn’t neces-
sarily mean that the locus of thought is natural language repre-
sentations (words, syntax, phonology). This is what Carruthers
calls the supra-communicative conception of language, and it is
the one that we endorse.
Let’s now turn to some of Carruthers’s arguments. Remember
that one of Carruthers’s hypotheses is that knowing a natural lan-
guage such as English or Chinese is essential for complicated rea-
soning because such reasoning requires access to the sort of repre-
sentational system that can only be provided through learning the
structure of a natural language. But, what does this representational
system consist of? Carruthers proposes Chomsky’s characterization
of language and hypothesizes that logical forms (LFs) are the level
of representation that constitute the locus of thought (where think-
ing is really happening). In a second hypothesis he claims that LFs
are the mechanisms that allow the connection between different
conceptual domain-specific modules (e.g., folk physics, folk biology,
ToM, etc.). We find it strange that he doesn’t take greater care in
characterizing with precision the notions of language and thought.
The notion of language for Carruthers is clearly based on what
is meant by it in Chomsky’s theories (Chomsky 1995).1 Specifi-
cally, he believes that Chomsky’s LFs are the basic building blocks
of thought. But why is this? It remains unexplained, but it seems
to be that the syntactical properties of LFs are the suitable
medium for explaining the fact that we can entertain thoughts
such as, “The food is in the corner with the blue wall on the left,”
where we connect “blue’ (color module) with “wall” (geometrical
module). In this respect he says, “natural language syntax allows
for multiple embedding of adjectives and phrases . . . so there are
already ‘slots’ into which additional adjectives – such as ‘blue’ –
can be inserted.” But this doesn’t look like an explanation! And he
doesn’t say much more about this matter in the article. Could it be
the case that the author believes it is not really necessary to make
those mechanisms more explicit? Aren’t those mechanisms at the
heart of what is at stake?2 I have to confess that I don’t know ex-
actly what the locus of thought is (who knows?),3 but whatever it
is, it will have something to do with the way we organize experi-
ence; and this is clearly not in terms of adjectives, nouns, and
verbs, but in terms of “conceptualised entities” such as objects,
events, properties, times, quantities, relations, intentions, and the
like. And as linguists have shown us, the mapping from concep-
tual category to syntactic category is many-to-many (see Jacken-
doff 1983; 2002).4
In addition, Carruthers points out that “the present hypothesis
commits us to a nonclassical account of speech production.” 
But, is Carruthers’s hypothesis a genuine alternative to Levelt’s
(1989)?5 In Carruthers’s view, there is no such entity as a “prever-
bal thought” because a thought “cannot be entertained indepen-
dently of being framed in natural language” (sect. 6.1, para. 1).6
OK, but why? Again, no explanation is given. It looks very much
like an ideological statement. Carruthers remarks that neither he
nor Levelt has an answer to the question of how thoughts get as-
sembled in the first place. In a certain way this is true, but there
are some important differences between both views: In Levelt’s ac-
count, the process of generating messages is analysed as a two-step
process, with macroplanning followed by microplanning. Roughly
speaking, macroplanning has to do with deciding what to say and
in what order; microplanning has to do with giving the units of
macroplanning an information structure, a propositional format
(as opposed to, say, a visual format), and a perspective. The final
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result of microplanning is a “preverbal message” that can be rec-
ognized by the language faculty as its characteristic input (see Lev-
elt 1989). All these processes are not capriciously stated but are the
result of taking into account the distinctions that speakers would
have to make to produce language. How could LFs deal with all
these different types of processes? This also remains unexplained.
Some other problems arise, such as how to deal (in terms of LF)
with the reasonable idea that, “there has to be a ‘what we meant to
say’ that is different from what we said” (Pinker 1994, p. 57).
In sum, we think that Carruthers makes a valuable contribu-
tion by making us take into account an important phenomenon:
When we engage in complicated reasoning, the language faculty
is required. So far so good, but the problem arises when the au-
thor establishes hypotheses concerning the mechanisms behind
this phenomenon. We believe that the mechanisms he puts for-
ward (LFs, etc.) are too general and unspecific. An adequate un-
derstanding of the relation between language and thought has to
point to specific features of both language and cognition. With-
out clear and adequate operational definitions, we cannot inves-
tigate general assertions about relationships between language
and thought.
NOTES
1. Chomsky identifies the level of language that interfaces with the con-
ceptual-intentional system as logical form (LF), a level built out of syntac-
tic units such as noun phrases and verbal phrases. Remember that Chom-
sky characterizes generative grammar not as a method for constructing
sentences but as a formal way to describe the infinite set of possible sen-
tences (competence). The fundamental generative component of the sys-
tem is the syntactic component; the phonological and semantic compo-
nents are “interpretive.” It is curious to find that Carruthers was inspired
by a theory that had no semantic motivations, and that is not concerned
with linguistic performance, all this given that his main concern is to un-
derstand “how we think.”
2. Remember that in Carruthers’s own views the problem is a natural
one, not a conceptual one.
3. “It is, of course, exceptionally difficult to determine how people ‘re-
ally’ represent situations to themselves” (Slobin, in press).
4. “It is widely accepted that syntactic categories do not correspond one
to one with conceptual categories. All physical object concepts are ex-
pressed by nouns, but not all nouns express physical object concepts (con-
sider earthquake, concert, place, redness, laughter, justice). All verbs ex-
press event or state concepts, but not all event or state concepts are
expressed by verbs (earthquake and concert again). Prepositional phrases
can express places (in the cup), times (in an hour), or properties (in the
pink). Adverbs can express manners (quickly), attitudes ( fortunately), or
modalities ( probably)” (Jackendoff 1997, p. 33).
5. The most sophisticated theory on the market and the result of years
of empirical and theoretical research.
6. It is assumed that Carruthers is referring here to structured or com-
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Abstract: Cross-domain representations provide the foundation for lan-
guage and are not its unique product. Modularity of a limited kind is con-
fined to early infancy in humans and is succeeded by domain-general
thinking and speaking. Representational language becomes accessible to
the cognitive system during the preschool years as a supplement to expe-
rientially based conceptual processing, resulting in a dual-process system.
Carruthers asserts that “all non-domain-specific reasoning of a non-
practical sort . . . is conducted in language” (sect. 5.1, para. C) be-
cause the nonlinguistic conceptual system is characterized by wide-
spread domain-specific modularity that inhibits many kinds of
conscious intelligent inference and reasoning. From a social-cog-
nitive-developmental perspective, none of this necessarily follows.
Nonetheless, there is a place for a dual process theory in cognitive
development.
Consider first the evolution of language as a communicative sys-
tem, certainly its primary function. Although its beginnings are
controversial and obscure, it can be said with confidence that it
emerged as a social symbolic system constructed from combina-
tions of symbols whereby representations of the external world as
well as internal thoughts could be shared among groups of hu-
mans. Shared linguistic representations provide the basis for col-
lective reasoning, as in the debates among hunters that Carruthers
cites. It seems plausible that such collective cognitive uses of lan-
guage were the platform from which individual thinkers derived
language representations and associated linguistic based reason-
ing as a supplement to the basic cognitive conceptual system, re-
sulting in a dual process cognitive architecture. Such a sequence
gains plausibility from similar social to individual sequences in de-
velopment, learning, and history (Scribner 1985; Vygotsky 1986).
But is it plausible that individuals participating in social collo-
quies did not already possess nonlinguistic, non-domain-specific
conceptual processed? If they did not, how would they compre-
hend or interpret the cross-domain discourse of others? Or, how
would any of the group be able to compose linguistic representa-
tions that crossed domain boundaries? Similar questions must be
raised with respect to development. How could language – a non-
domain-specific symbolic communication system – be acquired
by infants or children if they did not already possess a non-domain-
specific conceptual cognitive capacity? Language is not in fact ac-
quired in a domain-specific mode and then somehow transformed
into a nonspecific system. Even at the first one-word level, infants
are not confined to learning words within one ontological domain
such as objects, but range over a variety of conceptual domains
such as persons, places, times, natural phenomena, events, ac-
tions, social phrases, and so on (Nelson et al. 1994). And exchang-
ing the simplest utterances requires combining the perspective of
speaker or listener (intuitive psychology) with a message that may
refer to physical objects, actions, events, possessions, and so on.
The point is that language does have the potential for combin-
ing information from different conceptual domains, but that to ac-
quire language, infants and children must have a conceptual plat-
form adequate to the task, namely, one that does not constrain
language use to a single domain. (The earlier claim that language
learners focused solely on words for objects has been abandoned
in the face of variability of vocabularies, individual differences in
types of words learned, and cross-linguistic variability.) Two ques-
tions follow: What status then do domain-specific modules have?
What sort of conceptual representation supports nonspecific lan-
guage learning? A different sort of theory of early cognitive de-
velopment than that assumed by Carruthers and other cognitive
scientists in his camp is needed.
The importance of modularity in human thought may be ques-
tioned without doubting either that the intelligence of other ani-
mals, including our close primate relatives, may be largely domain-
specific, sculpted by natural selection; or that human infants are
born with predispositions to process certain classes of perceptual
stimuli (faces, objects, phonology, speech patterns, spatial rela-
tions) in modular ways. A plausible cognitive developmental se-
quence recognizes the adaptive significance of such processes to
early infant life and the laying down of basic neural structures.
These processes engage experience-expectant neural systems and
establish basic parameters regarding the environment, including
its critical social components. Beginning in the middle of the first
year, the infant cognitive system becomes less dependent on mod-
ular functions and more plastic, more experience-dependent and
domain-general, setting the stage for socially shared attention,
event representations, imitation, and language acquisition. That
event representations serve as basic cognitive structures beginning
at least in the last half of the first year is relevant to the claim that
language acquisition itself rests on domain-general processes (Nel-
son 1986). Representations of events (e.g., eating and going to bed)
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involve cross-domain integration of persons, objects, actions, space,
and time, and there is good evidence that such representations
provide conceptual input to early language (Toma-sello 1992). De-
layed imitation in later infancy is based on event representations
and provides a prelinguistic social-experiential semi-symbolic
cognitive representation (Donald 1991). At the perceptual, motor,
and nonsymbolic level of the cognitive system, automatic non-
conscious processes continue to subserve both the nonlinguistic
conceptual and linguistic representations. Non-domain-specific
conceptual processes, including language, may be thought of as
layers added to earlier evolved cognitive operations.
A transition period of language practice in social contexts con-
tinues up to the fifth or sixth year when linguistic representations
and processing supplement the basic experience-based system. I
have proposed a dual process theory to explain the important ad-
vances in cognitive development during the preschool years (ages
3–5) (Nelson 1996; in press; Nelson et al. 2003). Specifically, the
achievement of representational language supplements the initial
nonlinguistic experientially based conceptual system with a sec-
ond linguistic representation component available to the cognitive
processing system. Among other things, this enables holding in
mind two competing or complementary representations at the
same time (e.g., past and present states of affairs, first- and sec-
ond-person perspective on the same event, etc.), with implications
for performance on theory of mind tasks and category choice
tasks, as well as self-reflective thought. The achievement of rep-
resentational language involves the acquisition of complex se-
mantics and syntax necessary to express propositional thoughts
about things not evident in the immediate scene, such as descrip-
tions, explanations, narratives, plans, and so on. This level of lan-
guage competence, which follows several years of conversational
practice with adults, particularly those concerned with the past
and future, is reached by about four to five years of age.
Subsequently, domain-specific conceptual structures and asso-
ciated learning and memory strategies begin to be constructed
and consolidated, in collaboration with the social-cultural world
that defines useful domains such as writing and arithmetic, poetry
and physics, or alternatively, hunting and gathering, spinning and
woodworking (see also Karmiloff-Smith 1992). Such domain-spe-
cific knowledge does not of course prevent children or normal
adults from engaging in cross-domain thinking, either in science
or in everyday life.
In summary, language is a cross-domain communicative and
cognitive representational system made possible by a preexisting
non-domain-specific conceptual system perhaps unique to human
cognition. Together they compose a dual representation cognitive
processing system of the extraordinary flexibility and power that
we are familiar with.
Internalizing communication
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Abstract: Carruthers presents evidence concerning the cross-modular in-
tegration of information in human subjects which appears to support the
“cognitive conception of language.” According to this conception, lan-
guage is not just a means of communication, but also a representational
medium of thought. However, Carruthers overlooks the possibility that
language, in both its communicative and cognitive roles, is a nonrepre-
sentational system of conventional signals – that words are not a medium
we think in, but a tool we think with. The evidence he cites is equivocal
when it comes to choosing between the cognitive conception and this rad-
ical communicative conception of language.
Reflection on our phenomenology furnishes two very different
views of the role of natural language in human cognition. On the
one hand, as Carruthers observes at the beginning of the target ar-
ticle, we are constantly running words and sentences through our
heads, even when performing quite trivial cognitive tasks. This
provides some support for what Carruthers terms the “cognitive
conception of language,” according to which natural language
constitutes a representational medium of thought. On the other
hand, there is the familiar feeling that our thoughts are present in
some form before we attempt to express them in natural language
(“I know what I want to say, I just don’t know how to say it”). This
feeling is more consistent with what Carruthers terms the “com-
municative conception of language,” which denies that natural
language is a representational medium of thought and holds in-
stead that its role is restricted to the communication of thoughts
coded in other representational media.
Because phenomenology doesn’t settle this question, and be-
cause one of his aims is to defend the cognitive conception of lan-
guage, Carruthers turns to the empirical evidence. His trump card
is a series of experiments conducted by Hermer-Vazquez et al.
(1999), which suggest that natural language has a crucial role in
the human capacity to integrate information across different do-
mains (in this case geometric information and information con-
cerning object-properties). Carruthers concludes (as do Hermer-
Vazquez et al.) that natural language performs this integrating
function by acting as a mental lingua franca: a medium for repre-
senting items of information drawn from distinct domain-specific
modules in the brain.
In our view, however, the situation is not so straightforward. We
accept, on the basis of the experimental evidence Carruthers pre-
sents, that natural language contributes to the cross-modular inte-
gration of information in human subjects. What we question is the
further claim that it does so by acting as a representational medium
(and hence that the cited experimental work vindicates the cogni-
tive conception of language). Carruthers does allow that language
can influence cognition without acting as an (internal) representa-
tional medium, because it both sculpts and scaffolds cognition (sect.
2). But, as he points out, the function of language in these cases is
primarily diachronic – it contributes to the acquisition of certain
cognitive capacities rather than the real-time exercise of those ca-
pacities. Consequently, such processes are incapable of accounting
for the synchronic integration of internally coded information, and
the cognitive conception of language appears to be obligatory.
However, we believe that Carruthers has overlooked a significant
cognitive role for language that is both synchronic and consistent
with the communicative conception – one, moreover, that has the
potential to account for the cross-modular integration of informa-
tion in human subjects. To demonstrate this we’ll need to consider
the communicative conception of language in more detail.
What distinguishes the communicative and cognitive concep-
tions of language is that the former excludes natural language from
among the human brain’s representational media of thought. Nat-
ural language is in the communication business, not the thinking
business. Most proponents of this view accept that language en-
ables communication precisely because it is a representational
medium, but deny that it is a medium of thought. Some go fur-
ther. Robert Cummins, for example, argues that written and ver-
bal tokens of natural language communicate thoughts, not by rep-
resenting them, but merely by acting as conventional “signals” that
trigger appropriate representing vehicles in target brains (see es-
pecially Cummins 1996, pp. 135–40). Such signals are produced
when representing vehicles in a source brain interact with motor
systems via mechanisms that realize the governing conventions of
language. And they influence the receiving brain by impacting on
its sensory surfaces. Communication succeeds when the emitted
signals cause the receiving brain to token vehicles in its represen-
tational medium of thought whose contents are sufficiently simi-
lar to those tokened in the source brain. Cummins’s insight is that
linguistic signals need not (indeed should not) be conceived as
content-bearers to explain their role in this process.
Commentary/Carruthers: The cognitive functions of language
694 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2002) 25:6
This more radical communicative conception of natural lan-
guage is echoed in a recent paper by Paul Churchland, who adds
an interesting twist. He claims that language is not a system for
representing the world, but the “acquired skill of perceiving . . .
and manipulating . . . the brain activities of your conspecifics, and
of being competent, in turn, to be the subject of reciprocal brain-
manipulation” (Churchland 2001). From this perspective, lan-
guage is not just a means of communicating thoughts but also a
way for one brain to shape the cognitive activities of another – lin-
guistic signals fundamentally operate as a means by which we ma-
nipulate the contents and trajectory of thought in other people.
What sort of cognitive role does this leave for natural language?
Clearly, sculpting and scaffolding are not ruled out, but a far more
significant possibility is that the communicative process we have
described also goes on inside individual brains. It was Vygotsky’s
great insight that after children acquire a natural language as a tool
for communication, they internalise it, that is, they appropriate it
as a cognitive tool (Vygotsky 1962/1986). For Vygotsky, as for Car-
ruthers, this process is one in which an external communicative
scheme becomes an internalized representational medium. What
we are suggesting, by contrast, is that the internalisation of natural
language is a process whereby a conventionally governed set of
communicative signals is put to work inside a single brain. Lan-
guage becomes a system of signals apt not only for manipulating
the brains of others, but also for recurrent self-manipulation. Such
internalisation involves establishing communicative links (routed
through the language centres) that can be employed by one part
of the brain to steer the cognitive activities occurring in other parts
of the brain.1 In this picture, natural language is not an internal
representational medium, it is a powerful cognitive tool – one that
establishes coherent, multimodal representations, by facilitating
communication within the brain, and regulates the sequencing of
thought via the constant interplay between networks that encode
linguistic signals and those that encode thoughts (for a fuller dis-
cussion, see O’Brien & Opie 2002).
There is emerging evidence that language, implemented pri-
marily in temporal cortex, plays just this kind of role. Recurrent
connections that loop from language centres out to the repre-
senting vehicles they trigger, and back again, catch up language
and thought in a tight web of mutual influence that extends our
cognitive capacities well beyond those of infraverbal organisms.
Such connections may well function to integrate information
across the brain’s perceptual and conceptual faculties, without re-
course to a linguiform medium of thought. What we are propos-
ing is a synchronic, fully internalized cognitive role for language
that is consistent with the communicative conception. As we have
put it elsewhere (O’Brien & Opie 2002), words are not a medium
we think in, they are a tool we think with. The possibility of this
radical communicative conception of language is one that Car-
ruthers has failed to consider. And the empirical evidence he cites
is equivocal when it comes choosing between his favoured cogni-
tive conception and the alternative we have sketched.
NOTE
1. This idea is somewhat similar to (but not identical with) the specu-
lations that Dennett makes about the role of natural language in organiz-
ing our thinking (see, e.g., Dennett 1991, pp. 193–99).
Speech as an opportunistic vehicle 
of thinking
Csaba Pléh
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Abstract: Carruthers clearly identifies the basic issues involved in lan-
guage and thought relations and argues for an adaptive central model. Sim-
ilar conclusions were reached by classical research in the inner speech 
tradition. Sokolov (1968; 1972) especially emphasized that inner speech
appears only when the task is difficult. The use of inner speech is not a ne-
cessity to transform representations, but it is called for when transforma-
tions become difficult. This might be related to the cognitive reorganiza-
tions leading to language as emphasized by Donald (2001).
The clear differentiation by Carruthers between two basic ques-
tions involved in the complex language and thought interface is-
sue, namely, the involvement of language as a system and speech
as an actual bodily process, on the one hand, and the mandatory
or adaptive involvement of linguistic systems in thought, on the
other, is a most welcome effort in the domain of cognitive science.
In my commentary I shall concentrate on two issues: What can we
learn in this regard from traditional experimental work on dual
tasks in the inner speech research tradition, and how should one
envisage the shaping of domain general or cross-domain mecha-
nisms in the genesis of human cognition?
As Carruthers points out, cognitive science usually starts off
from a communicative conception of language when dealing with
the language-thought relationship. This is, according to Car-
ruthers, Fodor’s (1983) input/output modules. There is, however,
another work of Fodor (1975), the one Carruthers has in mind
when he talks about the outputs of mental modules, that is, the
Fodor of the language of thought, where an abstract proposition
like representation is claimed to be the vehicle of any internal
thought process. However, this claim is being made with no clear
position regarding whether this lingua mentis is related to actual
speech in either its genesis or its workings.
Determination in its different forms and scaffolding character-
ize the argumentation in the language and thought literature as
Carruthers surveys it, from the conceptual analysis of philosophy
through the studies on category use in cultural interactions down
to laboratory research on inner speech. One can summarize and
extend the different existing positions in Table 1.
Carruthers presents a rather well-argued view according to
which central process modularity should be reconciled with a
weakened version of linguistic determinism to the effect that lan-
guage is used as a central mediator between modules, as the ve-
hicle, if you wish, for the outputs of central processes – along the
line of Fodor (1975) – which is used to compute complex trains of
representations. I basically agree with this type of limited and
adaptive linguistic determinism, and with the evolutionary argu-
ments put forth in favor of it. One could enrich the evolutionary
tracing by realizing how the scaffolding introduced by culture sup-
plements or organizes the mental workings postulated by Car-
ruthers. I have in mind specifically the position of Merlin Donald
(1991; 1993; 2001) who claims that language and then writing in-
volve feedbacks toward our own cognitive architectures (see Pléh
2002.) Donald claims, “We are a culturally bound species and live
in a symbiosis with our collective creation. We seek culture, as
birds seek the air. In return, culture shapes our minds, as a sculp-
tor shapes clay” (Donald 2001, p. 300).
This is a nontrivial issue, because it touches on the way we con-
ceive the relationships between the external social world, together
with the communicative functions of language and the cognitive
domain and functions. There is disagreement about this, but I do
not wish to it solve here, just to allude to it with another quote from
Donald (2001, p. 254). “The great divide in human evolution was
not language, but the formation of cognitive communities in the
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first place. Symbolic cognition could not spontaneously self-gen-
erate until those communities were a reality. This reverses the
standard order of succession, placing cultural evolution first and
language second.”
My other point relates to Carruthers asking for “further evi-
dence” where he clearly emphasizes the need for more studies us-
ing dual tasks. Interestingly enough, the dual task tradition has
been with us in the domain of inner speech research, at times and
frameworks when central process modularism has not yet been
around. The initial doctrine in this domain was the behaviorist
claim that inner speech is the material carrier of internal processes.
However, we have the illusion that we think it is actually an activa-
tion of our speech muscles or the innervation of them that corre-
sponds to our impression of thinking (Watson 1920; 1924). Partly
because of the limitations of available technology, traditional inner-
speech studies used the logic of dual tasks in proving this claim,
looking for indirect evidence for the participation of speech in
mental processes. One of the methods was to inhibit inner speech
by asking the subjects, for example, to protrude their tongues while
solving mental arithmetic tasks. This passive dual task was supple-
mented by active dual tasks where subjects had to involve their
speech apparatus in an overlearned speech sequence, for example,
reciting a well-memorized poem or trying to read silently during
intellectual tasks (Sokolov 1968; 1972). McGuigan (1978) provides
a detailed survey of these methods, labeling them distraction and
interference studies. McGuigan, along the behaviorist tradition,
tends to summarize the literature and his own studies by claiming
that all mental processes require covert behavior, Sokolov (1968;
1972) arrives at a conclusion more in line with the adaptive ideas
of present-day central models like Carruthers. There is no one-to-
one correspondence between inner speech and thought. The ac-
tive involvement of the speech apparatus in another task usually
leads to decreased performance in mental arithmetic tasks, some
visual memorization tasks, and, of course, many language tasks like
translation. However, in easier tasks the rivaling articulatory dual
task does not impede performance.
This means that if thought acts remain stereotyped they can be per-
formed in a more or less inhibited status of the speech movement sys-
tem. Ordinary everyday experiences correspond to this experimental
fact. It is well known, for example, that many thoughts come to our mind
while we are engaged in conversation with others or we read something
or lecture, i.e., when our speech apparatus is busy in pronouncing other
words. (Sokolov 1968, p. 125)
Electrophyisiological studies also indicate that inner speech 
appears when the task becomes difficult, according to Sokolov,
across different domains as well. Thus, in solving easy visual fig-
ural tasks from the Raven test, no inner speech is observed
through electrophysiological measurements; it does appear, how-
ever, when the figural task becomes difficult. Functionally, as
some of the debriefing reports imply, this would correspond to
verbalizing the details of the representation and then comparing
the verbal formulations like, “Well, there are two lines on that one,
and three lines on the other one, these don’t fit, but two here and
two there. These belong together.”
This claim is rather similar to conclusions coming from a differ-
ent domain about the implied impact of linguistic labels on color
recognition: The accessibility of labels (codability, as it was called
by Brown & Lenneberg 1954) had an impact if the set was large
or if the delay time was increased. This suggests that the task is
performed in case of difficulties with the help of recoding and
memorizing color names rather than being based on sensory ex-
perience itself.
What domain integration could not be
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Abstract: Carruthers argues that natural language is the medium of non-
domain-specific thought in humans. The general idea is that a certain type
of thinking is conducted in natural language. It’s not exactly clear, however,
what type of thinking this is. I suggest two different ways of interpreting
Carruthers’s thesis on this point and argue that neither of them squares
well with central-process modularism.
According to central-process modularism, the bulk of postper-
ceptual cognitive processing is accomplished by a plurality of 
special-purpose mechanisms, each dedicated to a particular task 
domain, such as mindreading, causal inference, or biological clas-
sification. Few if any advocates of this theory of cognitive archi-
tecture endorse the radical view that all central cognition is like
this. Indeed, most are careful to leave space at the table for cen-
tral processes that are not proprietary to any particular cognitive
module, hence not domain-specific. No doubt this is a good thing
(Fodor 2000). But at this point it becomes natural and important
to ask: What features of our cognitive architecture explain those
instances of cognition that transcend the modularist framework?
Are these higher flights of thinking special to humans, and if so,
what is it about us that underwrites this fact?
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Table 1 (Pléh). Different positions and research strategies regarding the language/thought interface
Who leads? Lexicon and categories Grammar and propositions What research to do?
Language Labels shape categories Structured thought presupposes language Category analysis; cross-language 
(Wiitgenstein, Whorf, Carroll, Bowerman) comparison of cognition
Speech Naming facilitates recall Speech allows or facilitates long Inhibiting speech or dual tasks 
of categories (Brown trains of thought in cognition
& Lenneberg)
Thought and Universal cognitive Logical structure is primary Categorial analysis child development
mental theories (Piaget) (Frege, Husserl)
representation
Tied or unified Jackendoff “common core” theory; bootstrapping models (Pinker, Gelman) Comparing computations in 
different domains
Independent at Modularity Fodor and followers; Vygotsky culturalism; Karmiloff-Smith Search for domain specificity; study 
the outset but modularization of developmental interactions
meeting later
An increasingly popular view in contemporary cognitive sci-
ence, especially among developmentalists, suggests that the key to
answering these questions may be found in the domain of lan-
guage. This is the view Carruthers seeks to promote. Buoyed by
recent empirical findings of Elizabeth Spelke and her colleagues
(Hermer & Spelke 1996; Hermer-Vazquez et al. 1999; Spelke &
Tsivkin 2001a; 2001b), he argues that natural language is the
medium of non-domain-specific thought in humans. The general
idea is clear enough: A certain type of thinking, not proprietary to
any particular central module, is conducted in natural language.
What’s less clear – indeed, what stands in need of clarification –
is exactly what type of thinking this is. I will suggest two different
ways of interpreting Carruthers’s thesis on this point and argue
that neither of them squares well with central-process modular-
ism. The resulting dilemma threatens to undermine this particu-
lar variant of the cognitive conception of language.
The principal feature of the type of thought at issue is that it in-
volves “integrating information” from distinct domains. But there
are at least two ways to think about what such integration comes
to. The first is that it is simply a matter of the representational con-
tent of a thought, where thoughts are structures figuring in cer-
tain computational processes (reasoning, problem solving, deci-
sion making, and the like). Thoughts have constituent structure,
and their constituents – that is, concepts – may be drawn from one
or another domain. On this view, then, a non-domain-specific
thought is a thought that combines concepts from distinct cogni-
tive domains. A paradigm case, drawn from Spelke et al.’s studies
of spatial orientation, would be the thought (1) the toy is to
the left of the blue wall, which combines geometric con-
cepts (left of) with color concepts (blue). Carruthers says that
“our hypothesis is that such a thought cannot be entertained in-
dependently of being framed in natural language.” The capacity
for domain integration in this sense, then, is just the capacity to
host thoughts built up from domain-heterogeneous components.
If this is how the notion of domain integration is cashed out,
however, it becomes hard to believe that language is necessary for
domain-integrative thought. To see why, recall the background
thesis of central-process modularism. The idea is that most cogni-
tive capacities are realized by a special-purpose conceptual mech-
anism: Mindreading is accomplished by a folk psychology module;
reasoning about physical objects, by a folk physics module; spatial
navigation, by a folk geometry module; and so on. But when we
look into the representational contents of these various modules,
we are sure to find representations at least some of whose com-
ponents are not proprietary to the module in question. For exam-
ple, Carruthers suggests that the geometrical module might con-
struct the thought (2) the toy is in the corner with a long
wall on the left and a short wall on the right, and the
object-property system might build a thought like (3) the toy is
by the blue wall.
Notice, however, that both thoughts implicate exogenous con-
cepts (hence, exogenous information). The thought in (2) includes
the nongeometric concepts toy and wall, and the thought in (3)
includes both those concepts, neither of which is plausibly in the
domain of object-properties, as well as the spatial concept by. And
examples like this can be multiplied. Consider the case of mind-
reading. A key component of mindreading is the capacity to at-
tribute propositional attitudes to other agents. Such states are
specified in two dimensions: by attitude type (belief, desire, in-
tention, etc.) and by intentional content (that snow is white, that
lunch be served, etc.). And representing the latter typically re-
quires nonpsychological concepts (e.g., snow, white, lunch).
So here, too, domain integration in the weak sense just described
seems inevitable even in cases of intradomain thinking. Because
Carruthers insists that language is probably not necessary for this
sort of cognition, the present notion of integration doesn’t fit the
bill.
Here is a second proposal. Let’s say that a thought is domain-
integrative just in case it combines information in the weak sense
above and is an output of an inference whose inputs span two or
more central modules. This stronger notion locates the property
of informational integration at the level of processes rather than
states. For example, the thought (4) the toy is in the corner
with a long blue wall on the left is domain-integrative –
hence, non-domain-specific – because it is computed from (2) and
(3). According to this view, the claim that non-domain-specific
thought in humans depends on language, amounts to the idea that
without language, certain kinds of transitions in thought would be
impossible for us. Carruthers suggests that this is because the very
process of making such transitions causally implicates the lan-
guage faculty in an essential way. But how?
The answer on offer goes as follows (sect. 6.1). The geometry
module and the object-property module, respectively, output (2)
and (3), and both thoughts are taken up as inputs by the language
faculty. Each is then translated into a natural-language expression,
namely (5) [S The toy is in the corner with a long wall on the left
and a short wall on the right] and (6) [S The toy is by the blue wall],
and the results are somehow combined to yield (7) [S The toy is in
the corner with a long blue wall on the left]. This is just a tenta-
tive sketch of how speech production might proceed in the case
of non-domain-specific thought. But it does show how one might
sidestep the standard supposition that thought invariably precedes
its linguistic expression.
Unfortunately, the story just described hasn’t much to recom-
mend it beyond that. For it is doubtful that the language faculty
could carry out the sorts of extralinguistic computations ascribed
to it here. Speaking of the transition from (5) and (6) to (7), Car-
ruthers notes that “it would not be too complex a matter for the
language production system to take two sentences sharing a num-
ber of references like this, and combine them into one sentence 
by inserting adjectives from one into open adjective-slots in the
other.” But complexity is beside the point. The question is whether
the language faculty itself should be thought to contain a general-
purpose inference engine. And the likely answer – surely the an-
swer one would expect from a central-process modularist, as well
as the answer given by most linguists (Larson & Segal 1995) – is
No. Language is one thing, reasoning is another.
The spatial reorientation data do not support
the thesis that language is the medium of
cross-modular thought
Richard Samuels
Philosophy Department, King’s College, Strand, London, UK
richard.samuels@kcl.ac.uk
Abstract: A central claim of the target article is that language is the
medium of domain-general, cross-modular thought; and according to Car-
ruthers, the main, direct evidence for this thesis comes from a series of fas-
cinating studies on spatial reorientation. I argue that the these studies, in
fact, provide us with no reason whatsoever to accept this cognitive con-
ception of language.
Although there are many points of enormous interest in the target
article, perhaps the fundamental thesis contained therein is that
“language is the medium of [domain-general] cross-modular
thought.” And, according to Carruthers, the “most important”
source of direct evidence for this thesis comes from a series of el-
egant studies on spatial reorientation (Hermer & Spelke 1996;
Hermer-Vazquez et al. 1999; 2001). As he is well aware, however,
these studies constitute evidence for the fundamental thesis only
if they support the following restricted thesis: Language produc-
tion processes – as opposed to central processes – are responsible
for the integration of geometric and nongeometric information in
the performance of reorientation tasks. In what follows, I argue
that these studies do not support the restricted thesis, simply be-
cause they fail to provide us with any reason whatsoever to favour
it over the competing, more traditional view that one or more cen-
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tral system is responsible for the performance of such integrative
tasks (Fodor 1983). My burden is thus to explain how this tradi-
tional view can account for the main results on spatial reorienta-
tion – the dual-task data and the correlational data – without ced-
ing any integrative role to language production.
Accounting for the correlational data. As Carruthers correctly
observes, the main correlational finding is that, of a range of vari-
ables – including ones for age, nonverbal IQ, verbal working
memory and comprehension of spatial vocabulary – Hermer-
Vazquez and her colleagues have succeeded in finding only one
that correlates both positively and significantly with performance
on the reorientation task, namely, performance on a left-right lan-
guage production task (Hermer-Vazquez et al. 2001). To what ex-
tent does this finding support the restricted thesis? Here there 
appears to be a rather puzzling difference of opinion between
Carruthers on the one hand and Hermer-Vazquez and her collab-
orators on the other. According to Carruthers: “Even by them-
selves, these data strongly suggest that it is language which enables
older children and adults to integrate geometric with non-geo-
metric information into a single thought or memory” (sect. 5.2).
In contrast, according to Hermer-Vazquez et al. (2001), these
“findings . . . are merely correlational, leaving open multiple pos-
sibilities for the relationship between developmental changes in
spatial language production and advances in spatial memory task
performance” (Hermer-Vazquez et al. 2001, p. 294). To mention
merely one possibility, it may be that performance on the reori-
entation and production tasks both depend on a common devel-
opmental factor, such as the increasing accessibility of the con-
cepts LEFT and RIGHT to central processes external to the
geometry module. This and numerous other suggestions – some
of which are considered in Hermer-Vazquez et al. (1999) – seem
perfectly adequate to explain the correlational data without at-
tributing any integrative function to language production. Why,
then, is Carruthers so sanguine about the data?
Of course, the situation would be altogether different if Her-
mer-Vazquez had found that other variables – such as those for
nonverbal IQ and language comprehension – are significantly and
nonpositively correlated with reorientation performance. Under
such circumstances, one’s theory would need to account for the
reason these variables did not correlate positively. And although I
think that such an explanation could readily be provided without
rejecting the traditional view, it would clearly be a harder task than
merely explaining the production-reorientation correlation. In
any case, this is decidedly not the situation. What, in fact, hap-
pened was that Hermer-Vazquez failed to find any other signifi-
cant positive correlations; and this was simply because none of the
other correlations – positive or otherwise – were significant. But
– and this is the crucial point – under these circumstances, there
is no need whatsoever to explain why the other variables do not
positively correlate with reorientation performance. All one needs
do is explain why the correlations are not significant; and there is
an obvious explanation of this fact that in no way requires the en-
dorsement of the restricted thesis: The sample was very small
(N 5 24).
To summarise (and at the risk of belabouring the point): Fail-
ing to find significant, positive correlations is not the same as find-
ing a statistically significant absence of positive correlations. In
particular, mere failures do not demand explanations of the ab-
sence, whereas significant findings do. It is perhaps, in part, for
such reasons that Hemer-Vazquez and her collaborators seem in-
clined to view the dual-task data as providing stronger support for
the restricted thesis.
Accounting for the dual-task (shadowing) data. The main
dual-task finding is that verbal shadowing – but not rhythm shad-
owing – disrupts performance on the reorientation task. To what
extent does this finding support the restricted thesis? Again –
though for very different reasons – I’m inclined to think that it
does not. To see why not, however, it’s helpful to start by men-
tioning two assumptions about language production that are
widely held among psycholinguists: (1) The language production
system takes as input communicative intentions, and (2) central
systems are responsible for combining – or integrating – repre-
sentations to produce such intentions (Levelt 1989). If these as-
sumptions are correct, then there is a natural four-step explana-
tion of the dual-task data that cedes no integrative role to language
production:
1. Given the above assumptions and given that verbal shadow-
ing appears to be a production task, it’s very plausible that suc-
cessful verbal shadowing requires the activity of at least some of
those central processes responsible for the construction of com-
municative intentions.
2. In contrast, it is very hard to see why rhythm shadowing
should require the activation of such processes because there is no
reason whatsoever to suppose that rhythm shadowing requires
conceptual construction/integration of any sort.
3. Though little is known about the central processes responsi-
ble for conceptual integration, it is very plausible that – like any
central process about which anything is known – they are subject
to resource limitations. Moreover, it would be unsurprising if, be-
cause of such limitations, the simultaneous performance of two in-
tegrative tasks would tend to result in reduced performance on
one or both.
4. Finally, suppose that the integration of geometric and non-
geometric information in the reorientation task requires the acti-
vation of some of the very same central processes mentioned in (1).
Notice that the conjunction of (1) through (4) provide an ex-
planation of the shadowing task data solely in terms of the activity
of central processes. On the present story, verbal shadowing af-
fects reorientation performance by loading some of the same cen-
tral processes that are required to solve the reorientation task. In
contrast, rhythm shadowing has no such effect because it simply
does not require conceptual integration. Further, none of the four
claims seem particularly tendentious. Rather, they are largely con-
sequences of standard views about the nature of central systems
and their role in language production and representational inte-
gration. Finally, it is worth noting that although compatible with
the view that there are radically amodular central systems, noth-
ing about the preceding proposal requires that we posit such
mechanisms. So, for example, that explanation is entirely compat-
ible with Sperber’s (1996) suggestion that the kinds of conceptual
integration involved in these tasks depend on what he calls a
“metarepresentational module.”
To summarise: The available data provide us with no reason
whatsoever to endorse the restricted thesis that language produc-
tion processes – as opposed to central processes – are responsible
for the integration of geometric and nongeometric information in
spatial reorientation tasks. To this extent, then, the best (putative)
direct evidence for the fundamental thesis provides us with no
reason to adopt it in favour of the competing traditional view of
conceptual integration.
Bilingual inner speech as the medium 
of cross-modular retrieval in
autobiographical memory
Robert W. Schrauf
Buehler Center on Aging, Northwestern University, Chicago, IL 60611-2611.
r-schrauf@northwestern.edu http: //www.northwestern.edu /aging /
Abstract: Carruthers’s notion that natural language(s) might serve as the
medium of non-domain-specific, propositionally based inferential thought
is extended to the case of effortful retrieval of autobiographical memory
among bilinguals. Specifically, the review suggests that the resources of
bilingual inner speech might play a role in the cyclical activation of infor-
mation from various informational domains during memory retrieval.
There is evidence that bilinguals recall their memories in the lan-
guage(s) in which they were encoded (Marian & Neisser 2000;
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Schrauf 2000). Particularly in the case of consecutive (immigrant)
bilinguals, memories from the homeland seem to come back in the
first language; memories from after immigration come back in ei-
ther the first or second (Larsen et al. 2002; Schrauf & Rubin 1998;
2000). How are we to understand the relation between language
(the natural languages of the bilingual) and thought (the process
of autobiographical retrieval)?
On the one hand, if language has no constitutive role in think-
ing, but serves only for the outward narration of memory (Car-
ruthers’s communicative conception of language), then lan-
guage(s) would be involved only in labeling features of an
experience after it had been retrieved from memory where it is
stored in some nonlinguistic form. Current models of bilingual
memory in fact commit us to something like this position. These
models describe how words in either of the bilingual’s lexicons
map onto underlying nonlinguistic conceptual and imagistic ref-
erents (Kroll & de Groot 1997). It is arguable, however, that au-
tobiographical memories are very different from the atomistic
nonlinguistic referents of lexical memory, but rather are com-
plex, culturally and linguistically conditioned, narrative wholes at
higher levels of mental organization (Schrauf & Rubin, in press).
On the other hand, if language is wholly constitutive of think-
ing (Carruthers’s strong cognitive conception of language), then
the bilingual’s encoding and retrieval would be dramatically af-
fected and memories encoded in one language might be only im-
perfectly retrieved in the other language (Schrauf 2000). Put
bluntly, the immigrant would be amnesic in his or her second lan-
guage for events that occurred in the first language in the home-
land. Clearly, this is not the case, and between the former position
and this, there must be some middle ground.
Carruthers’s position provides a more promising foundation for
bilingual autobiographical memory. The central process modular-
ism underlying his theory fits the current understanding of auto-
biographical retrievals as complex integrations of multimodal sen-
sory and conceptual information from various sites in the brain.
And, at least in cases of conscious, effortful retrieval (e.g. “think
of a time when you . . .”), natural language in inner speech may
well function as the medium of non-domain-specific, cross-mod-
ular, propositional thought.
First, current conceptions of autobiographical memories as
“on-line” reconstructions of events fit well with central process
modularism. Autobiographical remembering is a temporally du-
rative process of integrating different kinds of sensory and con-
ceptual information from different brain sites (central and pe-
ripheral modules) into an episodic whole (Conway 2002; Rubin
1998). Information is processed at several sites: visual-object im-
agery (in occipital and parietal lobes), visual-spatial imagery (in
the occipital lobes through inferior temporal cortex), auditory im-
agery (temporal cortex), emotion (limbic system), and conceptual
information across the neocortex (Greenberg & Rubin, in press).
Sensory modalities are to some extent informationally encapsu-
lated and domain-specific (Moscovitch 1992). Both at encoding
and retrieval, the medial temporal lobes are active in “binding” to-
gether the information (Schacter et al. 1998; Squire 1992); and at
retrieval, when memory search is initiated in the frontal lobes
(Wheeler et al. 1997), the same sensory and conceptual associa-
tions between sites are again activated. This domain-specific en-
coding of sensory and conceptual information, and coordination
of information between domains, is consistent with the kind of
central process modularism advocated by Carruthers.
Second, it might be that natural language plays a coordinating
role in the inferential processes of effortful retrieval. Carruthers
argues that in cases of inference, let us say, “problem-solving”
(e.g., spatial cognition; see Hermer-Vazquez et al. 1999), central
processing modules deploy the resources of the peripheral lan-
guage module to coordinate information between domain-specific
modules. In this exercise of propositional thought, natural lan-
guage syntax provides a vehicle for the nested embedding neces-
sary in organizing the information. Were it possible to conceptu-
alize the integration of information in autobiographical retrieval
in these same terms (as in propositionally based problem solving),
then natural language might play a critical role in reconstructive
retrieval as well. But that is precisely how effortful retrieval is de-
scribed – as problem solving.
Effortful retrieval is a stepwise process in which information
provided in the cue is used to construct search criteria, which trig-
ger information in memory, which is evaluated against the criteria
and reemployed to trigger further information in a cyclic fashion
until the criteria are met and the final autobiographical memory
comes together (Conway 1996). Behavioral evidence for this
comes from protocol analysis in which individuals are asked to
“think out loud” while they search for a memory matching the 
cue requirements (Williams & Hollan 1981; Williams & Santos-
Williams 1980).
This cyclic search process through the structure of autobio-
graphical memory is to some extent conscious and lends itself to
inner speech (though much remains unconscious). Bilinguals are
in fact aware that their inner speech can take place in either lan-
guage: self-talk, calculating, thinking-in-words, praying, and so
forth (Larsen et al. 2002; Schrauf & Rubin 1998); and although
the “think-aloud” exercise is in overt speech, when bilinguals 
perform this exercise, they occasionally switch from one language
to another for the strategic purpose of triggering (activating) new
information (Schrauf, in press). Thus, reading the phenomenon 
of bilingual inner speech – the representation of propositional
thought in the auditory imagery of two natural languages and the
possibility of mental code switching – into effortful reconstructive
retrieval offers new possibilities for testing the theory of natural
language as a medium of interdomain thought and inference. For
example, by choosing languages that are syntactically very differ-
ent, we could investigate whether different structures of nesting
and embedding information affect the amount or kinds of detail
recalled from memories encoded in either language. In turn, ac-
cessing the natural-language inputs and outputs of the language
module would require more sensitive methods than protocol
analysis and thus more creative experimental design.
In sum, the notion that natural language might serve as a kind
of lingua franca in the brain in service of propositionally based,
problem-solving tasks sets the memory theorist a new way of con-
ceiving the structure of bilingual cognition. In turn, probing the
function of bilingual inner speech in reconstructive retrieval pro-
vides a way of testing and refining this version of the language-
thought relation.
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Talking to ourselves: The intelligibility 
of inner speech
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Abstract: The possible role of language in intermodular communication
and non-domain-specific thinking is an empirical issue that is independent
of the “vehicle” claim that natural language is “constitutive” of some
thoughts. Despite noting objections to various forms of the thesis that we
think in language, Carruthers entirely neglects a potentially fatal objection
to his own preferred version of this “cognitive conception.”
On Carruthers’s own account, the empirical evidence he adduces
only supports the essential involvement of language in certain
kinds of thinking and not the quite different “constitutive” doc-
trine that natural language is the medium or representational ve-
hicle of such thinking. Carruthers fails to consider an important
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and notorious objection to his own preferred version of the con-
stitutive “cognitive conception.”
As Carruthers acknowledges, the idea that we think “in” lan-
guage in some sense is unfashionable today. However, despite the
explanatory virtues of a rival Fodorian “mentalese,” the idea that
we think in natural language has a persistence and undoubted per-
suasiveness that needs to be addressed.
Even critics such as Jackendoff (1997), Pinker (1994), and
Magee (1997) feel the need to address the idea that we think in
language if only to refute it. However, these rebuttals are not new
and have obviously failed to lay the doctrine to rest.
Ironically, Carruthers’s own account suggests that this persua-
siveness is because of a certain notoriously seductive illusion
(Slezak 2002a; 2002b; in press). Carruthers’s effort to revive and
defend this cognitive conception of language has the virtue of
clearly articulating the doctrine in its various guises, thereby ex-
posing both the source of its attractiveness and its fatal flaws.
What does it mean to go beyond merely asserting the involve-
ment of language in certain kinds of thought to claiming that nat-
ural language is constitutive as the medium or vehicle of our con-
scious propositional thoughts? The precise nature of this claim
and the evidence for it are only referred to obliquely in Car-
ruthers’s talk of an “imaged natural language sentence.” Indeed,
from other writings (Carruthers 1996, p. 49) it is clear that Car-
ruthers sees the usual kinds of scientific evidence for the consti-
tutive claim as equivocal and, accordingly, he appeals to what he
calls “a very different set of data, namely that delivered by ordi-
nary introspection” (1996, p. 49).
Thus, for Carruthers, conscious thinking is constitutively in nat-
ural language in the sense that such thinking involves “imaging
sentences of natural language.” That is, sentences of natural lan-
guage are recalled and briefly held in short-term memory (1996,
pp. 228–29). Of course, this is the model of seeing with the mind’s
eye transposed to a different modality of imagination – hearing
with the mind’s ear, so to speak. Undeniably, introspection sug-
gests that, just as we appear to be looking at pictures when we
imagine visually, so we appear to be talking to ourselves when we
think.
Thus Carruthers’s thesis amounts only to the truism that when
we are aware of “talking to ourselves” – the inner speech of folk
psychology – we are simply imagining sentences of natural lan-
guage, just as we might imagine anything else. However, such a
claim does not amount to a theory of anything and, above all, has
no implications for the nature of an underlying medium or sub-
strate of thought. It is simply the avowal of introspection, just as
one might report imagining anything else visual, tactile, or audi-
tory.
U. T. Place (1956) famously observed that it is a “phenomeno-
logical fallacy” to suppose that when someone describes an expe-
rience of how things look, sound, smell, taste, or feel, then “he is
describing the literal properties of objects and events on a pecu-
liar sort of internal cinema or television screen” (Place 1956,
p. 37).
Just as Place noted we are not likely to have anything green in
our heads when we have a green afterimage, more recently, Edel-
man (1998) suggests that when we imagine a cat, we are unlikely
to ascribe furriness to the mental representation. However, this
very mistake seems remarkably compelling, though no more de-
fensible, in the case of other attributes. Of course, in these re-
marks Place anticipated what Dennett (1991) has made well
known as the fallacy of the Cartesian Theatre.
Significantly, Carruthers charges critics of the format or
medium thesis with denying the stream of inner verbalization, or
at least ascribing “some more-or-less epiphenomenal character” to
it. It is revealing that this is the same strawman charge that has
been leveled against critics of pictorial images (Kosslyn 1980,
p. 30) – namely, that these critics deny the reality of imagery ex-
perience. Thus, it is no surprise, and no accident, that Carruthers
invokes Kosslyn’s account to support his own analogous thesis.
However, it is remarkable that Carruthers makes no mention 
of the notorious controversy surrounding Kosslyn’s theory. Of
course, Kosslyn’s pictorial account has been the focus of the in-
tense “imagery debate” (Pylyshyn 1973; 1978; in press) and has
been seen as the paradigm case of the Cartesian Theatre fallacy.
Thus, with his appeal to pictorialism, Carruthers clarifies the na-
ture of his own doctrine and at the same time brings into relief its
fatal difficulties.
These parallels suggest that the issue of language and thought
provides yet another case study of a pervasive mistake in reason-
ing about the mind found throughout cognitive science today and
also throughout the history of the subject (Slezak 2002b).
Like pictures, sentences have their appeal as a medium for rep-
resentation because we, as theorists, can understand them. But
this is an illicit appeal to their intelligibility rather than their ex-
planatory force. It is, of course, precisely the same illicit criterion
employed by Searle to judge whether symbols can subserve in-
tentionality. Their meaningfulness to Searle in the Chinese room
is spuriously taken to be relevant to the theoretical question of
meaning for the system. In effect, this is to require that the lan-
guage of thought be English, just like Carruthers’s thesis. How-
ever, the vehicles of meaning cannot themselves be meaningful in
this sense on pain of the traditional regress of the homunculus
pseudo-explanations.
Overlooked by critics and defenders alike is the fundamental
question of the very intelligibility of the idea that we think in nat-
ural language. To raise this question is not merely to dispute an
empirical claim but to challenge the very coherence of the doc-
trine. The point was made by Gilbert Ryle (1968) who challenged
the very idea that “when thinking occurs, there occur internally or
externally, things or symbols that the thinker thinks in” (1968,
p. 12). This is not a behaviorism that would deny a Fodorian men-
talese, above all, nor is it to deny that we do seem say things sotto
voce, talking to one’s self, as it were, in a silent monologue. Ryle
attacks precisely Carruthers’s doctrine, saying: “I want to deny that
it even makes sense to ask, in the general case, what special sort
or sorts of things we think in. The very collocation of “think” with
“in so and so” seems to me factitious” (1968, p. 13).
What language is “mentalese”?
Dan I. Slobin
Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-
1650. slobin@socrates.berkeley .edu http: //ihd.berkeley .edu
Abstract: Carruthers’s “mentalese expressions” take the form of English
sentences, thus suggesting an isomorphism between thought and language
that ignores linguistic diversity. Furthermore, complex syntax is not the
only linguistic means of combining information from various domain-spe-
cific modules into domain-general expressions, nor is such syntax the pre-
ferred means of encoding basic experiences in all languages. The analysis
seems to rest on an unacknowledged version of linguistic determinism.
I will comment on only one part of Carruthers’s thoughtful and
stimulating paper. While I quite agree that language should not be
treated simply as “a channel, or conduit, for transferring thoughts
into and out of the mind,” I think it is just as problematic to treat
language as a faculty that takes “thoughts . . . for direct translation
into natural language expression” (emphasis added). This move
requires a common format for thoughts and linguistic expressions
– in effect, turning “thought” into a linguistic system of represen-
tation. Carruthers’s procedure is to use small capitals for “men-
talese expressions,” while ignoring the fact that these expressions
are literal translations of English sentences. One cannot say, in
every language, THE TOY IS IN THE CORNER WITH A
LONG WALL ON THE LEFT AND A SHORT WALL ON THE
RIGHT. That is, this is not a pure mentalese expression that can
be “directly translated” into a natural language. For example, if
you speak a language that does not use left and right to locate ob-
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jects but rather compass points or relation to landmarks (Levin-
son 1996; 1997; 2002), you would never have the mentalese ex-
pression just given. Your language would give you translations of
mentalese expressions using phrases such as “the long wall to the
North” or “uphill” or “seaward” or whatever. The research of
Levinson and his colleagues shows quite clearly that users of dif-
ferent languages store environmental information with regard to
the distinctions called for in speaking that language. So, for ex-
ample, Australian aborigines can accurately point to distant loca-
tions and to compass points, whereas Europeans tend to be hope-
less on similar tasks. Or they can quite readily warn you of a
mosquito approaching your north arm when you may have no clue
which arm is “north.” Mentalese, for the Australian, would have
to be in the form of, for example, THE TOY IS IN THE COR-
NER WITH A LONG WEST WALL AND A SHORT EAST
WALL. Further, of course, relations such as IN, locations such as
CORNER, and so forth, are specific to particular languages (Bow-
erman & Choi 2001; Choi & Bowerman 1991) and can’t be part of
mentalese. I will not further summarize the growing body of evi-
dence for the ways in which particular languages “reach back” into
the conceptual system to bias speakers toward language-specific
ways of encoding basic experiences. Carruthers reviews this re-
search in section 2.2 and seems to accept some version of “lan-
guage as sculpting cognition.” (Also see discussions of “thinking
for speaking” in Slobin 1996; 2003.)
Where Carruthers seems to go astray is in his undefined uses of
the terms sentence and language. For him, “the thoughts gener-
ated by central modules are used to produce a natural language
sentence with the same content.” What is “the same content” for a
thought and a sentence? If one thinks of language as only one lan-
guage – say, English – the problem looks tractable. But even here
it is illusory, because there is no way to line up the format of
thoughts and sentences without pushing the form of sentences
back into the form of thoughts. (In addition, any situation is open
to an indefinite number of different linguistic encodings in any in-
dividual language.) And when one considers even two different
languages, the task becomes impossible. There is no neutral
“thought” (in capital letters) that translates into “wall on the left”
as well as “west wall” and “uphill wall” and “seaward wall.” That is,
the user of mentalese must already know which system of orien-
tation is called for in the local language. In brief, Carruthers has
replaced a notion of language as a channel of communication with
the notion of language as a notation system for thoughts. Without
anchoring thought and language, however, this seems to be a
hopeless enterprise.
At the next stage in his model, language combines the sentences
translated from several types of thoughts into multiclausal sen-
tences, such as, “The food is in the corner with the long wall on
the left by the blue wall.” That is, the role of language in human
cognition is to combine “distinct domain-specific sentences . . .
into a single domain-general one,” thereby allowing for conscious,
non-domain-specific thinking. Is Carruthers claiming that such
sentences are necessary, in consciousness, to accurately remem-
ber where the food is? Introspection, along with observation of
child language, hardly supports such a proposal. These are not the
everyday forms of inner speech. Further, Carruthers’s discussion
of aphasia shows that such thinking can be conducted without the
ability to produce sentences. Therefore I am not convinced that
conscious problem solving requires the use of certain types of
complex sentences in inner speech.
So, if these sentences are not conscious productions of inner
speech, what are they? Carruthers requires these mental pro-
cesses to be conscious, yet I don’t find them in my consciousness.
Is the next step to propose that the format of my preconscious 
or unconscious thought is complex English sentences, provided by
a language faculty that is equipped with translations of domain-
specific propositions in mentalese? But consider languages that
analyze situations and events in quite different terms from En-
glish. That is, the same information can be presented in separate
clauses – in fact, this is required in many languages: For example,
“There’s some food. It’s over there by that wall – the long one, by
your left hand – the blue one. It’s where the long wall and the
other wall come together.” And so forth. See, for example, Paw-
ley’s (1993) analysis of event descriptions in Kalam, a language of
New Guinea that requires analysis of events into a chain of sepa-
rate segments, each encoded by a separate verb with no embed-
ding, or Bohnemeyer’s (2003) discussion of Yukatek Mayan, in
which one cannot say, “He went from his house to town,” but is
required to say “He was at his house and then he left and then he
arrived at town.” In brief, complex thoughts do not require com-
plex syntax (although they may well require complex discourse
structures).
Carruthers seems to propose that the format of mentalese is iso-
morphic with the format of English. Or, if he accepts cross-lin-
guistic diversity, then the format of mentalese matches the format
of the particular language in which it is to be translated. Either
way, we seem to be faced with an untenable version of linguistic
determinism.
Conjoining information from different
modules: A comparative perspective
Giorgio Vallortigaraa and Valeria Anna Sovranob
aDepartment of Psychology and B.R.A.I.N. Centre for Neuroscience,
University of Trieste, Trieste, Italy; bDepartment of General Psychology,
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Abstract: The hypothesis that nonhuman species, lacking verbal lan-
guage, do not really integrate information from different modules, but use
instead information sequentially, appears difficult to put under empirical
scrutiny. Evidence is discussed showing that in nonhuman species storing
of geometric information occurs spontaneously even when landmark in-
formation suffices for spatial reorientation, suggesting simultaneous en-
coding, if not use, of information from different modules.
We would like to discuss some comparative data that are relevant
to Carruthers’s hypothesis that language serves as the vehicle of
intermodular integration. Carruthers mentioned the challenge
provided by research with young chickens (Vallortigara et al. 1990)
and monkeys (Gouteux et al. 2001) suggesting that nonhuman
(and thus nonlinguistic) species can apparently integrate geomet-
ric and nongeometric (landmark) information when disoriented.
Actually, there are two other species that have been tested in the
reorientation task originally developed for rats (Cheng 1986),
namely, pigeons (Kelly et al. 1998) and, very recently, fish (Sov-
rano et al. 2002); both these species have been proved to be able
to integrate geometric and landmark information to reorient
themselves. The case of fish is particularly intriguing, for they have
been tested in the same blue-wall task in which children have been
shown to rely exclusively on geometric information (Hermer &
Spelke 1994; 1996).
Carruthers provides a very ingenious way to face the potential
challenge offered by these comparative data on the hypothesis
that integration of information from different modules would not
be possible without language. His idea is that even though other
species are able to solve the spatial disorientation problem, this
does not prove that they are able to integrate geometric with land-
mark information into a single belief or thought, for it could be
that they are making use of the information sequentially. Accord-
ing to this view, the difference between species such as chicks, pi-
geons, rhesus monkeys, and fish, on the one hand, and rats and
(prelinguistic) children, on the other hand, would simply be that
the former use nongeometric information first before using geom-
etry, whereas the latter use geometry exclusively.
We are sympathetic with Carruthers’s ideas, but we have diffi-
culty in understanding how they can be tested empirically. From
the behavioral point of view, we simply cannot distinguish be-
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tween the performance of the linguistic and nonlinguistic crea-
tures that solve the spatial reorientation task. Thus, saying that
nonhuman animals are not “really” able to integrate information
from the geometric and the landmark modules is just a petitio
principii, until we are able to specify for what aspects the spatial
reorientation behavior of chickens and fish is different from that
of human adults. Evidence that preventing verbal encoding in hu-
man adults impairs the capacity to integrate geometric and land-
mark information (Hermer-Vazquez et al. 1999) does not prove
anything with respect to the abilities of nonhuman animals. It
could be that the novel-acquired, human-specific, language abili-
ties interfere with the spatial modules we share with other ani-
mals, but that integration between spatial modules can occur any-
way even in the absence of language. If language is so crucial to
the integration of information from different modules, then there
should be quite specific difficulties that nonhuman animals should
exhibit in the spatial reorientation tasks. The problem is that, at
present, we are unable to unravel them. What sort of test could
disprove the idea that animals can really integrate geometric and
nongeometric information in a single thought?
Let us consider some recent results obtained in our laboratory
to explain the nature of the difficulty (Sovrano et al. 2003). We
trained fish with the usual rectangular arena (a rectangular tank in
this case) with four distinctive panels located at the corners. In this
case no integration of geometric and nongeometric information is
needed to solve the reorientation task: Each corner can be iden-
tified without any ambiguity on the basis of solely the featural in-
formation provided by the panels. Surprisingly, we found that the
fish managed the task. According to Carruthers’s hypothesis, they
should possess (like chickens and monkeys) an innate predisposi-
tion to seek landmark information first, only using geometric in-
formation to navigate in relation to a known landmark. However,
given that in this case geometric information was not necessary for
reorientation, we should probably have expected that no encod-
ing of such information would occur. Surprisingly, when tested af-
ter removal of all the panels, fish did not go back to random choice,
but searched systematically in the two locations specified by
purely geometric information (similar results have been obtained
with chicks; see Vallortigara et al. 1990). This clearly provides ev-
idence that fish encode geometric information even when not re-
quired, that is, even when featural information suffices to solve the
task. But does it provide evidence that fish had encoded geomet-
ric and nongeometric information in a single belief? Probably not,
for it can be claimed that encoding of geometric and nongeomet-
ric information by two separate modules occurs anyway, even
when this is not required by the task, but that information from
these modules can then be used only sequentially. Thus, the data
cast doubts over the adaptationistic account provided by Car-
ruthers, because it seems that there is a primacy of geometric in-
formation even in those species (like fish and chickens) that solve
the spatial reorientation task. Nonetheless, the data do not disrupt
Carruthers’s central tenet, for the crucial hypothesis is that infor-
mation is used sequentially, but the order in which information is
used can well vary in different species (though, admittedly, it re-
mains mysterious that rats use only one type of information). Car-
ruthers’s hypothesis thus does not seem to be easily viable to fal-
sification. It seems that whatever behavioral performance we
could document in animals, it would always be possible to explain
it as a result of a sequential, rather than a simultaneous, use of in-
formation from different modules.
Cognitive penetrability of a module can be assessed on the 
basis of behavioral performance. The behavior of at least some
nonlinguistic animal species and of human adults shows that non-
geometric information is taken into account in the spatial reori-
entation task. Hence we should conclude that language is not
needed to integrate information from the geometric and landmark
module. Alternatively, we should prove that, even if performance
in this task is identical, animals fail in other aspects of the spatial
reorientation process. In other words, we should prove that there
are aspects of spatial behavior of humans that are not accessible
or possible to nonhumans because of a supposed crucial differ-
ence, namely, a lack of possession of a verbal language allowing in-
termodular integration. Otherwise, the supposed difference would
not make any difference.
Language, cognition, and the nature of
modularity: Evidence from aphasia
Rosemary Varleya and Michael Siegalb
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Abstract: We examine Carruthers’s proposal that sentences in logical form
serve to create flexibility within central system modularity, enabling the
combination of information from different modalities. We discuss evi-
dence from aphasia and the neurobiology of input-output systems. This
work suggests that there exists considerable capacity for interdomain cog-
nitive processing without language mediation. Other challenges for a log-
ical form account are noted.
Peter Carruthers provides an elegant tour across the landscape of
competing claims on the role of language in human cognition. This
in itself is a complex undertaking, in view of the still limited evi-
dence. For example, the evidence from aphasia only provides a
window on the role of language in the mature cognitive system and
says nothing as to how language might sculpt a distinctively hu-
man cognitive architecture. Hence a whole class of “diachronic”
claims regarding the effects of language on cognition lie outside
of the scope of the evidence from aphasia. Moreover, the evidence
from aphasia studies of either associations or dissociations be-
tween language impairment and other cognitive functions should
be interpreted with caution. Evidence of associations – for exam-
ple, between aphasia and an inability to generate alternative strate-
gies on a problem-solving task (Varley 2002; Varley et al. 2001) – falls
far short of what is needed to draw causal inferences. Associations
may result from naturally occurring brain lesions crossing the
boundaries of the neural substrates of processing systems; the as-
sociation is then an anatomical coincidence rather than a causal 
relationship in which language gives rise to cognition. Equally, dis-
sociations between language impairment in aphasia and the spar-
ing of cognitive performance in other domains such as space and
number require careful consideration. In many studies, either the
nature and extent of linguistic impairment are not clearly specified,
or the abilities that are specified are such that the aphasic individ-
uals have considerable residual language capacity still available to
them that could support cognition. This capacity would be suffi-
cient to generate simple “proto-language” – a language that is char-
acterized by combinatorial properties but does not have the full
features of a mature grammatical system (Bickerton 1981).
The proposal of massive central system modularity requires a
mechanism that allows flexibility between domains of cognition.
Although the notion of modularity is subject to different inter-
pretations (e.g., Coltheart 1999; Fodor 1983), it is widely ac-
knowledged that this must involve core characteristics such as do-
main specificity, informational encapsulation, and a proprietary
operating code. However, flexibility and fluidity characterizes hu-
man cognition, particularly in higher-level reasoning and problem
solving; hence the requirement for a cognitive lingua franca to
combine the outputs of the modular subsystems. For Carruthers,
the central code that permits the combination of outputs is logi-
cal form – the abstract, deep structural representations that un-
derlie natural language sentences.
There are a number of possible reasons to reject the claim that
natural language in the form of logical form sentences is the mech-
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anism for intermodular combination. For example, the nature of
the brain architecture of input-output systems permits intermodal
mixing at an early stage in information processing. Sensory-per-
ceptual systems consist of batteries of micromodules that respond
only to very specific inputs (e.g., the tonatopic organization of the
primary auditory cortex). However, zones of association cortex,
described as polymodal areas, surround primary sensory cortices.
Association cortex receives inputs from a number of micromod-
ules within a sensory domain such as vision or from different sen-
sory domains. Tasks such as those of Hermer-Vazquez et al. (1999)
that require the combination of visual object and geometric in-
formation are central to Carruthers’s thesis on the relation be-
tween language and cognition. However, responses in such tasks
could be achieved by a lower-level nonlinguistic perceptual mech-
anism. Evidence from language training studies that result in ac-
curate spatial cognition could reflect a co-opted strategic resource
that is sufficient to assist performance on a range of problem-solv-
ing tasks, including theory of mind (Siegal & Varley 2002). There
is debate about the extent of association cortex, with the sugges-
tion that as perception is gradually fractionated into further mi-
cromodules, more of what is believed to be polymodal cortex may
be reclassified as primary, sensory cortex (Kaas 1999). However, it
is well established that the architecture of sensory-perceptual cor-
tices permits the integration of information from different do-
mains at an early stage in cognitive processing.
Another neurobiological example of interdomain information
combination involves mirror neuron systems. These are cells in mo-
tor regions that fire when an action is observed, thus providing a
mechanism for input-output linkage again at a low level of infor-
mation processing (Rizzolatti et al. 2001). Both polymodal associa-
tion cortex and mirror neuron systems show that the brain is
equipped with mechanisms to permit combination of interdomain
information at an early stage in information processing. These
neural systems are intrinsic to input-output modules and are remote
both anatomically and functionally from central cognitive systems.
There are other difficulties at both the theoretical and empiri-
cal levels for an account based on central modularity. For exam-
ple, Carruthers’s account suggests that the language faculty gen-
erates logical form (LF) sentences in response to inputs from a
range of central modules. This is a problem because now a fun-
damental criterion for modularity appears to be violated in that
the language production system is able to take as input a multi-
plicity of codes from a range domain-specific modules. The lan-
guage faculty, or at least its output component, then becomes an
omnipotent domain-general system, and Carruthers’s attempt to
develop the thesis of central system modularity results in a break-
out of domain generality elsewhere in cognition.
We conclude by noting that an LF account poses a considerable
challenge for experimental research. Imagine a set of results from
a Hermer-Vazquez et al. type of task in which one subgroup of
people with aphasia shows the ability to combine landmark and
geometric information whereas others do not. In our laboratory,
we have carried out a pilot study involving persons with severe
aphasia in which the Hermer-Vazquez et al. room procedure is
scaled down to a table-top box. In this task, rather than disorien-
tating the patient, the box is spun. Our subjects were capable of
utilizing both landmark and geometric cues in locating a hidden
object, pointing to the sparing of their spatial cognition. They
could find objects under conditions of no concurrent activity as
well as in a simple lexical verbal shadowing condition where resid-
ual lexical capacity was engaged by the concurrent activity. As the
aphasic participants had a profound impairment of their public
language, a counter to these results could be that, at a deep and
underlying level, the LF representation was intact. It is difficult to
determine how the integrity or otherwise of LF representations
could be established, given that evaluation of language processing
at both implicit and explicit levels requires the capacity to process
surface form. Similarities in aphasic impairments across input and
output modalities may be seen to indicate a loss of central lan-
guage competence. But this inference is an imprecise and indirect
metric of the integrity of logical form. An alternative account
might postulate parallel input-output impairments – resulting in
disturbance of public language that would mimic a central com-
petence deficit. Thus a crucial element in the evaluation of Car-
ruthers’s model must be whether it generates testable hypotheses.
The role of working memory in skilled and
conceptual thought
Thomas Wynna and Fred Coolidgeb
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Abstract: Models of working memory challenge some aspects of Car-
ruthers’s account but enhance others. Although the nature of the phono-
logical store and central executive appear fully congruent with Car-
ruthers’s proposal, current models of the visuo-spatial sketchpad provide
a better account of skilled action. However, Carruthers’s model may pro-
vide a way around the homunculus problem that has plagued models of
working memory.
Carruthers’s review of the various hypotheses of the cognitive
functions of language would have been aided invaluably by refer-
ence to Baddeley’s provocative and influential model of working
memory (Baddeley 1986; 2001; Baddeley & Logie 1999) and vice
versa.
For example, most current models of working memory (Miyake
& Shah 1999) suggest that some coordination of separate cogni-
tive domains takes place independent of language. The phono-
logical store of working memory is well documented experimen-
tally and is clearly the neural system responsible for holding words
in mind during the construction and comprehension of sentences.
Similarly, the visuo-spatial sketchpad (VSSP) holds visual and 
spatial information within immediate attention. Work by Logie
(1995) now indicates that spatial information (e.g., location and di-
rection) and visual information (e.g., color and shape) are actually
separate subsystems of the VSSP. This interpretation is congruent
with Kosslyn’s (1994) description of visual imagery, in which shape
and spatial information is seen to be coordinated by frontal lobe
functions. So here we have evidence for interdomain coordination
in the absence of language. This example might well be consid-
ered irrelevant (one could argue that the total output of the VSSP
should be considered a single content domain) if it were not that
it accounts for one of the central pieces of evidence put forward
by Carruthers – the coordination of geometric properties (spatial)
with color (visual). Carruthers suggests that children only solve the
hidden object problem when they are able to use “spatial vocabu-
lary conjoined with object properties.” We suggest that this par-
ticular ability is more easily understood as being a classic VSSP
task, and that children succeed at the problem when working
memory has developed sufficient capacity. Results of dual inter-
ference tasks (e.g., Hermer-Vazquez et al. 1999) could also be ac-
counted for by interference with the central executive of working
memory rather than language per se, as argued by Carruthers.
Work in cognitive anthropology reinforces the idea that the
VSSP is important to thinking but is largely nonverbal. Keller
(Dougherty & Keller 1982; Keller & Keller 1996), for example,
describes how individual steps in the blacksmithing process come
together in “constellations” brought to mind and tied to specific
intermediate plans of action. These constellations include not only
actual tools but also visual images of shape and color (crucial to
temperature judgments), aural images of the sound of forging (a
measure of the malleability of iron), and kinesthetic images of
muscle tensions, angle of grip, and so on. Little or none of this is
represented verbally, nor indeed is it easy to elicit post hoc ac-
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counts from artisans, who “grope for words” to describe the pro-
cess. One could of course argue that this is not conceptual thought,
a solution hinted at by Carruthers when he grants “practical” rea-
soning to all mammals. Alternatively, one could argue that the in-
ner speech is somehow outside the attention window of the smith,
but it seems simpler to conclude that there are sophisticated hu-
man actions that are coordinated in a nonverbal way via the VSSP
and central executive of working memory.
From this perspective, some non-domain-specific thinking ap-
peared prior to the emergence of modern language. Archaeolog-
ical evidence for coordination of visual and spatial information
goes back at least 300,000 years (probably more) in the guise of
handaxes (“handaxe” and “handaxes” are single words) with three-
dimensional symmetry (Wynn 2000, in press). Manufacture of
these artifacts required coordination of spatial thinking – allocen-
tric perception, size constancy (Silverman et al. 2000) – and shape
(symmetry), which is done via the VSSP of working memory.
We do not think, however, that the preceding arguments chal-
lenge Carruthers’s overall thesis vis-à-vis the role of inner speech;
they merely question its scope (all non-domain-specific thinking
is based on inner speech) and one piece of its evidentiary base (co-
ordination of visual and spatial knowledge). Otherwise, Car-
ruthers’s thesis meshes well with current understandings of the
phonological store and central executive of working memory.
Phonological storage for Baddeley is a short-term buffer where
sentences are prepared, rehearsed (“inner speech”), and ex-
pressed (outwardly articulated). Baddeley has recently proposed
an episodic buffer (or non-domain-specific central buffer in Car-
ruthers’s language) that may be identical to the role Carruthers has
proposed for inner speech. According to Baddeley, the episodic
buffer briefly stores and may chunk output from other systems us-
ing different codes. Interestingly, Baddeley (2001) claims that the
buffer may create an environmental model that can be manipu-
lated “to solve problems and plan future behavior.” Carruthers
asks, “What are the consumers for the LF [Chomsky’s logical
form] sentences generated from the outputs of the central mod-
ules?” It appears that at least part of Carruthers’s answer may lie
in Baddeley’s concept of an episodic buffer. But the parallels in
Carruthers’s and Baddeley’s theories become even more com-
pelling.
Carruthers proposes that in addition to a domain-general fac-
tual memory system (long-term, declarative memory in Baddeley’s
model), there must be an innate, domain-general faculty of ab-
ductive inference. He labels it a “consumer system,” but it seems
very like Baddeley’s central executive. Baddeley views the central
executive as largely attentional in nature; that is, it directs the cog-
nitive functions of the mind (including language) to relevant tasks
while inhibiting attention from irrelevant contexts. Carruthers
proposes that “central cognition” uses language (an innately struc-
tured input and output module) when engaging “in certain kinds
of reasoning and problem solving.” Baddeley wrestles with the
problem of a homunculus, that is, who or what actually makes the
decisions on these “inner propositions.” Carruthers hints at an an-
swer: It is innate, universal, and appears developmentally early (by
age 4). He cites the work of Frankish (1998a; 1998b), and Car-
ruthers purports that the “distinctive causal role of inner speech
is partly a function of our decisions to accept, reject, or act on the
propositions which our imaged sentences express. . . . Then pro-
vided that I can remember my commitments and execute them, it
will be just as if I believed the proposition in question” (sect. 4,
para. 4). Carruthers presents Frankish’s proposal that a level of our
mentality is constituted by our higher-order decisions and com-
mitments to accept or reject propositions, and also that language
constitutes the thoughts and beliefs entertained at that level.
Again, Baddeley’s concept of a central executive is germane to
these suppositions; although here is an example where Car-
ruthers’s speculations about the nature of this higher-order, innate
abductive mode of thinking would have furthered Baddeley’s
speculations about the nature of the central executive.
Language and conceptual development:
Words as essence placeholders
Fei Xu
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Abstract: Perhaps in addition to language being a potential medium of do-
main-general thought, as suggested by Carruthers, language may also play
another role in conceptual development: Words are “essence placehold-
ers.” Evidence is presented from studies on categorization, object indi-
viduation, and inductive inference in infancy. The assumption that words
are essence placeholders may be a mechanism by which infants acquire
kind concepts.
Carruthers argues for a particular version of the cognitive function
of language in his target article, where language serves to conjoin
modular representations. This is an intriguing thesis. However,
the empirical evidence seems to be fairly weak, for example, chil-
dren placed in a larger room succeeded on the reorientation task
without the aid of language. I suggest a different role for language:
Even at the very beginning of language development, words may
serve as “essence placeholders” for human infants. The empirical
evidence comes from studies in cognitive development, in partic-
ular, studies on categorization, object individuation, and inductive
inference.
In a series of categorization studies, Balaban and Waxman
(1997) showed that labeling can facilitate categorization in infants
as young as nine months. In their studies, the infants were famil-
iarized with a set of pictures of a given category, say, rabbits. One
group of infants heard a word when shown the picture, for exam-
ple, “a rabbit,” on some trials. For a second group of infants, a tone
accompanied the presentation of the picture on some trials. The
results showed that although both words and tones heightened the
infants’ attention to the objects, it was only in the label condition
that the infants categorized the objects. That is, they preferentially
looked at an exemplar from a new category (e.g., a pig) compared
to an exemplar from the old category (e.g., a new rabbit). These
results suggest that in the presence of a label, infants group to-
gether the exemplars into a single category more readily than in
the absence of a label.
In a series of experiments with 16- to 21-month-old infants,
Welder and Graham (2001) found that labeling guides infants’ in-
ductive inference, and it sometimes overrides perceptual similar-
ity. In their studies, the experimenter modeled a nonobvious prop-
erty of an unfamiliar target object, for example, an object making
a rattling sound when shaken, and the infant was given other test
objects that were perceptually similar or dissimilar to the target
object. In addition, one group of infants heard a label applied to
both the target object and the test objects, whereas a second group
did not hear a label. The question of interest was whether infants
would predict that the test objects would also possess the nonob-
vious property by reproducing the action; that is, they should
shake the object if they expected it to rattle. The results showed
that labeling had a powerful effect on inductive inference, often
overriding perceptual similarity.
A third line of experiments suggests that in addition to facilitat-
ing categorization and inductive inference, labeling may also play
an important role in object individuation. Xu (2002) presented
nine-month-old infant’s a task in which an object, say, a toy duck,
emerged from behind an occluder and returned behind it, fol-
lowed by another object, say, a ball, emerging from behind the
same occluder and returned behind it. The question was whether
the infants can use the property or object kind information to con-
clude that there were two distinct objects behind the screen. The
results showed that when the two objects were labeled by distinct
words, that is, “a duck” and “a ball,” the infants succeeded on the
task, whereas when the two objects were labeled by the same
word, that is, “a toy,” the infants failed. The labeling effects held
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up even with unfamiliar objects and nonsense words, for example,
“a blicket” and “a tupa.” Subsequent experiments showed that this
effect might be language specific because other auditory stimuli,
for example, distinct sounds or emotional expressions (e.g., ah ver-
sus eeu), did not facilitate object individuation.
These results suggest that even early in language development,
labeling may exert influence on several aspects of cognition. In-
fants may expect that words for objects map onto distinct kinds in
their environment; words are “essence placeholders.” Given this
expectation, if a set of objects are all labeled as “a rabbit,” it pro-
vides evidence to the infant that they belong to the same kind.
Similarly, the very fact that one object is called “a duck” and one
object seen on a different occasion is called “a ball” is sufficient
evidence for infants to posit two distinct kinds or essences. Ac-
cording to psychological essentialism (Gelman 2003; Medin &
Ortony 1989), essences determine the surface features and prop-
erties of objects. Three consequences follow. First, if two objects
share a label, they should belong to the same kind and their fea-
tural similarities should be analyzed, as in the categorization task.
Second, if two kinds of objects are indeed behind an occluder be-
cause two distinct labels are heard, there must be two distinct to-
kens of objects, as in the object individuation task. Third, if two
objects share a label, they should have the same nonobvious prop-
erties, as in the inductive inference task. The assumption that
words are essence placeholders may be a mechanism by which in-
fants first establish what kinds of things are in their environment.
Author’s Response
Modularity , language, and the flexibility 
of thought
Peter Carruthers
Department of Philosophy, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.
pcarruth@umd.edu
www.philosophy .umd.edu /people /faculty /pcarruthers /
Abstract: The present response elucidates, elaborates, and de-
fends the main thesis advanced in the target article: namely, that
natural-language sentences play a constitutive role in some human
thought processes, and that they are responsible for some of the
distinctive flexibility of human thinking, serving to integrate the
outputs of a variety of conceptual modules. Section R1 clarifies
and elaborates this main thesis, responding to a number of objec-
tions and misunderstandings. Section R2 considers three con-
trasting accounts of the mechanism of intermodular integration.
Section R3 discusses objections to some of the empirical data sup-
porting my main thesis. Section R4 criticizes some competing the-
ories of the role of language in cognition. And section R5 consid-
ers some proposed supplementary cognitive roles that language
might play.
R1. Clarifying and elaborating the main thesis
The main thesis of the target article is that natural language
sentences, constructed by the language module, serve to in-
tegrate and combine the outputs of a variety of central-
process conceptual modules, hence enabling some of the
flexibility which is distinctive of human cognition. In this
section, this thesis will be both clarified and elaborated on.
Only by casting the motivation behind my main thesis in a
new light, in fact, and by adding some later developments,
can I put myself in position to reply to the detailed criti-
cisms of my commentators.
R1.1. On mental modularity
A number of commentators challenge the assumption of
mental modularity that forms the backdrop to my proposal
(Bickerton, Dale & Spivey, Hurford & Dessalles,
MacWhinney), and Hermer-Vazquez complains of the
difficulty of defining what modularity is. Otherwise, most
are neutral or express some degree of support. Only two,
however (Atran, Bryson), identify the primary reason for
believing in mental modularity: computational tractability.
Let me elaborate on the positive before replying to the neg-
ative. Part of the point of the discussion will be to clarify ex-
actly how I think the modularity thesis should be construed.
The most important argument in support of mental mod-
ularity derives from Fodor (2000). It goes like this:
1. The mind is computationally realized.
2. Amodular, or holistic, processes are computationally
intractable.
Conclusion: So the mind must consist wholly or largely
of modular systems.1
Premise 1 is the guiding assumption that lies behind all
work in computational psychology, hence gaining a degree
of inductive support from the successes of the computa-
tionalist research program. And many of us believe that 
this form of psychology represents easily our best hope
(perhaps our only hope) for understanding how mental
processes can be realized in physical ones (Rey 1997).
Just about the only people who reject Premise 1 are those
who endorse an extreme form of distributed connection-
ism, believing that the brain (or significant portions of it,
dedicated to central processes) forms a vast collection of
connectionist networks, in which there are no local repre-
sentations (O’Brien & Opie). The successes of the distrib-
uted connectionist program have been limited, however,
mostly being confined to various forms of pattern recogni-
tion; and there are principled reasons for thinking that such
models cannot explain the kinds of structured thinking and
one-shot learning of which humans and other animals are
manifestly capable (Fodor & McLaughlin 1990; Fodor &
Pylyshyn 1988; Gallistel 2000; Horgan & Tienson 1996;
Marcus 2001). Indeed, even the alleged neurological plau-
sibility of connectionist models is now pretty thoroughly
undermined, as more and more discoveries are made con-
cerning localist representation in the brain (e.g., Rizzolatti
et al. 2001).
Premise 2 is almost universally accepted, too, and has
been since the early days of computational modeling of vi-
sion. You only have to begin thinking in engineering terms
about how to realize cognitive processes in computational
ones to see that the tasks will need to be broken down into
separate problems that can be processed separately (and
preferably in parallel). And indeed this is, for example, ex-
actly what we find in the organization of the visual system.
What this second premise does, then, is to impose on
proposed modular systems quite a tight encapsulation con-
straint. Any processor that had to access the full set of the
agent’s background beliefs (or even a significant subset
thereof) would be faced with an unmanageable combina-
torial explosion. We should therefore expect the mind to
consist of a set of processing systems that are not only mod-
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ular in the sense of being distinct isolable components but
that operate in isolation from most of the information that
is available elsewhere in the mind.
I should emphasize that this point concerns not the range
of inputs that are available to modular systems, but rather
the processing data-bases that are accessed by those sys-
tems in executing their algorithms (Carruthers 2003; Sper-
ber 2002). Failure to appreciate this point leads Varley &
Siegal to complain that language can’t be a module, be-
cause it receives inputs from many other modules. Al-
though we might expect some modules to receive only a re-
stricted range of inputs, this is by no means a requirement
of modularity.2 And indeed, the practical reasoning module
envisaged in the target article is hypothesized to receive in-
puts from all belief-forming and desire-forming modules
(see also sect. R1.3). This is quite consistent with its modu-
lar status, provided that the information that can be ac-
cessed when processing any given set of inputs is strictly
limited.
I should also emphasize that modularity is perfectly con-
sistent with an acknowledgment of the importance of at-
tention in organizing the direction of modular resources
and also with a variety of kinds of top-down processing.
(Both are found in the operations of the human visual sys-
tem; see Kosslyn 1994.) Some kinds of attention can be
thought of as directing the inputs to a module. And top-
down processing can all be internal to a wider modular sys-
tem. What is important, from a modularist perspective, is
just that the processing within the system shouldn’t require
habitual access to significant quantities of information held
elsewhere in the mind.
Modularism is now routinely assumed by just about
everyone working in artificial intelligence, in fact (Bryson
2000; McDermott 2001). So anyone wishing to deny the
thesis of massive modularity is forced to assume a heavy
burden. It must be claimed either that minds aren’t com-
putationally realized, or that we haven’t the faintest idea
how they can be. And either way, it becomes quite myste-
rious how minds can exist in a physical universe. (This isn’t
to say that modularism doesn’t have its own problems, of
course. The main ones will be discussed briefly in section
R1.4. And one of the major purposes of my target article
was to make a start on addressing them.)
Any computational psychologist should predict, then,
that the brain will contain a whole host of modular pro-
cessing systems, connected with one another in a variety of
complex ways, many of which can be decomposed into net-
works of smaller modules. (See any of the familiar and
highly complex wiring diagrams of the visual cortex to get
the flavor of the kind of thing I have in mind.) And nothing
in this account need prevent one submodule (e.g., for pro-
cessing faces) from forming a common part of a number of
distinct higher-level modules either (e.g., not only the visual
system but also an emotional system).
So far as I am aware, such a picture is consistent with (and
to some degree supported by) everything we currently
know about the organization of the brain. Certainly it is no
problem for this sort of modularist account that brain-imag-
ing studies show dispersed networks of neurons engaged in
any given task, to which Bickerton draws our attention.
First, most tasks are likely to involve the activity of a vari-
ety of modules, both input and output; and second, many
modules may well be composed out of submodules that are
located in different brain regions. (See, e.g., Baron-Cohen
& Ring 1994 for a tentative brain map of the subsystems in-
volved in our theory of mind module, or ToMM.)
Nor do the elegant eye-tracking data described by Dale
& Spivey count against this sort of modularist account.3
That language comprehension should be subserved by a
complex system involving a language module receiving in-
puts from both speech and vision, and an attentional system
for coordinating the two sorts of input (as well as a number
of other parts besides, probably) is exactly what a modular-
ist of my stripe might predict (see also Chomsky 2000; Piet-
roski 2003).
Is a modularist position implausible on evolutionary
grounds in the way that both Bickerton and Hurford &
Dessalles allege? In fact, no. What we know from biology
generally is that evolution is apt to operate by constructing
specific systems in response to specific adaptive pressures
(Tooby & Cosmides 1992). And often this will happen by
co-opting and reconfiguring resources that were available
as antecedents, in such a way that multifunctionality be-
comes rife (Hermer-Vazquez). What would really be 
biologically implausible would be the evolution of a big
equipotent brain (given the high costs of sustaining large
brain size) or the evolution of an unstructured central pro-
cessing arena, of the sort many antimodularists are com-
mitted to (Tooby & Cosmides 1992).
R1.2. Integration of module outputs without language
A great many commentators object to my thesis that lan-
guage is the medium of intermodular integration by point-
ing out cases where the outputs of different modular sys-
tems are integrated without language (Bryson, Chater,
Dale & Spivey, Hampton, Hermer-Vazquez, Hurford
& Dessalles, Nelson, Robbins, Slobin, Varley & Siegal,
Wynn & Coolidge). For example, the shape and space
modules in the visual system are integrated without lan-
guage (Wynn & Coolidge), and the mirror neurons dis-
covered by Rizzolatti et al. (2001) integrate both visual and
proprioceptive information (Bryson, Varley & Siegal).
But as will be shown by the account of mental modularity
sketched in section R1.1, I, too, believe that modular sys-
tems will frequently receive inputs from two or more dis-
tinct modules, and hence that integration of modular out-
puts will frequently occur in the absence of language.
Nothing that I said in the target article was intended to deny
this. Rather, the thesis that I advanced there assumed a cer-
tain sort of overall mental architecture and was intended to
be restricted to just one level of that architecture.
What I envisage is a layer of perceptual-input modules
(including language) that generate outputs to be taken as
input by a layer of conceptual belief-forming and desire-
forming modules. The input modules may bear complex re-
lations to one another (e.g., both hearing and vision feed
into language, as noted in sect. R1.1) and may themselves
decompose into a variety of submodules. And the concep-
tual modules, similarly, will bear complex relations to one
another, as well as being further decomposable.
The conceptual modules in turn feed their outputs to a
limited-channel practical reasoning system (besides gener-
ating memory; see sect. R1.3). I envisage that the latter is
capable of only a very limited range of inferences (e.g., se-
lecting the currently strongest desire among its inputs and
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using conditional inference; I presume that it has no ca-
pacity to conjoin inputs). And I envisage that it can only
draw on a limited database of information (e.g., a set of ab-
stract motor-schemas of performable actions and action se-
quences). So, the practical reasoning system, too, deserves
to be regarded as a module (Carruthers, forthcoming b).
The thesis that language is the vehicle of intermodular
integration is intended to apply only at the interface be-
tween the conceptual belief-forming and desire-forming
modules and the practical reasoning system. The claim is
that it is those contents (the outputs of the conceptual mod-
ules, fit to be taken singly as input by the practical reason-
ing system) that can only be conjoined with one another for
purposes of further inference (in contrast to the purposes
of storage or memory; see sect. R1.3) through the offices of
the language faculty. The fact that modular outputs can be
integrated at other levels of cognition is simply irrelevant.
The following puzzle arises, however. Given that modu-
lar outputs can be integrated at other levels in cognition,
how is it that (prior to the evolution of the language faculty)
this wasn’t the case at the interface between conceptual
modules and the practical reasoning system? The answer is
that cognitive systems only evolve the powers that they
need to, whereas cross-module talk is computationally ex-
pensive (Bryson); and it isn’t clear that there was any need
to integrate module-specific beliefs and desires.
Consider the powers that a practical reasoning module
might have in the absence of language. (For a more elabo-
rate and complex account, see Carruthers, forthcoming b.)
It takes as input whatever is the currently strongest desire
P. It then initiates a search for beliefs of the form Q r P,
cueing a search of memory for beliefs of this form and/or
keying into action a suite of belief-forming modules to at-
tempt to generate beliefs of this form. When it receives one,
it checks its database to see if Q is something for which an
existing motor-schema exists. If so, it initiates a search of the
contents of current perception to see if the circumstances
required to bring about Q are actual (i.e., to see not only
whether Q is something doable, but doable here and now).
If so, it goes ahead and does it. If not, it initiates a further
search for beliefs of the form R r Q, and so on. Perhaps the
system also has a simple stopping rule: If you have to go
more than n number of conditionals deep, stop, and move
on to the next strongest desire.
In addition, one thing that immediately ancestral practi-
cal reasoning systems would have had, surely, is the power
to initiate episodes of mental rehearsal. Once some sort of
initial plan had been hit upon (I want P; if I do Q, I’ll get P;
Q is something I can do right now), there would have been
considerable value in feeding the supposition that I do Q
back through the various central modular systems once
again as input, to see if such an action would have other as-
yet-unforeseen consequences, whether beneficial or harm-
ful. This doesn’t seem to require anything amodular to be
built into the system yet; for both the desire for P and the
belief that if Q then P can be products of individual mod-
ules.4,5
The point is that earlier hominid species, armed with
some such practical reasoning module and a bunch of pow-
erful belief-forming and desire-generating modules, would
already have been pretty smart. They could have generated
flexible and appropriate plans of action, with the different
elements of the plan drawn from different conceptual-
modular domains. I thus agree with MacWhinney that our
hominid ancestors would have had sophisticated planning
abilities prior to the evolution of language. But in contrast
with him, I don’t think that they would have needed to be
capable of integrating the outputs of conceptual modules
for this to be possible. For it simply isn’t clear why they
would have needed to do cross-modular integration of con-
tents. And on my account this only became possible as a by-
product once a language faculty had evolved for purposes
of communication, given that such a faculty would have
been set up in such a way as to receive, and to combine, con-
tents from each of the conceptual modules.
R1.3. Mental modularity and domain-integrating
concepts
As Robbins rightly notices, there is a sense in which my
thesis is intended to apply only at the level of process or in-
ference, not at the level of stored content. Indeed, modular-
ism, too, is a thesis about processing and not about storage.
Modules are learning mechanisms, charged with generat-
ing information and appropriate goals. Whether memory
systems are also fractionated along modular lines, or whether
their patterns of organization need to follow the same fault-
lines, is quite another matter, as shown in this section. So
the fact that there exist domain-integrating concepts, in the
way that both Hurford & Dessalles and Nelson argue,
poses no special threat to that thesis.
For example, it is plausible that prelinguistic representa-
tions of individual people should be organized in folders,
with some sort of identifying label (perhaps a recognition
schema), and with information about the individual drawn
from a variety of modular domains (physical, biological,
psychological, social, and so forth) contained within the
folder, and so in one sense conjoined. But I claim that to do
anything much with the information in a folder in the ab-
sence of language (to draw further inferences from it of a
nonpractical sort), one would have to take each item of do-
main-specific information and process it separately within
the appropriate conceptual module.
Similarly, then, for the prelinguistic event-concepts that
combine information from various domains, discussed by
Nelson I can allow their existence, consistently with my
thesis, by claiming that the drawing of inferences from such
concepts in the absence of language will always be a piece-
meal and module-specific affair.
What exactly a modularist should say about any given do-
main-integrating concept will depend on the details of the
case, of course. In addition to the possibility just canvassed
in connection with concepts of individuals and of event-
types, there are at least two further possibilities. Each of
these can be illustrated through discussion of the abstract
concept three, raised as an example against me by Hurford
& Dessalles. Let me elaborate.
The concept three can, of course, be applied across all
domains, wherever there are individuals to be numbered.
So one can have three rocks, three cats, and three thoughts.
But on some views that concept might still be proprietary
to a more abstract numerical module (Butterworth 1999),
whose operation is dependent on classifications effected by
other modular systems.6
An alternative view would be that the abstract and exact
numerical concept three is dependent on language (Spelke
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& Tsivkin 2001). All that would be available in prelinguistic
infants and monkeys, underpinning the behavior that seems
to approximate to possession of that concept, would be the
object-file system. This can hold in working memory a rep-
resentation of three separate concrete individuals, enabling
subjects to track the movements and absences of those in-
dividuals (Carey 2001).
R1.4. Mental modularity and distinctively human
thought
The central challenge for any strongly modularist account
of human cognition, of course, is to account for the distinc-
tive flexibility and creativity of the human mind, which
seems to mark us off so sharply from all other species of
creature on earth (past or present) in the way that Bicker-
ton emphasizes. The main thesis of the target article is in-
tended as a start on this problem: It is cross-modular con-
tents formulated in language and cycles of processing
activity involving language in “inner speech” that are sup-
posed to account for some of that flexibility. But this was, of
course, only a start and cannot by itself be the whole story.
Let me briefly mention two other components.
One (not mentioned in the target article) is a supposition-
generator or supposer (Nichols & Stich 2000), which in my
view is built on the back of the language faculty, picking up
on weak associations and analogies to generate novel sen-
tences for consideration. It is this that is responsible for the
distinctive creativity of human thinking, on my account.
And I claim that it is the function of the species-specific dis-
position to engage in pretend play in childhood to build and
hone the activity of this supposition-generator (Carruthers
2002b).
At this point I differ from Bickerton (and also, I think,
from Chomsky 1988). He seems to believe that the human
language-faculty by itself is sufficient to explain our dispo-
sition to engage in creative thought. But this can’t be quite
right. It is one thing to be capable, by virtue of the combi-
natorial powers of one’s language, of entertaining novel and
creative sentences. With this I agree. And it is quite another
thing to have any disposition to generate such sentences.
This is what the supposer confers on us, on my account.
The other major element in an account of human cre-
ative powers is some sort of faculty of abductive inference,
or faculty of inference to the best explanation, that can re-
ceive these novel sentences and evaluate their worth. This
was mentioned briefly in the target article, where I gave the
misleading impression that I thought it would be embodied
in a separate module. And to this Dale & Spivey rightly
object that a faculty of abductive inference would seem to
be the archetype of a radically amodular, or holistic, system
(Fodor 1983).
In fact, my hope is that a kind of “virtual” faculty of ab-
ductive inference can be built out of elements already pres-
ent in module-based cognition. For details, see Carruthers
(forthcoming a). But very roughly, the idea is that principles
of simplicity, relevance, and coherence with existing belief,
which are already employed in the interpretation of speech
and the evaluation of speech-dependent testimony from
other people, would become a faculty of inference to the
best explanation when directed inward, in cycles of “inner
speech,” giving rise to a preference for simple but fecund
theories constrained by background belief.
The overall goal of the research project (of which the tar-
get article is one component) is to try to explain distinctively
human cognition by seeing it as built out of modular com-
ponents. And the motivation for adopting that goal, in turn,
is to make it possible for us to see human cognitive pro-
cesses as computationally realized, given that computa-
tional processes have to be encapsulated if they are to be
tractable.
R1.5. LF and logical inference
The hypothesis tentatively advanced in the target article is
that it is linguistic representations of a certain specific kind
that serve as the medium of intermodular integration.
These are, namely, representations at the level of logical
form, or LF (Chomsky 1995; Hornstein 1995). In this sec-
tion I respond to a number of different objections to this
idea. But first let me stress that such a claim isn’t strictly es-
sential to the main thesis of the target article, which is just
that representations in a modular language faculty (what-
ever form they might take) serve to integrate contents
across conceptual modules.
Dale & Spivey challenge the very existence of LF, or at
least its psychological reality. But in doing so, they present
a challenge to a significant portion of contemporary lin-
guistics. I take my stand with the latter. For given Chom-
sky’s current construal of LF, in which LF and PF (phono-
logical form) are the only linguistic levels (Chomsky 1995),
to deny LF is tantamount to denying abstract syntax.
In fact, evidence of the psychological reality of LF is le-
gion. For example, not only adults but children as young as
three years old will only accept the contraction of “want to”
to “wanna” in those cases (statistically by far the most com-
mon) where there isn’t a covert wh-trace between the verb
and the preposition (Pietroski & Crain 2001; Thornton
1996). Thus subjects will accept the contraction of (1) to (2),
but not of (3) to (4).
(1) I don’t want to make breakfast for John.
(2) I don’t wanna make breakfast for John.
(3) Who does John want to make breakfast?
(4) *Who does John wanna make breakfast?
This is because the LF representation of (3) contains a
covert trace of the subject of “make breakfast,” as in “Whot
does John want t to make breakfast?”
Ironically, indeed, the very data cited by Dale & Spivey
in their attack on LF, concerning the partial and incomplete
nature of semantic processing (Ferreira et al. 2002; Sanford
& Sturt 2002), are fully in accord with Chomsky’s own
thinking (Chomsky 2000; Pietroski 2003). According to
Chomsky, the semantic contribution of the language faculty
and of LF stops short of a full specification of truth-condi-
tions. Thus the full LF representation of the sentence, “He
saw the book in the window and bought it,” would leave
open the question of whether it was the very token book
seen that was bought or just an instance of the same type.
It is then supposed to be the work of other faculties of the
mind to resolve such ambiguities. And presumably such
resolutions are only sought when needed, just as Sanford
and Sturt (2002) suggest.
Molina wonders why I chose LF to play the integrative
role and doubts whether it is plausible to say that LF rep-
resentations could constitute “the locus of thought (where
thinking is really happening).” But, of course, I don’t believe
that only LF thoughts are real! I believe that the individual
outputs of the conceptual modules, prior to integration in
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LF, are also thoughts, and that thinking is going on within
each of those modular systems and also in the practical rea-
soning module. LF plays a constitutive role in only a very
limited range of thoughts, in my view, namely, those that
combine together the outputs of conceptual modules for
further processing.7
But why LF? Partly because my thesis is that it is the nat-
ural language faculty that does the integrative work. And
partly because, according to our best theories, LF is the
place where the language faculty interfaces with other sys-
tems in such a way as to fix external reference, and these
systems would presumably include the various conceptual
modules whose outputs stand in need of integration.
Chater wonders whether there is really any difference
between my views concerning the role of LF and the tradi-
tional thesis that there is a language of thought (LOT, or
mentalese) over which logical and other forms of inference
are defined. And he wonders whether the difference be-
tween my view and that of, say, Fodor (1975) might be
merely terminological.
One difference is that LF representations will contain
lexical items drawn from a specific natural language (and
might also contain some language-specific structural ele-
ments; see the discussion in sect. R5.6), whereas LOT sen-
tences are supposed to be in some sort of universal “brain
language.” Put differently, the point is that the LF repre-
sentations of a speaker of English will contain lexical items
drawn from that very language; whereas LOT sentences
won’t (in general) do so (except in the case where a subject
is thinking about English sentences).
Another difference between LF and LOT is that I cer-
tainly don’t envisage that there is any kind of global logical
capability operating over sentences of LF. A language mod-
ule should, of course, be capable of certain limited forms of
inference defined over LFs (see later in this section). But
such inferences need not be manifestations of any sort of
general-purpose inference engine. In fact, I very much
doubt whether humans have a global logical faculty (Evans
& Over 1996; Gigerenzer & Todd 2000). Rather, a set of
heuristics and implicit procedures (together with the lim-
ited inferential powers of the language faculty) could col-
lectively provide a sufficiently good approximation of logi-
cal ability.
Of course, what we do also have, if dual process theories
of cognition are correct (Evans & Over 1996; Frankish,
forthcoming; Stanovich 1999; and see sect. R.4.4 here), is
the capacity to form explicit beliefs about which forms of
inference are and aren’t valid and to train ourselves to fol-
low only valid patterns in our explicit thinking. But this ca-
pacity, in my view (although also involving natural language
sentences as vehicles of thought), supervenes the more ba-
sic role of LF in integrating domain-specific thoughts.
Robbins correctly notices that the integrative role of the
language module, on my account, depends on it having the
capacity for certain kinds of inference. Specifically, it must
be capable of taking two LF sentences, constructed from
the outputs of two distinct conceptual modules, and com-
bining them appropriately into a single LF representation.
He claims that such a view is highly implausible, however,
and that it puts me into conflict with the views of most con-
temporary linguists. But, this is not so.
Robbins, like Chater, mistakenly thinks that what is in
question is the existence of a general-purpose inference en-
gine located within the language faculty. For, indeed, such
a claim is not only intrinsically unbelievable, but certainly
wouldn’t be believed by any working linguist. However, just
about every linguist does think (with the possible exception
of Fodor and those closely influenced by Fodor) that some
inferences are valid, and are known to be valid, purely by
virtue of our linguistic competence.
Most linguists believe, for example, that the inference
from “John ran quickly” to “John ran” is endorsed by virtue
of semantic competence (Parsons 1990); and many would
claim that such competence is embodied in the language
faculty. In contemporary parlance, this amounts to saying
that the inference is made by the language module trans-
forming sentences of LF. Indeed, it is worth noting that one
way in which such inferences might be handled is in terms
of covert quantification over events and conjunction reduc-
tion (Pietroski 2004). Thus on this sort of account, “John ran
quickly” really has the form, ∃ e (e is a running & e is by John
& e is quick). And then the inference to “John ran” is just
an instance of conjunction elimination.
In conclusion, then, so far from being implausible, the
idea that certain limited forms of inference (notably con-
junction introduction and conjunction elimination, among
others) are handled internally within the language faculty
in transformations of LF sentences is pretty much the or-
thodox view in contemporary linguistics.
R2. Mechanisms of modular integration
In this section, three distinct proposals made by commen-
tators will be discussed concerning the mechanisms for in-
tegrating central-modular domain-specific contents.
R2.1. The relative pronoun
Bermudez appears to endorse both the spirit and the let-
ter of my proposal but offers a friendly elaboration. Instead
of saying merely that it is sentences of LF that serve to in-
tegrate modular outputs, why not say that it is the availabil-
ity of the relative pronoun, in particular, which makes this
possible? I would be happy to accept such an amendment
if I thought that it was well motivated. But I can’t see that
it is.
Consider the simplest possible example arising from the
Hermer-Vazquez et al. (1999) re-orientation experiments:
Suppose that the sentences to be conjoined are “The toy is
near a long wall,” and “The toy is near the blue wall” (in a
case where the blue wall is also a long wall). My own pro-
posal is just that, with the referent of “wall” indexed as the
same, LF structures entitle us to multiply embed the pred-
icates “long” and “blue” to form the sentence, “The toy is
near the long blue wall.”
Bermudez’s proposal amounts to the claim that the first
of the preceding sentences really has the form, “The toy is
near a wall that is long,” and the second has the form, “The
toy is near the wall that is blue”; and then (because the ref-
erents of “wall” are indexed as the same) we are entitled to
move to the single sentence, “The toy is near the wall that
is long and that is blue.” In effect, the proposal seems to be
that all complex predicates are relative clauses. But I doubt
whether many linguists would consider such a suggestion
worth pursuing. For what could be wrong with allowing
“blue” and “long” to attach to a noun phrase directly, with-
out the formation of a relative clause?
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Bermudez’s worry (on my behalf) would seem to be this:
If the predicates “blue” and “long” express concepts drawn
from different modular domains, then there is nothing to
guarantee that it will even make sense to attach them to ob-
jects drawn from the other domain. And the abstract appa-
ratus of relative clauses is somehow supposed to help with
this. I don’t really see how the story here is supposed to go,
in fact. But in any case, the original worry is ill motivated
and betrays a misunderstanding of the sense in which con-
ceptual modules are domain-specific.
Many modules can process information concerning the
same object or situation, and so far as I can see, this will be
the general case. But then we automatically have a guaran-
tee that predicates produced by the one module will apply
to the objects of the other. This should have been manifest
from the original example. The thoughts produced by the
geometry module and the landmark module both concern
the location of the toy; and it is the toy that is the subject of
both resulting sentences. Equally, one and the same wall can
be both long (spatial module) and colored (color module).
The problem to which the language faculty provides a 
solution, in fact, isn’t that of generating abstract concepts
that can apply across modular boundaries (for this already
comes for free with the modules themselves); it is rather to
provide an abstract framework within which concepts of the
different kinds can be combined into a single thought for
the purposes of inference.
R2.2. Metaphor and structure mapping
Bryant & Gibbs and Dominey each propose that the hu-
man cognitive system contains a prelinguistic capacity to
map one domain onto another, giving rise to metaphorical
conceptual schemes. For example, the domain of debate
and argument can be mapped onto the domain of warfare,
giving rise to an elaborate system of concepts summarized
by the slogan, “Argument is war” (Lakoff & Johnson 1980).
And it is suggested that such conceptual schemes are non-
linguistic in character, receiving expression in metaphorical
language rather than being reflections of it. So on such an
account, the basic mechanism of intermodular integration
will be this domain-general, structure-mapping capability
rather than language.
The fact that there exists a correlation between cross-
domain mapping and metaphorical language is one thing,
however; the question of the direction of causation here is
quite another. It might be possible to claim that such con-
ceptual mappings begin initially with the integrative func-
tions of language. Or so, at least, I shall argue.
For these purposes, it is important to distinguish be-
tween live metaphors and dead ones. Live metaphors are
fresh creations and strike us (if they are effective) with the
force of insight; dead metaphors are once-live metaphors
that have been used so commonly that it takes hardly any
effort to process them, and their metaphorical status is
barely discerned. For notice that the metaphorical concep-
tual systems studied by Lakoff and Johnson (1980; 1999)
and others are dead ones, enshrined in common patterns of
speech. If someone says, for example, “Don’t worry; I’m on
top of the situation,” we probably won’t even notice that a
metaphor has been used.
Recall from section R1.4 that my account presupposes
the existence of a language-dependent supposer. It might
work somewhat as follows. Sometimes when two previously
unconnected concepts A and B are coactivated (albeit one
of them weakly) by the same stimulus, situation, or thought,
then this leads to the supposition that A is B being explic-
itly formulated. This supposition is then fed as input to the
various (mostly modular) reasoning systems, and the results
evaluated. At the outset of an episode of pretend play in
childhood, for example, the sight of a curved banana might
also activate the concept telephone (because of the banana’s
similarity in shape to a telephone handset). The child then
entertains the supposition, “The banana is a telephone.”
From this supposition various inferences can be drawn. If
the banana is a telephone, then you can call grandma on it,
and it will have buttons down its middle section for dialing.
The child can then access these consequences, pretend to
dial, and subsequently begin a pretend conversation with
grandma.8
Generalizing from this example, then, one might propose
that a live metaphor is first created when some sort of struc-
tural correspondence or similarity between two phenom-
ena leads to at least weak coactivation of the concepts ap-
plying to each. The resulting metaphorical thought is
formulated in language by the suppositional system and fed
back to the various modular inferential systems. Conse-
quences that are evaluated as true or useful are retained,
and the rest discarded. (For example, the playing child is
likely to discard the inference, “If the banana is a telephone,
then it won’t squish if I squeeze it.”) This account presup-
poses no domain-integrating capacity beyond the language-
dependent supposer.
In terms of such an account, it is easy enough to see how
culturally entrenched dead metaphors might become es-
tablished. Wherever two domains are structurally alike in
some significant respect, this is likely to lead to weak coac-
tivation of the corresponding concepts, and hence people
will sometimes entertain the supposition that the one do-
main (or an aspect of the one domain) is the other. If there
are enough structural similarities between the two domains
for the one to serve as a viable partial model of the other (as
in the case of “argument is war”), then the corresponding
modes of speech are likely to become entrenched. Hence
we now talk of “winning an argument” and “attacking some-
one’s premises” without giving it a second thought.
In conclusion, then, I claim that one can explain the
deeply metaphorical character of much of our language 
and speech consistently with my main hypothesis, without 
having to suppose that people possess some sort of lan-
guage-independent, domain-general, structure-mapping
capability.
R2.3. Metamodule or language module?
Atran presents the following important challenge to my ac-
count: Why should we think that it is language that does 
intermodular integration rather than some sort of meta-
representational faculty (or a theory of mind mechanism
[ToMM])? Atran agrees with the modularist framework
adopted in my paper; and he agrees that domain-general,
flexible cognition somehow has to be built out of modular
components. But he sees nothing yet to discriminate be-
tween my proposal and the idea previously advanced by
Sperber (1996) that ToMM is the module that has the
power to combine together the outputs of all the others.
This alternative proposal is worth replying to at some
length. So consider, then, the competitor hypothesis that it
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is ToMM that has access to the outputs of all the various
central or conceptual modules, and that also has the power
to combine those contents together to form intermodular
thoughts.
One difficulty for such an hypothesis is that there is evi-
dence that ToMM doesn’t, in fact, have any such access. In-
stead of automatically receiving as input the various beliefs
that influence our own behavior (which would then make
self-explanation relatively trivial), there is considerable ev-
idence that what ToMM does instead is engage in self-in-
terpretation, ascribing thoughts and goals to oneself to ex-
plain manifest behavior in something very much like the
way that thoughts and goals are ascribed to other people
(Gazzaniga 1998; Gopnik 1993).
This emerges most clearly in those many cases where it can
be demonstrated that people’s attributions of thoughts to
themselves are really instances of confabulation, rather than
mere reporting of contents to which ToMM has some sort of
direct access (Gazzaniga 1998; Gopnik 1993; Nisbett & Ross
1980; Nisbett & Wilson 1977; Wilson 1985; 2002; Wilson &
Stone 1985; Wilson et al. 1981). Indeed, a strong case can be
made that the only circumstances in which ToMM has non-
inferential access to a subject’s own thoughts is where those
thoughts are linguistically expressed in inner speech (Car-
ruthers 1998b; see also the discussion in sect. R5.2).
In conclusion, if ToMM doesn’t have access to the sub-
ject’s beliefs (i.e., the outputs of the subject’s belief-form-
ing conceptual modules), then it cannot, of course, be
ToMM that serves to bind together and integrate the con-
tents of those beliefs on a regular basis. In contrast, we
know that the language faculty must have access to (a sig-
nificant subset of) the subject’s beliefs for those beliefs to
be expressible in speech.
Another difficulty for the Sperber-Atran proposal (even
if we set aside the first) is to explain why any such meta-
representational intermodular architecture should have
evolved. For the main business of ToMM is presumably to
predict and explain the behavior of conspecifics. This ca-
pacity would only require the construction of intermodular
thoughts if others were already entertaining such thoughts.
Otherwise, attributions of domain-specific thoughts alone
would do perfectly well. By contrast, in the case of lan-
guage, the demands of swift and efficient communication
would have created a significant selection pressure for in-
termodular integration, allowing the outputs of distinct
central modules concerning the same object or event to be
combined into a single spoken sentence. So instead of say-
ing separately, “The object is near a long wall,” and “The ob-
ject is near the blue wall,” one can say much more suc-
cinctly, “The object is near the long blue wall.”
It might be replied that the pressure for ToMM to inte-
grate contents across modules could have come, not from
the demands of predicting and explaining the behavior of
oneself and others, but rather from the benefits that such
integration can bring for other areas of activity (such as solv-
ing the reorientation problem). This is possible. After all, it
is common enough in biology for a system initially selected
for one purpose to be co-opted and used for another. And
it might be claimed that ToMM would be ideally placed to
play the integrative role, taking inputs from all the other
central modules (allegedly anyway; see earlier in this sec-
tion) and providing outputs to practical reasoning.
Actually, it is hard to see how one could get from here to
anything resembling the full flexibility of human cognition.
For there is no reason to suppose that ToMM would have
been set up so as to provide its output as input to the other
central modules, in which case there would be no scope for
cycles of reasoning activity, with ToMM combining outputs
from central modules and then harnessing their resources
for further reasoning. In contrast, because language is both
an output and an input module, it is well positioned for just
this role, as I argued at length in the target article.
What of the experimental evidence? Atran attributes to
me the claim that dual-task data of the sort collected by Her-
mer-Vazquez et al. (1999) cannot discriminate between the
idea that it is language, on the one hand, or ToMM, on the
other, that performs the integrative function across modules.
But this is a misreading of the target article. What I said,
rather, is that dual-task studies cannot easily be used to test
whether it is language that plays the role of integrating the
outputs of ToMM and other modular systems, because of the
likelihood that ToMM itself sometimes accesses and deploys
the representations of the language faculty in the course of
its normal operation. For then any task that disrupts language
is likely to disrupt ToMM as well. But this is by no means the
same as saying that dual-task studies can’t discriminate be-
tween ToMM and language as candidates for playing the in-
tegrative role in respect of other modular systems (i.e., sys-
tems other than language and ToMM).
Indeed, the dual-task data collected by Spelke and col-
leagues seem to me to support my own proposal quite
strongly, when matched against the Sperber-Atran one.
For if subjects fail at the task in the speech-shadowing con-
dition (but not in the rhythm-shadowing condition) because
they cannot then integrate geometrical and landmark in-
formation, it is very hard to see how it can be a disruption
to ToMM that is responsible for this failure. For there is no
reason to think that shadowing of speech should involve the
resources of ToMM.
Admittedly, a good case can be made for saying that nor-
mal speech comprehension and production will implicate 
a subsystem of ToMM, at least, where that subsystem is
charged with figuring out the conditions for relevance in
communication (Sperber & Wilson 2002). So normal speak-
ing and comprehending would surely disrupt any other
ToMM-involving task (and so any task requiring intermod-
ular integration, on the hypothesis that it is ToMM that per-
forms this role). But there is no reason to think that this
should be true of speech shadowing. For in this case there
is no requirement of comprehension and no attempt at
communication (see also sect. R3.2).
In conclusion, then, I claim (on theoretical, evolutionary,
and experimental grounds) that language is a much more
plausible candidate for integrating the contents of other
central modules than is ToMM.
R3. The reorientation data reconsidered
Several commentators raise doubts about the reorientation
data collected by Spelke and her colleagues (Hermer &
Spelke 1996; Hermer-Vazquez et al. 1999). Responding to
these doubts is the task of the present section.
R3.1. Language as an aid to memory
Bryson and Clark each provide very similar alternative ex-
planations of the Spelke data, albeit from quite different
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theoretical perspectives (Bryson is a modularist; Clark, a
connectionist). Their idea is that linguistic terms might
serve, not as vehicles of intermodular integration, but
rather as aids to memory, helping us to focus our attention
on tasks that we would otherwise find difficult.
What this suggestion overlooks, however, is the datum
that the only predictor of success in the reorientation tasks
that could be discovered among young children was pro-
ductive use of “left” and “right” (Hermer & Spelke 1996).
For we already know that prelinguistic children and rats
rely on geometric information in attempting to solve these
tasks. So their problem is not to recover the spatial rela-
tionships involved when they have been disoriented: We
know that they can already make use of those. Rather, their
problem is to combine spatial information with landmark
(e.g., color) information.
Because it seems to be colors that children have trouble
remembering in these circumstances, a memory-enhance-
ment theory should predict that it would be the productive
use of color vocabulary that would be the best indicator of
success. But this isn’t what we find. What enables children
eventually to succeed in the task isn’t some way of re-
membering the relevance of color (memory enhance-
ment), but rather a way of combining into a single explicit
goal both items of relevant information (i.e., module inte-
gration).
But then why, on the module-integrating account, is it
spatial vocabulary that is crucial? Shouldn’t color vocabu-
lary be just as important? Indeed so; but the fact is that
color vocabulary is much more easily acquired. So the cru-
cial watershed, at which both types of lexical item become
available together for the first time, is the acquisition of
“left” and “right.”
Wynn & Coolidge put forward a related counterpro-
posal for explaining the Spelke data. Relying on Baddeley’s
(1986) model of the working-memory system as being
made up of a central executive and two slave systems (the
phonological loop and the visuo-spatial sketchpad), they
suggest that the reason why performance is disrupted in
the speech-shadowing task might be because of interfer-
ence with the central executive component of working
memory. And because the central executive isn’t supposed
to be language dependent, this means that integration of
contents across domains shouldn’t be dependent on lan-
guage.
Without a lot more detail, however, this proposal doesn’t
look well motivated. For Hermer-Vazquez et al. (1999) go
to great lengths to argue that the rhythm-shadowing task is
just as demanding of the resources of working memory as
the speech-shadowing one. So Wynn & Coolidge need to
show us how there is something about the speech-shadow-
ing task that is especially demanding of the resources of the
central executive in particular.
R3.2. A contrast otherwise explained?
Samuels raises an objection that, if it were successful, might
provide just the materials that Wynn & Coolidge need.9
He points out that on orthodox theories of speech produc-
tion, two additional kinds of cognitive resource are in-
volved, neither of which would be required for the rhythm-
shadowing task. First, extralinguistic concepts have to be
recruited and combined together into a representation of
the message to be communicated; and second, commu-
nicative intentions have to be formed. In that case, speech-
shadowing might differentially disrupt performance be-
cause forming communicative intentions places greater de-
mands on working memory than do mere motor intentions,
and/or because the resources used for combining concepts
are otherwise occupied by shadowing, not because lan-
guage per se is the medium of intermodular integration.
Unfortunately for Samuels’s proposal, however, there is
no reason to think that speech shadowing uses the same
cognitive resources as does normal speech production, and
there is good reason to think that it doesn’t. First, when
shadowing speech, people don’t have any intention to com-
municate, so no communicative intentions need to be
formed. And second, because there isn’t any message to be
communicated either, there is no reason to think that ex-
tralinguistic concepts would have to be combined together
with one another.
It looks as if speech shadowing should only need to use
some sort of fast-track loop between phoneme perception
and phoneme production, indeed, bypassing the concep-
tual systems altogether. And the speed of speech shadowing
might seem to suggest that this is in fact the case. Speech
can be shadowed with latencies as small as 250 millisec-
onds, with subjects beginning to pronounce each phoneme
as soon as it has been perceived. Indeed, these were among
the data used by Fodor (1983) to argue for the modularity
of the language faculty, suggesting that such shadowing can
be carried out independently of conceptual thought.
Admittedly, there is evidence from instances of speech
repair that shadowers are sometimes influenced by syntac-
tic and semantic context, in cases where they are shadow-
ing speech that contains errors (or at any rate, this occurs
when they are concentrating exclusively on the shadowing
task; see Marslen-Wilson 1975).10 But given the speed with
which repair is conducted, it seems highly likely that the
syntactic and logical forms implicated are all of the “nar-
row” sort that are internal to the language faculty (see sect.
R1.5). In that case, it is unlikely that conceptual systems ex-
ternal to the language faculty of the sort that (on the ortho-
dox account) would be needed to solve the reorientation
task are being accessed.
R3.3. Do fish integrate across modules?
Vallortigara & Sovrano remind us of the fact that a range
of species other than humans and rats (specifically, mon-
keys, chickens, and fish) are able to solve the reorientation
task in the absence of language. Many researchers have
drawn from this fact the conclusion that integration of in-
formation across the relevant modules can’t, therefore, be
dependent on language.
In the target article I pointed out that this conclusion is too
hasty, because sequential use of domain-specific information
would also be sufficient to solve the task. I suggested that the
practical reasoning system in fish, say, might be set up in such
a way as to embody the rule, “When disorientated, look for
landmark information first [e.g., red wall], and then geomet-
ric information second [e.g., long wall on left].” This would
generate the correct solution. In human children and rats, in
contrast, the rule would appear to be “When disorientated,
look for geometric information, period.”
Vallortigara & Sovrano acknowledge that this is an ab-
stract possibility; but they complain that it doesn’t appear to
be empirically testable. And they conclude that in such cir-
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cumstances my proposal would be a “supposed difference
[that] would not make any difference.” But this is far too
strong. Even if one thought that real theoretical differences
have to be testable in principle, it is quite another matter to
insist that they be testable now. And scientists frequently
articulate genuine theoretical contrasts that no one can see
how to test at the time.
What I do claim on behalf of my sequential-ordering pro-
posal is that it is theoretically well motivated. First, task-
analysis of what a practical reasoning system has to be able
to do suggests just such a picture (articulated briefly in sect.
R1.2). Given a goal, the practical reasoning system has to
be able to call up a sequence of conditional beliefs that will
guide the organism toward achieving that goal.
Second, consider the significance of the fact that human
children and rats are perfectly capable of using both geo-
metric and landmark information in other circumstances. If
the use of two forms of information in the same task means
that they are routinely integrated, in the way that Vallorti-
gara & Sovrano’s interpretation of their data implies, then
it would be puzzling why such integration should suddenly
become impossible under conditions of disorientation. If
we suppose that the information is only drawn on sequen-
tially, however, then it makes perfectly good sense that
some organisms might have an innate preference for just
one of these kinds of information when disoriented.
R3.4. Success in a dif ferent task
Varley & Siegal describe a piloted experiment in which
aphasic patients were tested on a version of the task just dis-
cussed, but with a scale model of a rectangular disorienta-
tion room being spun in front of the patient, rather than the
patient being disoriented in such a room. And they report
that all subjects were capable of solving the task, using both
geometric and landmark information in the absence of lan-
guage.
Unfortunately, this is just a different task, and no con-
clusions can be drawn. There is no reason to think that sub-
jects become disoriented in such circumstances. And there
are no data from rats or young children to suggest that the
task should be a difficult one. As I remarked in section R3.3,
we already know that rats and young children without lan-
guage can use both geometric and landmark information
when not disoriented; and I have just argued that sequen-
tial use of such information might be what enables fish and
chickens to solve the reorientation tasks. That may be how
the aphasic patients solve the spinning-model tasks, too.
R4. Competing claims for the involvement 
of language in thought
A number of commentators advance claims for the positive
involvement of language in thought that are inconsistent
with the main theoretical idea (central-module integration)
defended in the target article. These claims will be dis-
cussed in this section.
R4.1. No thought without language?
Gauker defends the traditional philosophical thesis that
there can be no conceptual thought without language. (This
also seems to be tentatively endorsed by de Villiers & de
Villiers as a generalization of their claims concerning
higher-order thought; see sect. R4.3) I claim, on the con-
trary, that there can be a great deal of conceptual thought
in the absence of language, namely, the outputs of the con-
ceptual modules and the inputs to practical reasoning.
Gauker proceeds by defining conceptual thought to
mean: having the capacity to represent a particular thing as
belonging to some general kind. He then tries to explain
away the behaviors that might seem to suggest that nonlin-
guistic animals have any such capacity (e.g., by appealing to
“elaborate mental movie making”). There is nothing wrong
with the definition; but the attempts at explaining away
limp badly, in my view.11
Gauker tries to explain animal capacities for categoriza-
tion in terms of an ability to discern similarities amongst
perceptual images. But this surely isn’t sufficient. All prey
species have the capacity to distinguish between predator
and nonpredator, for example. But if all such judgments
were made in terms of mere perceptual similarity, one
would expect warthogs and hyenas to be put together in one
category and lions in another.
Many social species (e.g., monkeys and apes) can recog-
nize individuals and are capable of tracking the changing
properties of those individuals. They behave appropriately
toward an individual depending on what happened at their
last encounter or depending on observed one-off encoun-
ters with others. Why this shouldn’t count as “representing
a particular thing as belonging to a general kind” escapes
me. And I have no idea how one might account for such
abilities in terms of sequences of sensory images, without
this tacitly amounting to the claim that the animals in ques-
tion engage in conceptual thought.12
R4.2. No of f-line thought without language?
In the target article I interpret Bickerton (1995) to be
claiming that all imaginative thinking that doesn’t simply re-
flect current or remembered circumstances requires lan-
guage. In his comment Bickerton corrects me, saying that
he had meant that language is the vehicle of genuinely cre-
ative thought, including the capacity to conceive of truly
novel objects or circumstances. With such a claim I can
agree. But I deny that language is sufficient for us actually
to entertain such thoughts. Rather, as pointed out in section
R1.4, I think that we need to postulate a distinct language-
dependent supposer, whose activities are honed in child-
hood through the disposition to engage in pretend play
(Carruthers 2002b).
Bickerton goes on to suggest that the capacities to en-
tertain conditional thoughts of the form, “If x then y,” and
to entertain causal thoughts of the form, “x because y,” are
dependent on language. With this I strongly disagree. It will
be the business of the conceptual modules (existing prior to
and independently of language) to generate such thoughts.
For example, the folk mechanics module can surely gener-
ate thoughts of the form, “The rock striking the core caused
the sharp edge.” And such thoughts would have been avail-
able to hominids long before the evolution of language. (In-
deed, rats, too, seem to be capable of causal thinking; see
Dickinson & Shanks 1995.)
On the model sketched in section R1.2, similarly, it is the
main business of all belief-forming modules to generate
conditional information for input to the practical reasoning
system. For example, a prelinguistic hominid engaged in a
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hunt might have needed some way to attract the attention
of a cohunter without alerting the prey. The theory of mind
module (or a precursor thereof) might have generated the
conditional, “If a pebble were to drop just in front of him,
it would attract his attention,” hence yielding an appropri-
ate plan (to throw a pebble). I see no reason to assume that
such routine planning should require language.
R4.3. No higher-order thought without language?
De Villiers & de Villiers present their claim that language
is the vehicle of higher-order thought, or thoughts about the
thoughts (e.g., the false beliefs) of another. I allow one as-
pect of this claim. Specifically, I allow that thought about
domain-integrating thoughts is dependent on language.
For if the very existence of such thoughts is dependent on
language, as I argue, then thoughts about them would have
to involve language, too. But I deny that language is neces-
sary for higher-order thought in general.
I make this denial, both because I think it very plausible
that the evolution of the language faculty would have pre-
supposed the prior existence of a capacity for higher-order
thought (Origgi & Sperber 2000), and because I think that
the experimental evidence supports it. Let me elaborate a
little on the latter point.
As de Villiers & de Villiers note, I appeal for support
to the experimental finding of Varley (1998), that a man
with severe agrammatic aphasia (and no mentalistic vocab-
ulary) was nevertheless easily able to solve the usual battery
of false-belief tasks (explained to him by pantomime; itself
an indicator of his sophistication in this domain). De Vil-
liers & de Villiers point out the possibility that he might
have deficits only of comprehension and production, how-
ever, leaving his underlying knowledge of LF intact. But, in
fact, his input and output deficits match one another very
precisely, suggesting a deficit in underlying competence.
And, indeed, brain scans show that he has lost the use of al-
most his entire left hemisphere!
The data that de Villiers & de Villiers cite in their own
support are that competence with verbs of communication
(e.g., “says that”) and verbs of thought (e.g., “believes that”)
predicts false-belief performance. But as Hale and Tager-
Flusberg (2003) point out, these data are confounded. That
competence with verbs of thought predicts competence
with false-belief might be because the requisite mental con-
cepts need to be in place first to understand those verbs,
rather than because those verbs are constitutive of thought
about thought.
Hale and Tager-Flusberg (2003) undertook their own
training study, coaching preschoolers on verbs of commu-
nication and on false belief. They found that training on
sentential complements did indeed boost false belief per-
formance, just as de Villiers & de Villiers would predict.
But they also found that training on false belief tasks
boosted performance, too, yet had no reciprocal influence
on language. This result counts strongly against their view.
Another recent study, by Woolfe et al. (2002), also counts
against the view that natural language syntax is crucially im-
plicated in mental state representation. It found that late-
signing deaf children were significantly weaker on a range
of theory of mind tasks, even when matched for syntactic
ability with a group of early-signing (and younger) deaf chil-
dren. (The two groups couldn’t be matched for ability with
sentential complements, because British Sign Language
has no sentential-complement construction!) Woolfe et al.
argue that exposure to and engagement in conversation
serves to boost theory of mind ability, rather than language
per se being directly implicated in theory of mind reason-
ing.
R4.4. Dual-process theories and language
Evans & Over discuss the relationship between the main
ideas of the target article and so-called dual process theo-
ries of the sort developed by themselves (1996), Reber
(1993), and Stanovich (1999). (Dual process theories are
also endorsed by Frankish and Nelson.) They find several
deep connections between the two approaches.
They object, however, to the modularism that forms an
important part of my approach. Although they allow that
implicit “System 1” processes are generally domain-spe-
cific, they assert that much of this sort of cognition results
from domain-general learning. But there is no reason why
a modularist should insist that all modules are innate, in
fact. We can allow that some modules are built in the course
of development (Karmiloff-Smith 1992). This will be cor-
rect if chess-playing skill counts as modular, for example
(possible), or if reading ability is so (very likely).
It is one thing to say that many implicit processes result
from learning, however (and I agree); to say that they result
from domain-general learning is quite another. For some
modules might be built through the operations of other
learning modules. And there might not really be any such
thing as “general learning,” anyway. For example, a strong
case has now been made that even classical conditioning is
best explained not as resulting from general associationist
processes, but rather as arising from the computations car-
ried by a specialized and innately structured foraging mod-
ule, which calculates rates of return from different activi-
ties (Gallistel 2000; Gallistel & Gibson 2001).
Moreover, although Evans & Over accept that explicit
System 2 thinking is closely related to language, they doubt
whether it is conducted in language, citing evidence for the
involvement of mental models in System 2 thinking. But
they forget that natural language sentences form only one
part of the overall process of explicit domain-integrative
thinking, on my account. And they forget that mental mod-
els play an important element in my own views, enabling
the natural language sentences that are being looped back
in inner speech to be cast in a form accessible to the vari-
ous conceptual modules once again.
I conclude, therefore, that the correspondence between
dual-process theories and the main claim defended in the
target article (the module-integrating role of language) may
be much closer than Evans & Over suggest.
R4.5. Language and connectionism
Clark and O’Brien & Opie put forward accounts of the
role of natural language in cognition from a connectionist
perspective.13 Both comments focus on the role of inner
speech in enabling different parts of the brain to commu-
nicate with one another and serving as a locus of attention
and memory.
This might be all well and good if connectionism were vi-
able as an overall model of cognition. But it isn’t, for the rea-
sons sketched in section R1.1. The successes of distributed
connectionist models have been restricted to various forms
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of pattern recognition and feature extraction. And insofar
as connectionist nets can approximate to anything resem-
bling systematic thought and one-off learning, it is only
through the imposition of an architecture that is tanta-
mount to symbol processing (Marcus 2001).
It might be suggested that it is interesting, at least, to see
that my thesis that language has an important cognitive
function can have a close analogue within such a different
theoretical framework. Well, yes, to a degree. But it isn’t
news that connectionism can find a place for natural lan-
guage in cognition. Such views have been proposed since
the early days of the movement (Rumelhart & McClelland
1986). And this is perhaps no accident, because natural lan-
guage structures provide connectionists with their only
means of approaching the serial and structured nature of
conceptual thought. What is news is that language can be
accorded a central role in the human mind within a frame-
work that is realist and representationalist about structured
thought and that is committed to a strongly modularist ac-
count of our overall mental architecture.
R4.6. Language as an invention for encoding platonic
meanings
Baumeister & Vohs deny that language evolved. Rather,
they claim, it was invented. But this ignores the very signifi-
cant body of evidence built up over the last half-century for
the thesis that humans have an innately structured natural
language faculty (for reviews, see Chomsky 1988; Laurence
& Margolis 2001; Pietroski & Crain 2001). Some such view
was taken for granted in the target article, and I stand by that.
According to Baumeister & Vohs, too, language is a tool
for processing meanings, where meanings are abstract,
mind-independent, platonic entities, discovered by humans
when their brains reached a certain level of sophistication.
In effect, this is just Popper’s (1959) “third realm” doctrine
all over again: (1) there is the physical world of objects and
physical processes, (2) there is the mental world of experi-
ences and ideas, and (3) there is the abstract world of prop-
ositions and meanings. The mental world is supposed 
somehow to “grasp” and make use of the abstract world in
representing the physical one (see also Frege 1918).
The consensus among naturalistically inclined philoso-
phers, however (once again for much of the last half-cen-
tury), is that Platonism of this sort places insuperable ob-
stacles in the way of achieving a scientific understanding of
mind (Papineau 1993). We have reasonable hopes of un-
derstanding how minds can represent the physical world by
being realized in computational processes in brains that en-
gage in the right sorts of causal commerce with that world
(Rey 1997). And abstract meanings might surely supervene
upon such processes. But we have no hope at all of under-
standing, in causal and scientifically acceptable terms, how
minds or brains might succeed in grasping elements of an
abstract mind-independent reality (“meanings”) directly,
through which they would then succeed in representing the
physical world.
R5. Supplementary claims for the involvement 
of language in thought
A number of commentators present proposals that are sup-
plementary to, and/or largely consistent with, the main the-
oretical idea (central-module integration) defended in the
target article. These proposals will be discussed in this sec-
tion.
R5.1. Language and concept formation
Both Hampton and Henser claim that natural language
lexical items serve as the vehicles of our more abstract con-
cepts, serving to chunk otherwise unwieldy amounts of data
into discrete and manipulable packages. This proposal
strikes me as plausible, to a degree, especially in connection
with concepts that have emerged out of many years of col-
lective labor by scientists, and that can only be acquired by
immersion in the relevant scientific theories, such as elec-
tron, neutrino, and DNA.
If Hampton and Henser intend their thesis to be very
much stronger than this, however, then it seems to me al-
most certain to be wrong, because of the phenomenon of
“fast mapping” (Bloom 2000). Children acquire lexical
items at such a prodigious rate that the only plausible ac-
count of how they do it is that they are mapping those items
onto previously existing nonlinguistic concepts, rather than
constructing a set of language-involving concepts from
scratch.
Xu introduces a fascinating body of data that suggest that
natural language kind-terms are “essence place-holders.”
As I understand it, the thesis is exclusively diachronic:
There is no suggestion that lexical items are constitutive of
possession of the corresponding concepts. Nor does the
thesis imply that language learning is the manner in which
children acquire many new concepts, I think. Rather, use of
kind-terms is taken by children to be evidence of the exis-
tence of an underlying essence to the kind. So the use of
kind-terms is what enables children to select from among
the wider set of concepts available to them the subset to
which they are going to attach a belief in an underlying
essence.
That children should possess some such disposition as
this makes good sense, on the assumption that the language
surrounding the child will embody the hard-earned wisdom
of the society as a whole, concerning those kinds in the en-
vironment (especially biological kinds) that can underpin
robust forms of inductive generalization. So in this sense, it
may be that to learn a language is to tap into the beliefs of
a culture (see also sect. R5.7).
R5.2. Conscious thinking and “inner speech”
Both Chater and Clark are happy to accede to one of the
subsidiary claims defended in my target article, namely,
that “inner speech” is constitutive of conscious proposi-
tional thinking. But each also puts forward a stronger the-
sis, namely, that this is the only way in which we can enter-
tain conscious propositional thoughts. Now as it happens,
this is a thesis I am inclined to endorse and have defended
elsewhere (Carruthers 1998b). But it requires a bit more
work to establish than either Chater or Clark seem to al-
low.
The problem is that, besides reporting the occurrence of
inner speech, many people also report engaging in pure
wordless (nonlinguistic, nonimagistic) conscious thinking
(Hurlburt 1990; 1993). So it needs to be argued somehow
that these reports are illusory. And as it turns out, the con-
fabulation data mentioned in section R2.3, which show that
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humans lack direct access to (most of) their thought
processes, can be deployed to plug this gap (Carruthers
1998b); but it does need to be plugged, to get the conclu-
sion that Chater and Clark both want.
Frankish, too, is happy to allow my claim that linguisti-
cally mediated thinking occurs consciously, in inner speech.
But he challenges my suggestion that such thinking might
also occur nonconsciously, through the manipulation of LF
representations alone, without any phonological component.
I grant Frankish that the evidence of nonconscious lin-
guistic thinking (e.g., the occurrence of “eureka thoughts”)
is far from conclusive. And the thesis isn’t one that I need
to place any weight on. But I still think that a case of sorts
can be made. In particular, the well-known phenomenon of
“sleeping on it” seems to me to support such a view. As we
all know, when stumped by some difficult (conscious and
linguistically formulated) problem, it often helps to sleep
on it, or to turn our conscious thinking to other matters.
And as a result, the solution sometimes just “comes” to us
on waking, or in the midst of thinking about something else.
These seem to be cases in which we can be confident that
no conscious thinking about the problem has been going on
in the interim (contra Frankish’s suggestion), which would
imply that the thinking in question has been nonconscious.
Frankish also argues that it is implausible to postulate
two feedback loops: a phonological one, for conscious lin-
guistic thinking; and an LF one, for nonconscious linguistic
thinking (citing the work of Levelt 1989 in his support). But,
actually, Levelt himself is committed to the existence of two
feedback loops: a phonological one, for on-line speech re-
pair; and a “message to be communicated” one, for moni-
toring one’s own speech intentions. So it is open to me to
claim either that this second loop runs on LF representa-
tions, or (more plausibly) that it can be exploited by LF rep-
resentations in such a way as to subserve nonconscious
module-integrating thinking.
In contrast, both Bickerton (in passing) and Slezak (at
length) seem to challenge the very coherence of the idea
that some thought might be conducted in inner speech.
Bickerton offers no arguments. But Slezak claims that I
have been seduced by the image of “hearing with the mind’s
ear” (cf. “seeing with the mind’s eye”). He claims that my
position commits me to endorsing one particular side of the
“imagery debate” (Kosslyn 1994; Pylyshyn 2002), and that
my account ends in incoherence as a result. There is much
that goes awry here.
First, there is nothing fundamentally incoherent in Koss-
lyn’s (1994) position on images. The claim that images are
like percepts (indeed, perhaps are percepts of a self-in-
duced sort), occupying the same cognitive resources as does
perception, is a perfectly sensible (albeit controversial) one.
And nothing about it need commit one to the idea of a lit-
tle homunculus who perceives the image (i.e., to the exis-
tence of some sort of pernicious and question-begging
“Cartesian Theatre”; see Dennett 1991). Rather, the idea is
that images will be consumed and interpreted in whatever
way perceptual states are consumed and interpreted.
Second, I don’t, in fact, need to come down on one side
or the other of the imagery debate. For my purposes, it mat-
ters little whether inner speech is relevantly like heard
speech, or whether it is realized in complex mentalese de-
scriptions of heard sentences instead. Either way, it can still
be the case that the states in question bear a semantic in-
terpretation. And either way, it can still be the case that cer-
tain kinds of cognitive process (namely, domain-integrative
processes) are dependent on their existence.
R5.3. Language and memory
Schrauf makes an interesting connection between the
main thesis of the target article and evidence of the role of
language in effortful cases of episodic memory building.
For episodic memories will often need to link narrative in-
formation across different modular domains, and there is
considerable evidence of the role of natural language in the
process of reconstructing such memories.
Especially intriguing is the evidence that bilinguals find
it easier to reconstruct a memory in the language that they
would have been using at the time of the original events. I
don’t think Schrauf ’s claim here is that memories are
stored in one natural language rather than another; instead,
it seems to be that there are associations of various sorts
created between the currently used language and the vari-
ous nonlinguistic components of episodic memory. This
seems very plausible.
Wynn & Coolidge complain that it would have been
helpful if my proposal had been compared with the model
of working memory developed by Baddeley (1986),14 and
they then proceed to provide a very useful comparison of
this sort for themselves. And I basically agree with their ac-
count of the connections between Baddeley’s views and my
own, including the role of the phonological loop, and their
suggestion that Baddeley’s central executive might be
equated with the sort of “virtual” executive that gets ap-
pealed to on my own proposal.
I also think that Wynn & Coolidge are right to stress the
importance of visual imagination (Baddeley’s “visuo-spatial
sketchpad”) in the coordination of complex skilled action,
as the work of Keller and Keller (1996) illustrates. I would
suggest that visual imagination is one of the main vehicles
of the sort of prelinguistic mental rehearsal discussed in
section R1.2, indeed. But I would claim that prelinguistic
visual imagery needs to be driven by the outputs of specific
conceptual modules and/or by the contents of the practical
reasoning module; and I would also claim that the process
of generating images that link together the outputs of dif-
ferent conceptual modules is dependent on language.
R5.4. Perspective taking and language
MacWhinney stresses the importance for central cognitive
processes of perspective taking in production and compre-
hension of discourse. It is this, he says, which enables lan-
guage to integrate information from many different parts of
the brain. Taken in one way, this might seem to be a com-
petitor to the hypothesis that it is sentences in LF that are
the vehicles of intermodular integration. And this might in-
deed be what MacWhinney has in mind, because he (like
Baumeister & Vohs) thinks that grammatical language is
a late human invention, rather than an aspect of our innate
human endowment (MacWhinney 2003). But if so, then the
account founders on the evidence of an innately structured
language faculty, as mentioned in section R4.6.
MacWhinney’s proposal might be better seen as an ac-
count of how mental models get built, I think; emphasizing
their role in the comprehension process especially. If so,
then it would emerge as a friendly supplement to my own
account. For I, too, have stressed the importance of men-
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tal-model building in the comprehension of language. And
it is this, in my view, that enables linguistic representations
in LF to be taken as input and consumed by the various con-
ceptual modules.
R5.5. Vygotskian processing
Both Frawley and Pléh rightly point out that there are
strong connections between my main thesis and the Vygot-
skian tradition in psychology and cognitive science. For
this, too, stresses the importance of language (specifically,
“silent speech”) not just in development but also in mature
cognition, especially when task demands increase. My in-
termodular integration proposal can be seen as one way of
fleshing out what “hard” amounts to in this context.15
Both Frawley and Pléh point out, as well, that the use
of inner speech in cognition isn’t hardwired (so to speak),
but is rather variable and opportunistic. With this, too, I
agree. On my account, distinctively human creative think-
ing arises out of the interaction of a range of hardwired sys-
tems that were selected for other purposes. (These include
a set of sophisticated conceptual modules for generating
beliefs and desires; a language module that both takes in-
puts from the conceptual modules and provides inputs to
them and that forms LF sentences integrating the outputs
of the conceptual modules; feedback loops for mental re-
hearsal, which routinely run the contents of intended ac-
tions back though the conceptual modules for further eval-
uation; and a set of principles of relevance and coherence
used in interpreting speech and evaluating the testimony of
others.) What then had to be added were a set of disposi-
tions: to generate novel linguistic contents as mere suppo-
sitions, for input to conceptual modules; to evaluate the
consequences of those suppositions as if they were testi-
mony; and to form explicit (language-involving) beliefs about
appropriate patterns of reasoning and decision making.
I would predict that these dispositions, while to some de-
gree universal amongst humans, are highly variable in their
strength. Indeed, they might constitute the main compo-
nents of the kind of “cognitive style” that Stanovich (1999)
argues is the major determinant of differential success in
batteries of reasoning tasks and measures of IQ.
R5.6. Weak Whorfianism
In the target article I was concessive about the powers of
different natural languages to sculpt cognition differently
during development. And Slobin points out that, in the
light of Levinson’s results concerning the ways in which
space is handled differently in different natural languages
(Levinson 1996; 1997; 2002), I am therefore not entitled 
to assume that concepts such as long wall on the left will 
be cross-culturally available, existing prelinguistically and
awaiting translation into language.16
Now, in one respect this is quite right. I very much doubt
that the output of the geometry module will include the
concepts of left and right. Acquiring the vocabulary of left
and right would surely be a great deal easier for children if
it did! So, in this respect the way in which I developed my
hypothesis was misleading. Rather, the output of the geom-
etry module might take the form, “The toy is at the corner
of this [diagram] shape,” which then has to be mapped la-
boriously into the language of left and right.
However, I now also believe that I may have been too
concessive toward the “language sculpts cognition” ap-
proach (as Atran, too, points out). Each set of data will have
to be examined on a case-by-case basis, of course. But in re-
spect of Levinson’s spatial results, Li and Gleitman (2002)
provide an elegant demonstration that those results would
seem to depend on the spatial cues that are salient in the
testing environment. (However, see Levinson et al. 2002,
for a vigorous reply.) Similarly, Papafragou et al. (2002)
conduct a test of Slobin’s (2002) claims concerning the ways
in which different encodings of manner of motion in differ-
ent languages will create patterns of attention that will lead,
in turn, to effects on nonverbal memory. They are unable
to find any such effects.
I think the jury is still out on the question whether lan-
guage sculpts cognition, then. Certainly the weak forms in
which this thesis is currently being pursued are consistent
with the strong modularism adopted in my target article
and also with my main thesis. But no such weak Whorfian
claims are supported or entailed by my views. And the em-
pirical data are still subject to a variety of interpretations.
Both Frawley and Henser claim that my view of the
cognitive role of LF commits me to some sort of synchronic
linguistic relativity thesis. They reason that if some thought
is conducted in natural language, then (because languages
differ in significant ways) people’s thought processes, too,
must differ in significant ways, depending on the language
in which their thoughts are entertained. Such a claim is
surely correct in respect of what Slobin (2002) calls “think-
ing for speaking.” For if your language requires you to en-
code manner of motion, then of course, you have to think
about manner in describing a motion event; and if your lan-
guage uses cardinal directions to describe space, then of
course, you will have to think in terms of such directions to
tell someone where something is. But it is another matter
to claim that speakers of different languages will differ in
their nonlinguistic thoughts. And as previously indicated, I
regard such claims as currently unproven.
Perhaps Frawley and Henser have in mind a stronger
thesis, however. Perhaps their idea is that, by virtue of
speaking different languages, certain thoughts will be inac-
cessible to one group of speakers that are available to the
other. But it is highly controversial to claim that languages
differ in their expressive powers. Indeed, the working hy-
pothesis adopted by most linguists in the Chomskian tra-
dition is that, at the deepest level, the LFs of any language
are determined by UG (universal grammar) together with
the relevant lexicon and parameter settings (Higginbotham
1995; Hornstein 1995). And it is generally assumed that
there is no incommensurability between languages in re-
spect of the thoughts that they can carry. (See Baker 2002
for extended and detailed discussion.)
R5.7. Language and the transmission of culture
A number of commentators stress the importance of lan-
guage in the generation and transmission of culture (Bau-
meister & Vohs, Bryson, Hampton, Pléh). I agree en-
tirely. I didn’t emphasize this in the target article, because
my focus was on the synchronic cognitive functions of lan-
guage. But nothing that I said was intended to be inconsis-
tent with it.
Of course, language is the primary means by which we
construct and communicate elements of culture, and it is
also the primary means by which cultures are transmitted
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from one generation to the next, whether informally, through
gossip and narrative, or formally, through education and
training. And as Baumeister & Vohs point out, language
is the vehicle for multigenerational accumulation and trans-
mission of knowledge. Moreover, it is through language that
most social processes are conducted and negotiated. And as
Hampton highlights, too, language is crucial for the devel-
opment of socially shared, explicit, logical, and scientific
thinking. There is nothing here that I should want to dis-
agree with.
R.6. Conclusion
Modular models of mind are well motivated by the need to
understand mental processes as computationally realized.
But such models give rise to a problem: namely, to com-
prehend how flexible and creative human cognition could
emerge out of the interactions of a set of modular compo-
nents. The main thesis of the target article (that the lan-
guage module serves to conjoin the contents of a suite of
conceptual modules) is one aspect of a solution to that prob-
lem. And both that thesis and the evidence for it have, I be-
lieve, survived the commentary process clarified and fur-
ther elaborated, but essentially undamaged.
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NOTES
1. In a way, Fodor doesn’t deny either of the premises in this
argument; nor does he deny that the conclusion follows. Rather,
he believes that we have independent reasons to think that the
conclusion is false; and he believes that we cannot even begin to
see how amodular processes could be computationally realized. So
he thinks that we had better give up attempting to do computa-
tional psychology (in respect of central cognition) for the foresee-
able future. Fortunately, however, Fodor’s reasons for thinking
that central cognition is holistic in character are poor ones. For
they depend on the assumption that scientific enquiry (social and
public though it is) forms a useful model for the processes of in-
dividual cognition; and this supposition turns out to be incorrect
(Carruthers 2003; but see also sect. R1.4 for discussion of a related
problem for mental modularity).
2. A similar point holds in respect of the outputs of a module.
Although we might expect that many modules will pass on their
output to a quite restricted range of other systems, this is by no
means mandatory. And the visual module, for example, would ap-
pear to make its outputs available to all central belief and desire-
forming modules, as well as to the practical reasoning system to
underpin indexical planning, in such a way as to ground thoughts
of the form, “I’ll go that way.”
3. And incidentally, in claiming that thoughts are discrete
structured states, I by no means intend to claim that all mental
states share the same character. In particular, I believe that many
perceptual states and processes are analog or continuous, rather
than discrete (Carruthers 2000), just as Dale & Spivey assert. Of
course there is a use of “thought” in which percepts can be de-
scribed as “thoughts”; but this wasn’t the usage I adopted in the
target article. For me, thoughts are conceptualized propositional
states, such as beliefs, judgments, and desires.
4. What is presupposed here, however, is that the representa-
tions in the practical reasoning system are in the right format for
use in generating inputs to the various central-modular concep-
tual systems. This will be so if the practical reasoning system itself
operates through the manipulation of sensory images; or if it uses
conceptual structures which can exploit the same top-down sys-
tems deployed in the conceptualization of vision, in such a way as
to generate visual images with appropriate contents, which can
then be consumed by the central modules in the usual way. (I am
assuming that nothing here yet involves the generation of cross-
domain contents; that is supposed to depend on the activity of a
language faculty and a language-dependent supposer [see sect.
R1.4], to make their appearance rather later in evolution.) For
such modules would, of course, have been set up already in such
a way as to feed off perceptual outputs.
5. It is worth noting that a good deal of the evidence which
has been cited (controversially) in support of chimpanzee theory
of mind can also be used (much less controversially) to support
the claim that this species of great ape, at least, engages in men-
tal rehearsal. (I am quite prepared to believe that there is evi-
dence of mental rehearsal from outside the great-ape lineage,
too. But I shall not pursue the point here.) For example: A sub-
ordinate ape knows the location of some hidden food within an
enclosure, and from previous experience expects to be followed
by a dominant who will then take the food. So the subordinate
heads off in the other direction and begins to dig. When the dom-
inant pushes her aside and takes over the spot, she doubles back
and retrieves and quickly eats the food. Such examples are gen-
erally discussed as providing evidence that chimps can engage in
genuine (theory-of-mind involving) deception, that is, as show-
ing that the chimp is intending to induce a false belief in the mind
of another (Byrne 1995; Byrne & Whiten 1988), whereas critics
have responded that chimpanzees may just be very smart behav-
iorists (Povinelli 2000; Smith 1996). But either way, it seems that
the chimp must engage in mental rehearsal, predicting the ef-
fects of walking in the wrong direction and beginning to dig (the
dominant will follow and take over the digging) and discerning
the opportunities for hunger satisfaction that will then be af-
forded.
6. Note that on such an account the number module would be
a bit like the cheater-detection system investigated by Cosmides
& Tooby (1992). For the latter is supposed to operate on algo-
rithms defined over costs and benefits in an exchange, where these
can of course bridge other modular categories. A benefit can be a
physical item (a jewel), a biological item (a goat), something so-
cially defined (a wife), or something more psychological, like sym-
pathy.
7. In a related error, Molina complains that language cannot
be “the locus of thought” because thought organizes experience in
terms of objects, events, properties, relations, and so on, not in
terms of nouns, adjectives, and verbs. And he remarks (in in-
tended criticism of me) that the mapping from conceptual cate-
gory to syntactic category is many-to-many. I agree with these
points entirely. The thesis of the target article isn’t about concepts.
I accept that most concepts are prior to and independent of lan-
guage, indeed (in contrast with the view attributed to me by
Chater). Rather, it concerns only a limited kind of thinking and
reasoning (i.e., thinking that integrates the outputs of conceptual
modules).
8. Note that a prediction of this account is that children will be
capable of engaging in creative pretense only in respect of kinds
of thing or activity for which they have names in their emerging
vocabulary. I gather from Paul Harris (personal communication)
that there are no data from normal children which address this
question directly; and also from Michael Siegal (personal com-
munication) that those working with late-signing deaf children
haven’t yet addressed this question, either.
9. Samuels also criticizes (at length) my claim that Hermer
and Spelke’s (1996) correlational data “strongly suggest” that lan-
guage is implicated in cross-modular thought, on the grounds that
correlations aren’t evidence of causality. I agree with the latter
point, of course; but then “suggests” neither means nor implies “is
evidence of.” And I believe that correlational data do strongly sug-
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gest causality, in the following sense: They render a causal hy-
pothesis highly salient and a plausible candidate for further em-
pirical testing.
10. I have been unable to find any data that speak to the ques-
tion of whether subjects repair semantic errors while shadowing
speech when undertaking a concomitant task. But it should also be
noted that repairs aren’t especially common, even when speech
shadowing is the only task undertaken. Even the most common cat-
egory of repair in Marslen-Wilson (1975) – namely, alterations of
the third syllable of a semantically anomalous three-syllable word –
was only found in 32 out of a total available 130 instances; and for
most other categories of repair the proportions were much lower.
11. Note that Gauker could have defined conceptual thought
in such a way as to warrant his conclusion. For example, on some
construals of the Generality Constraint on concept-possession de-
fended by Evans (1982), it might be required that thinkers should
be capable of combining any concept together with any other con-
cept into a single thought, to qualify as thinking conceptually. And
then on my own account, too, nonlinguistic animals and prelin-
guistic children wouldn’t count as engaging in conceptual thought.
I just don’t think that this would be a well-motivated definition of
what it takes to think conceptually.
12. Recall that the vehicles of structured thoughts don’t have
to look much like sentences, on my view. So depending on the
properties of the images in question and the manner of their ma-
nipulation, Gauker’s idea might amount to the claim that animals
(like humans, for much of the time) think through the exploitation
of mental models. But a mental model can still be a conceptual
thought.
13. In the case of Clark the connectionist framework is made
explicit; in O’Brien & Opie it is largely hidden – but see O’Brien
& Opie (2002) from which their comment is largely drawn.
14. Here I plead guilty. But let me say in mitigation that I did
provide an extended comparison between Baddeley’s views and
the theory I was then developing (admittedly, not at that stage for-
mulated in terms of modularity) in the final chapter of Carruthers
(1996).
15. Of course, processing will also be hard which requires us
to extend or correct the resources of just a single module, such as
our folk-mechanics system. And processing will be especially hard
where we are required, not just to conjoin contents from distinct
modules, but to integrate those contents into a single system that
may violate the assumptions made by one or another module; ar-
guably this is the difficulty we face when we attempt to be physi-
calists about the mind. (This answers a question raised by Hamp-
ton.)
16. And note that if Slobin is right that there are languages
that contain no equivalents of “left” and “right” (and no other
means of linguistically representing egocentric spatial relations),
then my prediction would be that such people will be incapable of
solving the Spelke reorientation tasks. For under conditions of dis-
orientation, absolute directions will no longer be available to
them. So they will lack any way of combining landmark cues with
the necessary spatial information in language.
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